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Preface
The licensing of occupations has a long and varied history. Among the 
oldest evidence of rules governing occupations is the existence of the Baby-
lonian Code of Hammurabi, dating to around 1780 BCE. This body of codes 
stipulated both the fees patients were to pay for medical services and the pun-
ishments practitioners were subject to for negligent treatment. The medieval 
guilds of Europe form perhaps the most often-cited example of the imposition 
of tough restrictions on entering a craft or occupation. In the United States, 
through much of the nineteenth century, few restrictions were imposed on oc-
cupations that we normally think of as licensed, such as doctors or lawyers. 
During the past 50 years, however, with the increase in complexity of jobs, 
especially in the service sector, the licensing of individuals in these occupa-
tions has emerged as one of the fastest-growing labor market institutions in the 
United States and other industrialized nations.
Academics and policymakers have examined whether workers, consum-
ers,	practitioners,	or	 society	benefits	 from	 the	 regulation	of	occupations.	As	
other labor market institutions such as unions have declined as a percentage 
of the workforce, the new guilds (as some have called licensed occupations) 
have grown. In this book, I attempt to answer some of the following questions: 
Why is occupational licensing a growing labor market institution? Who gains 
from this form of regulation? Do members of the occupation receive higher 
prices and earnings for their services as a result of regulation? Is the quality of 
service to consumers enhanced through the additional training and scrutiny of 
practitioners that licensing requires? Does the impact of licensing in the United 
States	differ	from	that	in	Europe?	Are	there	net	economic	benefits	to	occupa-
tional licensing? Why are practitioners often the driving force behind occupa-
tional regulation? Are there policy alternatives to occupational licensing?
The	answers	to	these	difficult	questions	are	not	made	easier	by	the	large	
amount of published material from economics, political science, history, law, 
psychology, and sociology on these topics. Although this book touches on all 
the disciplines that have delved into the topic of occupational licensing, its 
focus is on policy analysis, using economics and statistical methods. The book 
attempts	 to	 present	 a	 systematic	 discussion	 of	 the	major	 benefits	 and	 costs	
of occupational licensing to the economies of the United States and several 
European countries. It follows that the reader must bring some knowledge of 
economics and statistics to the analysis of the topic. The general reader with-
out	this	background	will	have	no	difficulty	getting	through	the	major	portions	
of the book. Nevertheless, in places, I have brought in specialized material 
and directed the exposition to the specialist in economics and policy analysis. 
xiii
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Here the general reader may feel like a guest at a family party. When, after po-
lite general conversation, the family turns to narrow, immediate concerns, the 
guest is left out of the loop of conversation. At such places, the reader should 
judiciously push on, since the key elements of the book can be understood 
without a technical background. 
Morris M. Kleiner
xiv
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Introduction and Overview 
Dentists, doctors, lawyers, fortune tellers, and frog farmers are now 
licensed occupations in either all or some U.S. states.1 During the early 
1950s, only about 4.5 percent of the labor force was covered by licens-
ing laws at the state level. That number had grown to almost 18 percent 
of the U.S. workforce in the late 1980s, with an even larger number if 
city and county licenses for occupations are included (Kleiner 1990). 
The number and percent of licensed occupations has continued to grow. 
Data from the Labor Market Information Survey and the 2000 census 
showed that the number of workers in occupations licensed by states in 
2000 grew by 11 percent during the past 15 years to approximately 20 
percent of the workforce.2
The	reasons	given	for	the	growth	and	benefits	of	this	form	of	regu-
lation usually include the idea that existence of licenses may minimize 
consumer uncertainty over the quality of the licensed service and in-
crease the overall demand for the service (Arrow 1971). However, in 
some cases, poor quality has larger social implications. A doctor who 
makes a bad diagnosis may cause a widespread epidemic. A boilermak-
er	who	installs	a	furnace	incorrectly	may	cause	a	building	to	catch	fire,	
which could result in the death of many people. In this sense, regula-
tions that require a practitioner to be trained at a minimum level may 
produce positive social payoffs. Consumers often value the reduction in 
downside	risk	more	than	they	value	the	benefits	of	a	positive	outcome.	
This consumer preference for the reduction of the risk of a highly nega-
tive outcome has been called “loss aversion” by Kahneman and Tver-
sky (1979). 
The general issue of licensing is often thought of in the context of 
most people’s general experience with getting a driver’s license (Cam-
erer et al. 2003). In the case of driver’s licenses, there are generally no 
supply	limits	that	may	drive	up	the	benefits	to	a	group	of	citizens,	and	
the tests and requirements for the license are generally low. Most peo-
ple would argue that driver’s licenses are a good idea because a person 
cannot control who is driving on the road next to them and would like 
Kleiner.indb   1 1/9/2006   2:44:30 PM
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some assurance that the other individuals on the road are at least mini-
mally competent. In contrast with licensing drivers, the entry costs of 
occupational licensing are generally high. Many years of schooling are 
often required, as are classes focused on professional training and tests 
that	are	often	difficult	to	pass	and	given	infrequently.	Moreover,	in	the	
case of regulated occupations (e.g., doctors, dentists, and cosmetolo-
gists), the consumer has the ability to choose a service based on the per-
ceived quality and service price but no ability to choose an unregulated 
practitioner. Whereas motor vehicle licensing has few costs and many 
benefits,	 the	 licensing	of	occupations	 is	often	perceived	as	providing	
few	benefits	to	consumers	and	possibly	imposing	large	costs.
A recurring issue for the public, policymakers, and economists has 
been deciding how government regulation of occupations impacts who 
works and how the work should be conducted. Usually such regula-
tions require some demonstration of a minimum degree of competency 
to serve the public, and they specify a means to address negligence 
by service providers. Overall, these requirements are intended to have 
beneficial	 effects	 for	 consumers	by	 increasing	 the	quality	of	 service.	
Individuals in these regulated occupations gain standardized work re-
quirements and an increased demand for their services. This book ex-
amines the impact of occupational licensing on who gets to work in the 
licensed occupations. It focuses on the question of whether this labor 
market institution results in consumers receiving higher-quality servic-
es, as well as if there are enhanced earnings for practitioners and higher 
prices for consumers. The book presents new analysis and evidence on 
the productivity effects of licensing while detailing its price and labor 
market impacts. The evaluation of licensing focuses on the labor mar-
ket impacts on the earnings and employment of regulated practitioners 
relative to similar unregulated practitioners. The data examined use in-
formation on licensing in the United States and give some comparisons 
for several of the larger nations in the European Union (EU), namely 
France, Germany, and the United Kingdom (UK). Policy options for 
regulating	occupations	in	light	of	the	findings	are	presented	in	the	final	
chapter. 
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LICEnSIng: A HISTORICAL PERSPECTIvE
The study of the regulation of occupations has a long and distin-
guished tradition in the study of the labor market. Licensing was dis-
cussed by Adam Smith in the Wealth of Nations, where he focuses on 
the ability of the crafts to lengthen apprenticeship programs and limit 
the number of apprentices per master, thereby ensuring higher earnings 
for persons in these occupations (Smith 1937, Book I, Chapter 10, Part 
II). A part of Milton Friedman’s dissertation focused on licensing, and 
he collaborated with fellow Nobel Laureate Simon Kuznets to coauthor 
Income from Independent Professional Practice, which examined the 
impact of licensing in the medical profession and compared it to li-
censing in the dental profession (Friedman and Kuznets 1945). During 
the 1960s the National Bureau of Economic Research’s Aspects of La-
bor Economics, which presented the major works and important issues 
in labor economics, had a study of licensing as its lead article (Lewis 
1962). In 1980 the American Enterprise Institute published Occupa-
tional Licensure and Regulation, which concluded with an assessment 
that occupational regulation had a positive effect on practitioners, but 
that it had a negative impact on consumers (Rottenberg 1980).  
Recently there have been few studies detailing the effects of oc-
cupational licensing. Perhaps this lack of recent analysis is because the 
topic lies at the intersection of labor economics, law, and industrial or-
ganization	and	 thus	does	not	fit	 easily	within	one	of	 the	 subfields	of	
the social sciences as they have evolved. The reason for the lack of 
study is not because occupational licensing is on the decline. Using 
data from the census, Table 1.1 shows that, for the period 1990–2000, 
some of the largest licensed occupations (accountants, doctors, dentists, 
elementary school teachers, secondary school teachers, lawyers, and 
cosmetologists) showed considerable variation in employment growth. 
For example, the labor force grew by 13.2 percent over the decade, 
the number of doctors grew by 23.6 percent, and the number of law-
yers grew by more than 24 percent. In contrast, the number of dentists 
and hairdressers and cosmetologists remained constant even though the 
U.S. population grew. 
Consistent with general growth in wage inequality over the period, 
the greatest wage growth occurred in licensed occupations with the 
Kleiner.indb   3 1/9/2006   2:44:30 PM
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Table 1.1  Employment and Wages (in nominal dollars) in Major Licensed Occupations, 1990–2000
SOURCE: Employment and earnings are estimated from the 5% sample of the U.S. Census of Population. Employment estimates are 
from Scopp (2003, Table 9).
Employment Hourly wage ($) Hourly earnings ($)
1990 2000 % change 1990 2000 % change 1990 2000 % change
Accountants 1,488,481 1,762,729 18.4 14.64 22.06 50.7 17.65 25.00 41.7
Doctors 571,320 705,960 23.6 34.10 58.23 70.8 47.91 70.96 48.1
Dentists 155,529 155,715 0.1 24.22 46.66 92.6 48.93 86.90 77.6
Elementary 
school teachers
3,105,603 3,125,320 0.6 16.28 22.07 35.6 16.50 22.47 36.2
Secondary school 
teachers
494,326 772,462 56.3 17.14 23.57 37.6 17.50 24.01 37.2
Lawyers 697,272 871,116 24.9 22.97 36.50 58.9 36.95 51.76 40.1
Hairdressers and 
cosmetologists
661,773 667,365 0.8 5.59 7.79 39.3 8.78 13.08 48.9
U.S. labor force 191,829,270 217,168,077 13.2 11.91 17.53 47.1 13.34 19.35 45.1
K
leiner.indb   4
1/9/2006   2:44:30 PM
Introduction and Overview  5
highest levels of income. Wage growth in the U.S. economy was 47.1 
percent, and hourly earnings growth was 45.1 percent in nominal val-
ues from 1990 to 2000. Table 1.1 presents growth in both wages and 
earnings.	There	are	substantial	bonuses	and	profit	sharing	from	being	
involved in private practices in some occupations (e.g., lawyers, physi-
cians, and dentists), and tips and private business revenues are a substan-
tial part of the economic returns for cosmetologists. Growth in hourly 
wages was 92.6 percent for dentists and more than 70 percent for physi-
cians. It is interesting to observe that the supply of dentists remained 
constant over the decade, but that the number of doctors increased. Un-
like the decline in the number of doctors and their wage growth relative 
to dentists during the 1930s (Friedman and Kuznets 1945), the hourly 
earnings	of	dentists,	when	profit	sharing,	dividends,	and	other	income	
from their practice are taken into account, were higher than they were 
for physicians by 2000. The relatively lower-wage occupations shown 
in Table 1.1, like cosmetologists and teachers, saw the smallest wage 
growth (between 35.6 and 39.3 percent) during the 1990s. However, 
when hourly earnings are included, which include other business in-
come, cosmetologists’ earnings growth was slightly higher than those 
of accountants. Regulated occupations followed national patterns of 
growing inequality of earnings by having the highest-wage occupations 
in 1990 showing the largest wage growth, but lower-wage occupations 
had smaller wage growth than national averages.
From a public policy perspective, all states have enacted licensing 
of some occupations. Tabulations by the Council of State Government’s 
affiliated	Council	on	Licensure	Enforcement	and	Regulation	(CLEAR)	
show that more than 800 occupations are licensed in at least one state, 
but about 50 occupations are licensed in all states (Berry 1986; CLEAR 
2004). The path toward licensing usually includes initially becoming 
either	certified	or	registered,	but	hardly	ever	does	an	occupation	move	
from	licensing	to	certification	where	others	legally	can	do	the	work	of	
certified	practitioners.	The	occupation	with	the	largest	number	of	indi-
viduals in the profession is public school teachers; from 1984 to 1998, 
26	states	instituted	state	exams	for	entering	teaching	for	the	first	time.	
Most state legislatures have hearings during each session dealing with 
questions of the licensing of occupations. Recently, the Federal Trade 
Commission (FTC) and the U.S. Justice Department had hearings on 
the effect of occupational licensing practices on reducing competition 
Kleiner.indb   5 1/9/2006   2:44:30 PM
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on Internet transactions and on competition in health care (Kleiner 
2002, 2003). An analysis of income inequality in the United States has 
shown that being in an occupation—not just educational attainment—is 
an important determinant of growing relative wage differences among 
workers (Eckstein and Nagypal 2004). Consequently, barriers to en-
try into these regulated and high-income occupations, regardless of 
whether they are licensed, may provide an additional explanation for 
the growth of income inequality in the United States. 
Among universally licensed occupations there are institutional, ad-
ministrative,	and	legal	factors	that	are	likely	to	influence	entry	into	an	
occupation within a state. These are generally perceived to be statutory 
as well as administrative constraints such as examination requirements 
that impact labor supply and subsequently earnings (Kleiner 2000). 
Statutory factors at the state level generally include education for gen-
eral	training,	which	is	defined	as	years	of	high	school	and	college	edu-
cation,	and	occupation-specific	years	of	schooling	that	include	years	of	
professional	or	trade	school.	Further	measures	include	specific	require-
ments for good moral character, citizenship, residency in the state for 
specific	periods	of	 time,	recommendations	from	current	practitioners,	
and tests for competency. States can vary in the stringency with which 
they each set the requirements for practicing in an occupation. 
A further set of requirements is established for individuals who at-
tempt to move to the state from elsewhere. These requirements gener-
ally	include	similar	general	and	specific	statutory	requirements	to	those	
entering the occupation but with several notable exceptions, including 
retaking	certain	 specific	parts	of	 the	original	 licensing	exam	 to	enter	
the occupation. Often this also includes working with a licensed prac-
titioner to ensure the out-of-state applicant follows current state proce-
dures. States, however, can establish virtual “treaties” with other states 
to allow them to accept each other’s licensed practitioners without ad-
ditional education or tests. The statutes and agreements with other po-
litical entities vary from accepting any out-of-state applicant who has 
a valid license at one end of a continuum to acceptance of applicants if 
they meet the entry requirements in force at the time of initial licensure 
(Kleiner, Gay, and Greene 1982; Tenn 2001). State entry requirements 
vary a great deal both across and within occupations in how they allow 
licensed practitioners from other states or countries to enter and work 
within their political jurisdictions.
Kleiner.indb   6 1/9/2006   2:44:31 PM
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Beyond the statutory factors, each state can establish its own pass 
rate for entering the occupation even when they use a national standard-
ized test. The pass rate on the same exam can be higher in California 
than in North Dakota. Individuals considering entering an occupation 
in a state may decide not to move to a state when the pass rate is low. 
This	reflects	the	fact	that,	for	most	licensed	individuals	choosing	a	state	
in which to locate, initial failure on an exam would result in more study 
time, lower incomes, and retaking the test. 
SOCIAL BEnEFITS OF LICEnSIng 
The previous sections have documented the growth and importance 
of licensing as an institution, but they do not discuss how licensing may 
impact	society.	The	main	benefit	usually	cited	for	occupational	licensing	
is improving the quality of services received. Licensing creates greater 
incentives	for	individuals	to	invest	in	more	occupation-specific	human	
capital because they will be able to recoup the full returns on their in-
vestment if they do not need to face low-quality substitutes for their 
services (Akerlof 1970; Shapiro 1986). Under these conditions, some 
sectors of the market segmented by income or price for the services 
may	benefit	more	than	others,	which	is	what	Shapiro	calls	a	“separating	
equilibrium.” 
Economists often look at next best solutions that may provide great-
er	choice	for	both	practitioners	and	consumers.	In	this	case	certification	
may	provide	many	of	the	same	benefits	as	licensing	without	the	costs	of	
restricting the supply of practitioners or limiting choice for consumers. 
Licensing	 is	 contrasted	with	 certification	 because,	 with	 certification,	
any person can perform the relevant tasks, but the government or gener-
ally	another	nonprofit	agency	administers	an	examination	and	certifies	
those	who	have	passed,	as	well	as	identifies	the	level	of	skill	and	knowl-
edge	for	certification.	For	example,	travel	agents	and	car	mechanics	are	
among	the	more	than	65	occupations	that	are	generally	certified	but	not	
licensed (Cox and Foster 1990; Rottenberg 1980). Skeptics of licensing 
point out that the empirical evidence on the increase in quality, greater 
training, or avoidance of catastrophes is usually thin or nonexistent. 
They	argue	that	if	a	signal	of	quality	is	important,	certification	is	a	bet-
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ter way of accomplishing the goal than occupational licensing. More-
over,	many	of	the	skeptics	would	suggest	that	any	remaining	beneficial	
effects of occupational licensing are more than offset by the monopoly 
effects of the restriction of supply of practitioners. 
QUALITy AnD DEMAnD EFFECTS OF  
OCCUPATIOnAL REgULATIOn 
The	major	public	policy	justification	for	occupational	licensing	lies	
in its role in improving quality of service rendered and, consequently, in 
generating consumer demand for the service. Licensing is expected to 
improve quality by setting initial entry requirements in the occupation. 
These generally include residency requirements, letters from current 
practitioners regarding good moral character, citizenship, general edu-
cation,	occupation-specific	training	levels,	and	scores	on	specific	tests.	
States and local governments can also change pass rates to mirror rela-
tive supply and demand conditions for the service. For example, when 
there is perceived to be an oversupply in the occupation, the regulatory 
board can raise the test scores required to pass the exam thus reducing 
the number of new entrants (Maurizi 1974; Kleiner 1990).
The consequence of these regulatory practices is a reduction in the 
flow	 of	 entrants	 into	 the	 occupation,	which	 can	 have	 several	 effects	
on quality. The average quality of service provided increases as less-
competent providers of the service are prevented from entering the oc-
cupation. Moreover, persons in regulated jobs may think that they can 
capture	additional	 returns	 to	 their	occupation-specific	 training,	which	
may increase the overall competency of the persons in the occupation. 
However, prices and wages will rise as the result of restricting the num-
ber of practitioners, which is expected to reduce quality received by 
consumers. This would occur as certain low-income consumers would 
not receive any service due to rising prices. As with any production 
relationship, other factors such as capital or technology may also con-
tribute to the overall quality of service outputs. 
Because of these different factors of price and restricting supply of 
lower-skilled applicants, the effect of regulation on the level of service 
quality is uncertain. However, changes in technology for service deliv-
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ery or increases in the amount of capital available may change the im-
pacts of regulation on outcomes. It is impossible on theoretical grounds 
to determine whether more intense regulation will increase or decrease 
the quality of the service provided. 
The countervailing forces of the effect of occupational licensing 
on quality carry over into the ambiguity about the effect of licensing 
on the quantity of the service demanded. The assumption is that the 
higher price should discourage consumption of the service. However, 
higher (or less-variable) quality may lead to an increased demand for 
the service by consumers. Moreover, one additional question is whether 
all	consumers	benefit	from	this	increase	in	quality	or	if	there	are	also	
distributional impacts as well.
Developing empirical evidence on these issues of quality and de-
mand	is	difficult.	Typically,	direct	observations	or	estimates	of	the	qual-
ity of a service (e.g., the quality of a dental visit) are not available. 
For many licensed occupations, like barbers and cosmetologists, it is 
not clear how one would measure quality. Perhaps measures of outputs 
such as customer satisfaction, complaints to state licensing boards, or 
liability insurance rates may serve as adequate proxies. 
An alternative approach is to examine the “productivity effects of 
licensing” by examining actual outputs (Carroll and Gaston 1981). For 
dentistry, Kleiner and Kudrle (2000) examined the records of U.S. Air 
Force recruits who were from different states and for whom there were 
individual records over their lifetimes. They found little statistical sup-
port for the role of tougher licensing measured either through charac-
teristics of state licensing statutes or through pass rates on measures of 
dental health. Further examinations of the impact of occupational regu-
lation on malpractice insurance rates or complaints to state licensing 
boards also found few effects of tougher regulations. However, they did 
find	a	positive	impact	of	licensing	on	the	prices	of	some	dental	services	
as well as on the hourly earnings of dentists. 
LICEnSIng OCCUPATIOnS AnD LABOR SUPPLy 
The dominant view among economists is that occupational licens-
ing restricts the supply of labor to the occupation and thereby drives up 
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the price of labor and of services rendered (Rottenberg 1980). State-
regulated occupations can use political institutions such as state legis-
latures or city councils to control initial entry and in-migration, thereby 
restricting supply and raising the wages of licensed practitioners. There 
is assumed to be a “once and for all” income gain that accrues to cur-
rent members of the occupation who are “grandparented” in and do not 
have to meet the newly established standard (Perloff 1980). Individuals 
who attempt to enter the occupation in the future will need to balance 
the	economic	rents	of	the	field’s	increased	monopoly	power	against	the	
greater	difficulty	of	meeting	the	entrance	requirements.	
Once an occupation is regulated, members of that occupation in a 
geographic or political jurisdiction can implement tougher statutes or 
examination pass rates and may achieve an economic gain relative to 
those who have easier requirements by further restricting the supply 
of labor and obtaining economic rents for incumbents (Kleiner 1990). 
Restrictions could include lowering the pass rate on licensing exams, 
imposing	 higher	 general	 and	 specific	 requirements,	 and	 implement-
ing tougher residency requirements that limit new arrivals in the area 
from	qualifying	for	a	license.	Moreover,	individuals	who	have	finished	
schooling in the occupation may decide not to go to a particular politi-
cal jurisdiction where the pass rate is low because both the economic 
and shame costs may be high (Kandel and Lazear 1992). Of course, an 
individual	who	takes	a	test	in	Mississippi	may	have	different	qualifica-
tions and abilities than someone in California. Consequently, any analy-
sis of pass-rate effects needs to be tempered with some controls for the 
academic quality of the test takers both across states and over time. One 
additional effect of licensing is that individuals who are not allowed to 
practice in an occupation as a consequence of regulation may then enter 
an unlicensed occupation, shifting the supply curve outward and driv-
ing down wages in these unregulated occupations. 
The costs of failing an exam required by the state can be quite high. 
For example, the present value cost of failing the exam in dentistry is 
estimated to be about $54,000 in 1997 dollars when reduced earnings 
growth, lost experience, and nominal earnings growth differences are 
accounted for over time (Kleiner and Kudrle 2000). Long residency 
requirements	or	the	necessity	of	retaking	new	state-specific	parts	of	a	
licensing exam further impede geographic mobility across states or lo-
cal jurisdictions (Kleiner, Gay, and Greene 1982). For example, states 
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like Florida, Arizona, Hawaii, and California have traditionally had lon-
ger continuous residency requirements for many regulated occupations, 
presumably to keep persons from states with more inclement weather 
during winter months from moving to the state and working in the oc-
cupation. Other states focus on unique parts of an occupation, such as 
the	“gold	 foil”	method	of	filling	 teeth,	which	was	used	 in	California	
and was only examined within that state’s licensing exam. Out-of-state 
applicants were required to learn this unique procedure to pass the Cali-
fornia exam.
ARE THERE LICEnSIng WAgE AnD PRICE PREMIUMS? 
The analysis provided in this book will examine wage premiums 
as a consequence of licensing by focusing on two questions. First, do 
licensed occupations have higher earnings as a consequence of govern-
ment regulations in comparison to other similar unregulated occupa-
tions? Second, when changes occur among licensed occupations, do 
they have labor market consequences? 
To	examine	 the	first	question	of	whether	 there	 is	 a	wage	gap	 for	
licensed occupations, I estimate how much regulated workers would 
make if they were not regulated. This methodology entails holding con-
stant human capital characteristics such as education and experience to 
determine whether individuals in licensed occupations are more likely 
to have higher earnings than persons in unlicensed occupations. This 
approach assumes that the earnings difference is attributable to licens-
ing and that there is not much spillover from the licensed to the unli-
censed occupations. Also, individuals with greater unobserved ability 
may choose to enter a licensed occupation where the economic returns 
are greater, rather than occupations that require similar aptitude but are 
unregulated. Given the large queue of persons wishing to enter these 
regulated occupations, part of the returns to licensed occupations may 
be the higher-quality labor market abilities of persons in regulated oc-
cupations, which consumers in turn see as raising the quality of service 
in these areas. 
Economists generally accept that licensing is a way of limiting 
competition since they argue that licenses limit labor supply, often quite 
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explicitly through varying the pass rates and statutory regulations on 
residency requirements. As a result of this restriction in labor supply, 
prices and wages rise. For example, the number of dentists has declined 
and their earnings relative to doctors has risen. Moreover, economists 
have	often	argued	that	certification,	such	as	granting	degrees	in	the	area	
of expertise, could easily assure minimum quality with less impact on 
supply.
COMPARIng UnIOnS AnD LICEnSIng 
Figure 1.1 shows the trends in both union and licensing coverage 
from 1950 through the early 2000s. Whereas union membership and 
coverage has declined from the mid-1950s from almost 35 percent to 
12.5 percent, the opposite is true for the coverage of occupational li-
censing, which has gone from about 4.5 percent in the 1950s to more 
than 20 percent after 2000. Nevertheless, when an occupation becomes 
regulated, there are some similarities to union limitations on entry at 
the	firm	level	(Freeman	and	Medoff	1984).	Where	management	agrees	
to a union shop provision as part of a collective bargaining agreement, 
generally only members of the union can be employed at that workplace 
to do certain tasks. This presumably increases the economic leverage of 
the union and also may contribute to the more than 20 percent premi-
um	received	by	the	average	union	member	(Blanchflower	and	Bryson	
2003). Unions in newly organized establishments introduce voice ben-
efits	such	as	grievance	procedures	to	the	organization	and	a	standardiza-
tion of work practices. However, recent evidence on the union effects 
shortly following an organizing drive shows that unions have a modest 
effect on wages in newly organized establishments, and the same lack 
of a large increase in earnings initially also may be true of persons in li-
censed occupations (Freeman and Kleiner 1990). Many of the estimates 
presented in this book examine whether changes in licensing statutes 
and administrative procedures impacted changes in labor market condi-
tions (such as wages, employment, and quality) in the period from 1990 
to 2000. 
However, a major difference between occupational licensing and 
unions	is	that	licensing	may	be	a	more	secure	job	classification.	It	is	rare	
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for an occupation to become deregulated by a government agency, for 
the regulatory powers of a licensing board to be stripped by the legisla-
ture, or for the licensing board to ask to be terminated. There is one rare 
example: the occupational licensing of watchmakers was eliminated in 
Minnesota when the number of persons in the occupation in the state 
dropped to less than 100 individuals. In contrast, unions can be and are 
decertified	as	representatives	of	employees	under	National	Labor	Rela-
tions	Board	election	procedures.	Annually,	hundreds	of	decertification	
elections are conducted in the private sector, and unions lose more than 
half of these elections (Fossum 2002).
Figure 1.1  Comparisons in the Trends of Labor Market Institutions: 
Licensing and Unionization
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NOTE: Tabulations for licensing coverage for the 1950s are from Council of State 
Governments (1952), which lists licensed occupations in the public use census sample 
for 1950. For the 1960s, the tabulations are from Greene (1969), which links the 
available listing of licensed occupations to census tabulations. The data for the 1980s 
are from Kleiner (1990) tabulations, and new estimates were developed for 2000. 
Estimates for union density are from the Bureau of Labor Statistics (1979) and Hirsch 
and Macpherson (2005).
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FOCUS OF THE BOOk
During the 1990s there were many changes in the licensing provi-
sions among U.S. states, and the pass rates for entry into the occupa-
tions changed substantially. Did these changes have any impact on the 
earnings and employment growth of these already regulated occupa-
tions? This book will examine changes in employment regulation in the 
occupations that increased regulation relative to ones that experienced 
little change. 
The remainder of this book is organized as follows. Chapter 2 
examines the development of licensing as a labor market institution. 
Chapter 3 focuses on the quality impacts of occupational licensing, with 
an	emphasis	on	the	influence	of	these	benefits	on	the	demand	for	licens-
ing and its effects on price. Chapter 4 analyzes the effects of licensing 
on the earnings of regulated occupations relative to unregulated ones, 
with special attention to accountants, cosmetologists, dentists, lawyers, 
and teachers in the United States. Chapter 5 shows the trends in the 
statutes and administrative procedures by state and develops estimates 
of the economic costs of licensing to the economy. Chapter 6 expands 
the analysis for regulated occupations to the three largest nations in 
the EU, namely France, Germany, and the UK. The concluding chapter 
presents rationale for standardization of licensed services, analyzes the 
employment growth impacts of occupational licensing, summarizes the 
major	empirical	findings	of	the	book,	and	develops	policy	alternatives	
and implications of occupational licensing as an emerging labor market 
institution.
notes
 1. Dentists, doctors, and lawyers are licensed in every state, fortune tellers are li-
censed in Maryland, and frog farmers are licensed in South Dakota (Hollings and 
Pike-Nase 1997; Studenmund 1997).
 2. The methods used to calculate the percentage of the workforce in licensed oc-
cupations involved using the listing of licensed occupations from the Department 
of Labor’s Labor Market Information Survey and matching it with occupations 
in the 2000 census. If no match was obtained, the occupation was dropped. The 
number working in the licensed occupation in each state was estimated from the 
census and used to calculate a weighted average of the percentage of the U.S. 
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workforce that works in a licensed occupation. Given the growth in employment 
in service industries, where the licensing of occupations is greatest, the vast ma-
jority of the employment growth in licensed occupations occurred in already-
regulated employment during the late 1990s through the early part of the 2000s. 
Estimates from Minnesota show that three-fourths of the employment growth 
occurred in already-licensed occupations (Broat et al. 2004). 
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2
Development of 
Occupational Licensing as 
a Labor Market Institution 
The modern state owes and attempts to perform a duty to protect 
the public from those who seek for one purpose or another to ob-
tain money. When one does so through the practice of a calling, 
the state may have an interest in shielding the public against the 
untrustworthy, the incompetent, or the irresponsible. 
—Robert H. Jackson, U.S. Supreme Court Justice 1941–
1954, U.S Attorney General 1940–1941, and American 
Chief of Counsel, War Trials at Nuremberg 1945, in Thomas 
v. Collins (1945).
The overthrow of the medieval guild system was an indispensable 
early step in the rise of freedom in the Western world. It was a sign 
of the triumph of liberal ideas, and widely recognized as such, that 
by the mid-nineteenth century, in Britain, the United States, and 
to a lesser extent on the continent of Europe, men could pursue 
whatever trade or occupation they wished without the by-your-
leave of any governmental or quasi-governmental authority. In 
more recent decades, there has been a retrogression, an increasing 
tendency for particular occupations to be restricted to individuals 
licensed to practice them by the state.
—Milton Friedman, Nobel Laureate Economist, in Capital-
ism and Freedom (1962a, p. 137).
As	these	two	statements	suggest,	there	are	often	conflicting	views	of	
the goals and outcomes achieved by occupational licensing. This chap-
ter aims to provide the institutional setting for the theoretical and empir-
ical analysis that follows, building a background for the development of 
this labor market institution. The background begins with the origins of 
occupational licensing, with an emphasis on its development in Europe 
and the United States. Following that, I review several studies that show 
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the	benefits	of	licensing	during	the	early	part	of	the	twentieth	century.	
The	results	of	these	studies	suggest	that	initially	the	public	may	benefit	
from more regulation as quality increases, but long-term effects of li-
censing are more likely to be dominated by restricted competition due 
to the more strict entrance requirements into the profession. Moreover, 
the growth of information technology through the Internet minimizes 
the argument that licensing reduces asymmetry of information between 
consumers and suppliers of the service (Kleiner 2002). Further on, I 
outline the major court cases and their decisions that made licensing by 
states part of the legal framework in the United States. Finally, I look 
at a case study of one particular state, which details recent trends in oc-
cupational licensing for the state of Minnesota, with some comparisons 
to its neighboring state of Wisconsin. This case study shows evidence 
of the extent to which the legislature and licensing boards act to both 
protect the public and how they could be “captured” by the members of 
the occupation.
The regulation of occupations in the United States and other na-
tions takes various forms. The three major forms of occupational regu-
lation	are	licensing,	certification,	and	registration.	The	Council	of	State	
Governments in the United States established a special agency to focus 
exclusively on occupational licensing. That agency is the Council on 
Licensure, Enforcement, and Regulation (CLEAR), and its stated ob-
jective is to improve “the quality and understanding of regulation in 
order to enhance public protection” (CLEAR 2004). The council also 
developed	widely	 accepted	 national	 definitions	 for	 each	 of	 the	 cate-
gories of occupational regulation. The toughest form of regulation is 
licensure, and CLEAR refers to this as the right-to-practice. Under li-
censure laws, it is illegal for a person to practice a profession without 
first	meeting	state	standards.	A	less-restrictive	form	of	regulation	is	cer-
tification,	where	states	grant	title	(occupational	right-to-title)	protection	
to	persons	meeting	predetermined	standards.	Those	without	certifica-
tion may perform the duties of the occupation, but they may not use 
the title. The least restrictive form of regulation is registration, which 
usually	requires	individuals	to	file	their	names,	addresses,	and	qualifica-
tions with a government agency before practicing the occupation. This 
may include posting a bond or paying a fee to have the practitioner’s 
name listed by the state among those in the occupation. The regulation 
of occupations in the United States and other nations falls under the 
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continuum of little to highly restrictive forms of government regulation 
of occupations.
DEvELOPMEnT OF OCCUPATIOnAL REgULATIOn 
Occupational licensing has a long and prominent history as a la-
bor market institution.1 The Babylonian Code of Hammurabi (c. 1780 
BCE) stipulated both the fees patients were to pay for medical services 
and the punishments for negligent treatment. Women were barred from 
medical practice in Greece during the period around 300 BCE, and ex-
amining and licensing boards existed for “healers” in Baghdad in 931 
CE (Gross 1984). Even the Hippocratic Oath taken by Greek physicians 
as early as the fourth century BCE, urging physicians to do no harm, 
also	provided	provisions	regarding	conflict	of	interest	and	the	need	to	
refrain from wrongdoing and corruption. In the Middle Ages in Europe 
during the course of the Holy Roman Empire, physicians were required 
to	have	specific	years	of	schooling,	and	those	who	did	not	have	the	ap-
propriate	qualifications	had	their	property	confiscated	and	the	sentence	
of a year in prison (Gross 1984). 
The merchant guilds that developed during the Middle Ages and 
“Enlightenment” in Europe later served as models for current profes-
sional associations. The guilds limited entry into occupations and en-
forced requirements that merchants only hire from the guild. Both the 
university and the guilds tied education to licensing, also serving to 
tie the state to the professions. As educational historian H.G. Carman 
states: 
The medieval universities both trained and licensed. In reality a 
degree	was	a	certificate	of	competence	which	in	the	cases	of	law	
and medicine usually conveyed certain exclusive rights of practice 
to its holder. Similarly, the guilds which evolved into professional 
bodies often gave training and always attempted to give exclusive 
rights of practice to their members. (Carman 1958, p. 269) 
In 1518 in England, Henry VIII established the Royal College of 
Physicians and Surgeons, which gave the state and the church the pow-
er to license physicians. Through much of Europe during this period, 
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another licensing requirement was membership in the proper church 
(Gross 1984).
The development of occupational licensing in the United States 
borrowed	much	from	the	European	experience.	The	first	physician	li-
censing occurred in the new British colony of Virginia in 1639. By 1800 
13 of the 16 states had given the authority to examine and license to the 
state medical authorities. By 1840 there were 30 medical schools in the 
United States and 77 by 1876. Medical education varied from a few 
months to two years (Tabachinik 1976). However, almost anyone could 
claim to be a doctor during this period, but there is little evidence that 
the trained or “regular” doctors during this period did much better than 
the unlicensed doctors in terms of patient outcomes (Ehrenreich and 
English 1973). In contrast to the earlier period at the time of the U.S. 
Civil War, the early licensing system had fallen away and there was still 
no effective occupational licensing system in place (Council of State 
Governments 1952).
In the latter half of the nineteenth century, modern professional 
and	scientific	associations	were	formed,	 including	one	for	physicians	
in 1847, pharmacists in 1852, and lawyers in 1877. One of the major 
methods of obtaining integrity for these organizations was to obtain 
state sanction for these occupations and the individuals in them (Car-
man	1958).	The	first	modern	medical	practice	legislation	was	passed	in	
Texas in 1873. By 1905, 39 states were licensing physicians. Similarly 
nurses formed a national association in 1896, and 40 states were licens-
ing nurses by 1926 (Gross 1984). 
The major period during which licensing laws initially were passed 
was 1890 to 1910. In his article on “Freedom of Contract,” Law Profes-
sor Lawrence Friedman relates the major legal principles on licensing 
and other labor reforms that were taking place during this period (Fried-
man 1965):
In	 the	 same	 period	 1890	 to	 1910,	 occupational	 licensing	 first	
achieved	 a	firm	 foothold	 in	 the	 statute-books	of	most	American	
states. Laws to license doctors, plumbers, barbers, funeral directors, 
nurses, electricians, horse shoers, dentists, and the practitioners of 
many other occupations were debated, propounded and very often 
passed. Many of these laws gave rise to constitutional test cases. 
Unlike the more spectacular labor law cases, the licensing cases 
called down no pronouncements of doom and enlisted neither pro-
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ponents nor opponents in high and academic places to argue valid-
ity	and	propriety	on	the	basis	of	first	principles.	This	was	a	quieter,	
blander area of constitutional law. From the standpoint of logic 
and	of	life,	however,	the	cases	involved	first	principles	no	less	than	
those which arose under wage and hour laws. If a workman had a 
constitutional and God-given right to work eleven hours a day in 
a bakeshop, or to be paid in kind instead of cash, he should have 
had a similar right to contract with an unlicensed barber or to buy 
a	laxative	from	a	druggist	without	a	certificate	on	his	wall. 
The major Supreme Court case that established the right of states 
to grant licenses was Dent v. West Virginia (1888). The decision estab-
lished the state law purporting to protect the health, welfare, or safety of 
citizens	and	was	justified	as	having	a	rational	relationship	to	the	legiti-
mate end of government under the police power banner (Gross 1984). 
This decision took away the federal right of preemption in the arena of 
occupational licensing and gave it to the states. This is different from 
most other later labor laws, such as the National Labor Relations Act, 
which established federal law over any state provisions dealing with the 
regulation of unions and management on collective bargaining. Occu-
pational regulation continued to grow and, by 1889, 10 additional occu-
pations besides law and medicine were licensed. A steady increase saw 
30 occupations licensed in 1920, including more than 2,800 statutory 
provisions in the different states (Greene 1969). Following World War 
II, the number of regulated occupations continued to expand as more 
occupations became well-organized and sought licensing from state 
governments (Council of State Governments 1952). In 2003 the Coun-
cil of State Governments estimated that more than 800 occupations are 
licensed in at least one state and more than 1,100 are either licensed, 
certified,	or	 registered	(Brinegar	and	Schmitt	1992;	Smith-Peters	and	
Smith-Peters 2004). Although the vast majority of occupations have 
sought licensing through their associations from federal, state, county, 
or city sources, there are instances of occupations for which licensing 
was imposed mainly as a result of perceived corruption. For example, 
stockbrokers were brought under federal regulation in response to the 
financial	scandals	that	grew	out	of	the	crash	of	the	stock	market	in	1929	
(Gellhorn 1976).
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QUALITy FIRST, THEn RESTRICTIOnS On COMPETITIOn? 
The initial work on estimating the impacts of licensing focused on 
the ability of the occupations to restrict the supply of new entrants into 
the occupation. The classic work by the future Nobel Laureates Milton 
Friedman and Simon Kuznets analyzed the differences in the regula-
tory restrictions of doctors and dentists from 1900 to the early 1940s. 
Based in large part on the greater ability of doctors to restrict entry 
through their professional associations by eliminating “overcrowding” 
in the profession relative to dentists, the authors attribute about half 
of the 23 percent difference in the earnings within the two professions 
to these restrictions on supply (Friedman and Kuznets 1945). On the 
other hand, they do not attempt to examine the impact of occupational 
regulation on the quality of the service. Rather, the focus of the discus-
sion in their book is on the restrictions on competition during the period 
of initial licensure of many of the major regulated occupations in the 
United States.
	One	of	the	major	issues	on	costs	and	benefits	of	occupational	li-
censing is that, initially, licensing is a product of consumer demands for 
higher levels of credible information on the quality of service. Law and 
Kim (2004) state that from 1880 to 1930, licensing laws were passed in 
response to the growth of knowledge within the professions and the re-
duction in transportation costs that made urbanization more feasible. In 
fact	they	find	that	urbanization	and	population	density	were	the	domi-
nant factors in the passage of initial licensing laws during the twentieth 
century. They argue that there is evidence of information asymmetry as 
the major force for regulation as individuals move to an urban area and 
have limited information on the quality of key service providers such as 
lawyers and doctors. A similar argument can be made currently for the 
maintenance of licensing laws as immigrants, the poor, and the elderly 
also have little knowledge of physicians’ or attorneys’ competence or 
have little experience with information sources like the Internet or other 
sources of data on service quality. Consequently, licensing offers a rela-
tively low-cost method of providing information on critical services. 
Law	and	Kim	(2004),	however,	find	that	licensing	has	an	impact	on	
restrictions in the growth rate in employment for certain key occupa-
tions such as dentists, physicians, and cosmetologists. They are unable 
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to	find	any	impact	of	their	licensing	index	on	the	incomes	of	physicians.	
However, during the early part of the twentieth century, as Friedman 
and Kuznets (1945) point out, the mechanism through which physicians 
restricted supply was through limiting the number of positions in medi-
cal schools and only tangentially through the passage of tougher licens-
ing	exams.	One	important	finding	from	the	licensing	of	physicians	was	
the increase in malpractice lawsuits following the regulation of phy-
sicians. This may be a consequence of higher consumer expectations 
from regulation. When an occupation becomes licensed, the licensing 
results in the creation of regulatory boards and greater visibility for the 
occupation, an expectation of higher-quality services, and an infrastruc-
ture that allows lawsuits and other forms of consumer voice to be heard 
relative to a regime of no licensing. The greater visibility provided to 
members of the licensed occupation may counterbalance any greater 
quality	benefits	of	regulation	through	measures	such	as	complaints	or	
malpractice insurance rates.
From Law and Kim’s (2004) analysis there appears to be many 
similarities between the workings of the regulation of occupations and 
those of another labor market institution, unionization. For example, 
Freeman	and	Kleiner	 (1990)	find	 that	 initially	unions	bring	 to	an	es-
tablishment	voice	benefits	such	as	a	grievance	procedure,	the	posting	
of job requirements for promotion, and seniority-based layoffs and re-
calls,	but	 there	are	 few	 initial	wage	and	benefit	 increases.	Only	after	
the union is established are the employees and their union leadership 
willing	to	go	after	wages	and	benefits.	These	“monopoly	effects”	have	
led to a union wage premium of 10 to 25 percent over time (Freeman 
and Medoff 1984). In a similar manner, licensing and unions initially 
provide	nonwage	benefits	of	perceived	quality	of	working	conditions	
and later seek outcomes that result in increases in earnings or greater 
control of who works and under what conditions. During the period of 
initial regulation from 1880 to 1930, occupational licensing provided a 
form of information to consumers on minimum quality (Law and Kim 
2004). As basic science grew in the health occupations, the migration 
from rural to urban areas became substantial and immigrants were a 
large percentage of the urban landscape, occupational licensing pro-
vided basic information on essential services for newcomers. Although 
licensing provided some information on quality, it did so with the cost 
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of higher prices and slower growth in employment of the service oc-
cupations that it regulated.
LEgAL BASIS OF STATE OCCUPATIOnAL LICEnSIng
As mentioned earlier, the Dent v. West Virginia decision in 1888 
gave	the	first	federal	justification	to	the	states	to	have	the	power	to	regu-
late occupational licensing. In another major court decision, Parker v. 
Brown (1943), the Supreme Court held that antitrust statutes are aimed 
at private, not state, action and ruled that a California statute constrict-
ing competitive marketing in the private sector was legal (Gellhorn 
1976). The implication of the law as stated in this case was that a state 
must command, not merely permit, a restraint of trade in order to immu-
nize it against federal antitrust laws. This case also gave the states wide 
latitude in setting occupational licensing laws without the oversight of 
the federal courts.
Perhaps the most important case dealing with licensing practices 
was decided by the Supreme Court in Goldfarb v. Virginia (1975). The 
Court ruled that the state bar’s policy of an association’s minimum fee 
schedule violated the Sherman Act’s prohibition of combinations in re-
straint of trade. This case vindicated lawyers’ abilities to advertise and 
charge fees that can be negotiated with the client and not set by the 
bar association or the state (Gellhorn 1976). Prior to this case, many 
state and federal courts thought that the “learned professions” should be 
treated differently because their goal was to provide services necessary 
to	the	community	rather	than	to	generate	“profits.”	Consequently,	their	
activities did not fall within the terms “trade and commerce” in Section 
One	of	the	Sherman	Act.	The	central	finding	of	the	Supreme	Court	in	
the	Goldfarb	case	was	that	professional	activities	have	a	sufficient	ef-
fect on interstate commerce to support the Sherman Act jurisdiction. 
In subsequent decades, both the FTC and the Antitrust Division of 
the Department of Justice have undertaken a broad enforcement program 
designed to eliminate private restrictions on business practices of state-
licensed professions that may adversely impact the competitive process 
and raise the prices or decrease the quality of professional services. 
From 1976 to 1978 the FTC had more than doubled its expenditure 
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on funds it allocated to occupational licensing research and litigation 
(Clarkson and Muris 1980). For example, since the Goldfarb v. Virginia 
decision, these two federal agencies have sued or charged the American 
Medical	Association,	the	American	Institute	of	Certified	Public	Accoun-
tants, the California Dental Association, the National Society of Profes-
sional Engineers, and other public or quasi-public associations in order 
to alleviate restrictions on advertising, minimum fee agreements, restric-
tions on competitive bidding, and increases in requirements for entering 
a profession (Committee on Competition Law and Policy 2000). 
Recent issues involve the attempts by the professions to capture 
work from other occupations or to restrict the ability of licensed or un-
licensed occupations, such as alternative health care providers, to do 
work within the occupations’ “span of control.” For example, in South 
Carolina, the state dental association (through the state legislature) re-
quired dentists to examine Medicaid-eligible children rather than al-
low them to be seen only by dental hygienists (Nash 2003). The FTC 
perceived this as a restraint of trade problem that raised the cost to the 
federal government of funding the Medicaid program for eligible young 
children. These U.S. policies to enhance competition have resulted in 
more price and marketing competition within and across occupations 
following individuals entering into the occupation in comparison to 
other nations in the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and De-
velopment (OECD), which consists of the major economically devel-
oped countries (Garoupa 2004).
Since the Goldfarb v. Virginia decision, professional associations 
have been more modest in attempting to lobby states to become licensed, 
and states have opened up the occupations’ work practices to advertis-
ing and less-restrictive marketing practices. Nevertheless, the number 
of licensed occupations has continued to grow, but at a slower pace, 
because it is rare for an occupation to move toward a less or unregu-
lated status once it has become regulated. The growth in employment 
in service industries during the past decade has resulted in a growth in 
employment in licensed occupations as well. In fact, during the past 
decade, most of the growth of employment in licensed occupations has 
occurred as a consequence of employment growth within occupations 
rather than increases in the number of newly regulated occupations. 
In order to illustrate how licensing works in greater depth, I use 
one state to provide more detailed information for that state’s licensing 
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provisions and practices. I chose to examine Minnesota, a state that 
has been at the forefront of the “good government” movement and has 
attempted to provide clear guidelines for new occupations seeking to 
become regulated. Examining this state in depth, with access to more 
detailed information on the institution of licensing, will also allow the 
subsequent analysis of the United States and Western Europe in the 
context of the detailed issues raised within these case studies.
HOW LICEnSIng WORkS: A CASE STUDy OF MInnESOTA 
Although a broader examination of state-by-state regulation of oc-
cupations is instructive, much can be learned about how licensing works 
by examining a single state in detail. As a result of the evolution of the 
legal system in the United States, most licensing takes place at the state 
level. For this analysis, I chose Minnesota since it is a state with an em-
phasis on “good government,” and it has evolved its regulatory policy 
from little oversight by the legislature to establishing clear criteria for 
licensing and tougher regulations for occupations. This section also de-
velops	comparisons	of	 the	 impact	of	 licensing	versus	certification	on	
the complaints of consumers for certain regulated occupations in Wis-
consin and Minnesota. Moreover, Minnesota has gathered considerable 
data on licensing and devoted much effort to reports from the state’s 
legislative	auditor	on	this	subject	(Broat	et	al.	2004;	Office	of	the	Leg-
islative Auditor, State of Minnesota 1999). 
Occupational regulation began in the state in the 1880s, starting 
with physicians (1883), dentists (1885), and accountants (1909) (Coun-
cil of State Governments 1952). These initial dates of licensure were 
similar to other states in the Midwest, but they were earlier than most 
other states nationally. There was a steady increase in the number of 
occupations seeking to become regulated. For example, 20 occupations 
were regulated in Minnesota in 1950, a number that included about 5 
percent of the workforce (Council of State Governments 1952). Dur-
ing the 1960s and 1970s, the state, along with many others, received 
several requests annually, mainly from organized representatives of the 
occupations seeking licensure (Kleiner and Gordon 1996). Although 
there were some changes in census categories over time, making exact 
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matches somewhat imprecise, the number of occupations regulated rose 
from 47 to 141 in the period from 1968 to 1990 (Kleiner and Gordon 
1996). From 1998 to 2004, the percentage of persons in licensed oc-
cupations grew by about 1 percent, or approximately 100,000 work-
ers. About 75 percent of overall growth was in employment in already 
licensed occupations, and about 25 percent (approximately 25,000 
workers) of overall employment increases was due to the addition of 
individuals in newly licensed occupations (Broat et al. 2004). This in-
crease is largely a result of the growth in the service and health-related 
industry employment during this period. In 2004 the state regulated 
a total of 167 occupations, of which 131 are licensed with their own 
boards,	 19	 are	 certified,	 15	 are	 registered,	 and	 two	 are	 regulated	 via	
the “after credentialing” activity of the occupation, which is a weaker 
form of registration (Broat et al. 2004).2 The percentage of workers in 
occupations regulated by the state in 2004, using state of Minnesota 
internal measures of regulation, was approximately 30.2 percent of the 
total state workforce. Approximately 27 percent were licensed, 2 per-
cent	were	certified,	and	1	percent	were	registered	(Broat	et	al.	2004).3 
In comparison to other states, Minnesota ranks in the middle tier of 
states in both the number of occupations regulated and percentage of 
the workforce licensed.
 Table 2.1 shows changes in occupational regulation in Minnesota 
from 1999 to 2004, the period of the last two reports to the Minnesota 
State	Auditor	on	occupational	licensing	(Office	of	the	Legislative	Au-
ditor, State of Minnesota 1999). As the table shows, the trend in Min-
nesota is toward regulating more occupations or increasing the level of 
regulation for existing occupations. For example, midwives and multi-
purpose water piping system contractor/installers became licensed. 
Physical therapists and occupational therapists moved from being certi-
fied	 to	 being	 licensed.	Other	 occupations	 lost	 their	 own	 independent	
board and were merged into larger commercial or medical licensing 
boards.	One	of	these	occupations	was	weather	modifiers.	Watchmakers	
were deregulated because their numbers diminished to just a few. In 
general, the trend has been toward more regulation through the licens-
ing of new occupations and increasing the toughness of regulation for 
certified	occupations	by	requiring	them	to	license	their	work.	The	goal	
of most of the occupational associations seeking regulation in Minne-
sota	is	licensing	rather	than	certification	or	registration	because	it	gives	
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Newly licensed occupations Newly regulated occupations
Occupations with  
stricter regulation
Regulated occupations merged 
with other licensing boards
Licensed professional 
counselor (LPC) (2003)
Unlicensed complementary 
and alternative health care 
practitioners (2000)
Physical therapists  
(certified	to	licensed	–	1999)
Weather	modifier	(1999)
Traditional midwife (1999) Athlete agents  
(registered – 2002)
Occupational therapist 
(certified	to	licensed	–	2000)
Commercial animal waste 
technician (2000)
Environmental health food 
manager	(certified	–	1999)
Power limited technician 
(2002)
Multi-purpose water piping 
system contractor/installer 
(2003)
SOURCE: Broat et al. (2004).
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the occupation control of the standards and the work. No occupations 
went	from	licensing	to	certification	during	this	period.	
gOALS AnD EFFORT OF REgULATORy BOARDS 
The goals of regulatory boards are to control entry into the occupa-
tion and to enforce the standards of practice among licensed practitio-
ners. Typically, board administrators examine the credentials of appli-
cants and determine whether their education, experience, and “ethical” 
fitness	meet	statutory	or	administrative	admission	requirements.	They	
often decide whether certain schools meet the requisite training stan-
dards in the occupation. This generally involves setting an approved list 
of schools that meet the minimum standards for the occupation. A board 
may contract out the examinations for passing the licensing exam, but it 
will often set the pass rate for the examination. Boards are also required 
to administer the reciprocity or endorsement provisions between the 
states	to	determine	who	qualifies	to	be	regulated	within	the	state	if	they	
were initially in a regulated occupation elsewhere. They set standards 
for persons who have licenses from other countries. Boards generally 
have the authority to investigate violations of standards and conduct 
hearings when there is evidence of violations of state standards and if 
a revocation of a license is warranted. Finally, they collect annual fees 
and	can	levy	any	fines.	Often	revenues	collected	from	licensed	practi-
tioners become part of the general state budget.
The way regulatory boards operate is not uniform. Many of the li-
censing boards meet often to discuss issues of quality and disciplinary 
procedures. Often new approaches to setting standards in the occupa-
tion and the ways that information can be disseminated are discussed. 
Subcommittees usually meet to discuss the cut-off scores for passing 
the state licensing exam. Economist Milton Friedman (1962a) states 
that boards limit new entrants so that current licensees will not be com-
pelled to charge higher prices or engage in unethical practices to gener-
ate more clients in order to make an “acceptable income.” Other issues 
considered are the criteria for accepting out-of-state applicants and for-
eign nationals. 
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The time allocated to meetings varies a great deal. Table 2.2 gives 
the variations in the time allocated to meeting annually in Minnesota by 
regulated	occupation.	For	example,	“peace	officers”	spend	less	than	1	
hour per month on board-related activities, whereas the board dealing 
with the licensing of public school teachers spends about 10 hours per 
month on licensing-related issues (Broat et al. 2004). There does not 
appear to be a relationship between the number of persons in an occupa-
tion and time spent on licensing-related activities. For example, barbers 
have only 2,700 licensed practitioners, but licensing board members 
spend more than 8 hours per month on regulatory meetings in 2003. 
Conversely, the licensing board that regulates electricians and related 
fields	with	more	 than	 27,800	 practitioners	 spends	 about	 one-fifth	 as	
much time in meetings as other licensed occupations presented in Table 
2.2 (e.g., barbers in 2003). The allocation of time for licensing-related 
activities by board members varies a great deal, suggesting that the im-
pacts on labor market outcomes may also vary by state and occupation, 
depending on whether the board is focused on the quality or supply 
aspects of occupational regulation. 
Table 2.2  Average Total number of Hours Spent by Board Members in 
Meetings and on Other Board Activities in Minnesota
Board title FY 2003 FY 2004
Board	of	Peace	Officer	Training	
and Standards
7.6 10.1
Board of Electricity 18.5 22.4
Board of Teaching 91.2 115.3
Board of Barber Examiners 104.3 61.8
Board of Accountancy 68.8 94.2
Board of Architecture, 
Engineering, Land Surveying, 
Landscape Architecture, 
Geoscience, and Interior 
Design
100.7 101.5
SOURCE: Broat et al. (2004).
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HOW DO OCCUPATIOnS BECOME LICEnSED? 
In Minnesota, as in many other states that regulate occupations 
through the legislative process, licensing appears to be responsive to 
political pressure from occupational associations seeking to become 
regulated. Occupations that are well-organized and have well-funded 
campaigns	with	no	organized	opposition	are	more	likely	to	find	them-
selves at the top of the agenda before occupational regulatory com-
missions. This is consistent with other evidence from Illinois, which 
showed that occupations whose practitioners work for individual con-
sumers (e.g., barbers) have an easier time getting licensed than do, for 
example, electricians who were opposed in Illinois by groups such as 
farmers when they attempted to become regulated (Wheelan 2005). 
Minnesota passed legislation in 1976 that established criteria for the 
passage	of	new	licensing	laws	(Office	of	the	Legislative	Auditor,	State	
of Minnesota 1999). This provision, Chapter 214, establishes the crite-
ria	for	assessing	any	proposed	licensing	law	(Office	of	the	Legislative	
Auditor, State of Minnesota 1999). The criteria stated in detail in Ap-
pendix Table A.1 are the questions that all legislators on the regulatory 
commission are required to consider and document when an occupation 
seeks to become regulated. The central questions focus on both quality 
and restriction of supply issues that form the essence of issues on oc-
cupational licensing. Beyond the forms that the legislators are required 
to complete, the advocates from the occupations who want to become 
licensed are also required to complete a form providing evidence sup-
porting their position that the legislature should pass a bill regulating 
the occupation (see Appendix Table A.2). In both cases the burden of 
proof is on the occupation to provide a compelling reason for the job to 
be regulated.
Although this is the policy for the legislature, the practice is often 
quite different. The surveys are often not completed, and blank copies 
exist in the minutes (Minnesota Legislature, Senate 2000, 2002). Even 
though it is a policy for associations representing occupational groups 
to address the issues raised in the memo, only two groups addressed 
the memos during a recent legislative session: traditional midwives and 
massage therapists, and oriental bodywork therapists (Minnesota Leg-
islature, Senate 2000, 2002). Of these two bills, only the midwives leg-
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islation was passed (Minnesota Legislature, Senate 2000). During the 
following legislative session in 2001–2002, the same trends concerning 
the practice of not completing the proper evaluation of occupational 
regulation continued. There were a number of bills that went before the 
Legislature. All except one bill were tabled in a joint subcommittee. 
There is little detailed public record of these meetings (Minnesota Leg-
islature, Senate 2002). The one occupation that made it through these 
hearings, dental assistants, was not passed into law (Minnesota Legis-
lature, Senate 2002).
Nevertheless, establishing criteria for the regulation of occupations 
in the state appears to have had some effect on the composition of new 
legislation. Table 2.3 shows the proposed and adopted bills on occupa-
tional regulation for the period from 1981 through 2003. For example, 
from 1981 through 1998, a third of the bills proposed attempted to li-
cense new occupations, and 29 percent of them passed. Following the 
tighter implementation of the criteria for evaluating new licensing laws 
during the 1999–2003 sessions, only 26 percent of the bills proposed 
involved licensing a new occupation and 74 percent involved modify-
ing an existing occupation. This shift implies that a trend exists toward 
making	entry	provisions	more	difficult	or	adding	continuing	education	
requirements (Broat et al. 2004). 
Table 2.4 gives the number and percentage of bills that were pro-
posed at the Minnesota legislature on occupational regulation, by in-
dustry, from 1995 to 2003. The last column in the table also shows the 
percentage of the Minnesota workforce for each of the industries cov-
ered. The numbers of bills proposed that deal with occupational regula-
tion in the state by the regulated sectors are substantially higher than 
their percentage in the Minnesota workforce. The data are divided into 
the periods before and after the implementation of the tougher enforce-
ment of Chapter 214 and the report of the legislative auditor in 1999 on 
occupational regulation. The basic data show that the majority of bills 
on occupational regulation were in the health sector, with 53 percent of 
all proposed legislation from 1995 to 1998 focused on this sector, and 
more than 67 percent of all legislation from 1999 through 2003 was 
focused on the regulation of health occupations. 
To	complement	the	information	in	Table	2.4,	Table	2.5	presents	fi-
nancial contributions to the Minnesota legislatures’ leadership by in-
dustry sectors that have interests in occupational regulation.4 Consistent 
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Table 2.3  Composition of Proposed Legislation on Occupational Licensing in Minnesota, 1981–2003a
1981–1998 1999–2003
Type Bills proposed Bills passed % of bills passed Bills proposed Bills passed % of bills passed
Modifying 
existing law
158 76 48 64 32 50
New occupations 
regulated
79 23 29 22 7 32
Total proposed 
and passed
237 99 42 86 39 45
a In 1999 new criteria were adopted for legislators to follow when occupations requested regulation.
SOURCE: Adapted from Broat et al. (2004).
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Table 2.4  Bills Proposed by the Minnesota Legislature on Occupational 
Regulation, by Industry, 1995–2003
1995–1998
% of  
total bills 1999–2003
% of  
total bills
% of total 
employment 
in Minnesota 
in 2003
Accounting 5 7.58 5 5.81 0.6
Construction 4 6.06 4 4.65 4.6
Education 7 10.61 0 0.00 2.9
Health 35 53.03 58 67.44 12.2
Mental health 8 12.12 9 10.47 — a
Public safety 0 0.00 0 0.00 12.2
Social work 3 4.55 0 0.00 1.9
Other regulated 4 6.06 10 11.63 4.4
Total 66 86 38.8
a Mental health employment was subsumed under the general health category. 
SOURCE: Adapted from Broat et al. (2004).
Table 2.5  Total Donations by Major Sectors to the Leadership of Each 
House of the Minnesota Legislature Relative to Employment, 
1996–2004
House ($) Senate ($) Total ($)
% of total  
lobbying  
expenditures
% of total 
employment 
in Minnesota 
in 2003
Accounting 2,004 6,497 8,501 2 0.6
Construction 17,767 31,085 48,852 11 4.6
Education 32,002 39,403 71,405 15 2.9
Health 59,921 75,734 135,655 29 12.2
Public safety 70,109 45,619 115,728 25 12.2
Other 33,846 47,905 81,751 18 4.4
Total 216,060 246,859 462,919 100 36.9
NOTE: All amounts are in 2004 dollars. Mental health was subsumed under the 
general health category.
SOURCE: Adapted from Broat et al. (2004).
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with a “capture theory” approach to the impact of regulation, which 
states that those who are regulated attempt to monopolize the process, it 
is not surprising that the largest single contributor to political campaigns 
during this period was in the health sector in Minnesota. From 1996 to 
2004, the health industry contributed 29 percent of all industry-related 
funding to the legislative leadership in Minnesota (Broat et al. 2004). 
Although this amount is smaller than the proportion of licensing-related 
bills	proposed	in	the	legislature,	it	does	reflect	that	industries	that	are	
most impacted by occupational licensing are more likely to contribute 
to	influential	individuals	in	the	legislature.	Funding	for	legislative	lead-
ers followed the occupational groups with the most at stake in the regu-
latory process. This approach is consistent with a capture theory view 
of occupational licensure, and the occupational associations perceive 
state regulation as an important arena for their members, and they at-
tempt to directly impact legislation. 
LICEnSIng AnD QUALITy OF SERvICES In MInnESOTA 
AnD WISCOnSIn 
One of the major questions in the regulation of occupation literature 
is the institution’s ability to increase the quality of service provided. 
The evolution of occupational licensing in Minnesota and Wisconsin 
allows for an examination of the quality effects of licensing versus 
certification,	a	less	rigorous	form	of	regulation.	Wisconsin,	which	has	
tougher occupational regulations than Minnesota, is next to Minnesota 
geographically, has a similar population, income level, and unemploy-
ment rate. These similarities allow for a relevant comparison to examine 
the impact of different forms of regulation on one measure of service 
quality and on complaint rates to the regulatory body. If occupational 
licensing	is	successful	relative	to	certification	in	accomplishing	its	ob-
jective of eliminating incompetent practitioners, lower-quality services 
are	 eliminated	 from	 the	market	 and	 consumers	 are	 less	 likely	 to	file	
complaints with state agencies. 
The examination of these two similar states is instructive, especially 
since their policies on occupational licensing are different. The stated 
policy in Wisconsin is that it “favors regulation only when there is a 
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clear and direct harm to the public.” Wisconsin has no “sunrise provi-
sion,” which is legislation that requires that the burden of proof for 
regulation is with the proponent of the regulation. On the other hand, 
Minnesota has legislation labeled Chapter 214, which became termed 
“sunrise legislation” and includes criteria for occupational regulation 
against which any new or increased occupational regulation must be 
judged and explicit questions that legislators and proponents of licens-
ing	must	address	(Office	of	the	Legislative	Auditor,	State	of	Minnesota	
1999). The regulatory policy articulated by Chapter 214 recognizes the 
“potential danger of occupational restrictions and challenges proponents 
of regulation to demonstrate that regulation serves the public interest” 
(Office	of	the	Legislative	Auditor,	State	of	Minnesota	1999).	“Sunset	
legislation,” which eliminates regulation or reduces it, has not resulted 
in the widespread success that it once seemed to promise and has never 
been a regular part of the political process in Minnesota, which is gener-
ally perceived as a tougher state on occupational organizations seeking 
regulation.
Using	Department	of	Labor	and	Census	definitions	of	licensing,	it	
is therefore not surprising that Wisconsin ranks sixth in the country in 
the number of regulated occupations. It licenses 117 census-listed oc-
cupations covering 24 percent of its workforce, but Minnesota ranks 
twenty-first	and	licenses	94	occupations	covering	only	13	percent	of	its	
workforce in 2000. The ability to compare the impact of licensing ver-
sus	certification	is	based	on	a	comparison	of	physical	therapists,	respi-
ratory care providers, and physician assistants (Broat et al. 2004). These 
three	health	occupations	are	licensed	in	Wisconsin	but	were	certified	in	
Minnesota5 (Minnesota Board of Medical Practice 1993–2002; Wiscon-
sin Department of Regulation and Licensing 2004). If an occupation is 
certified,	data	are	collected	by	the	state	on	complaints	about	individuals	
in the occupation, and all licensing boards must maintain data on com-
plaints	filed	with	the	state	licensing	board.6 
Figure 2.1 gives estimates of the complaint rate for Wisconsin rela-
tive	 to	Minnesota.	 Either	Minnesota	 has	 a	more	 visible	 certification	
board or there is a more litigious population in Minnesota relative to 
Wisconsin. Evidence for a more litigious environment is that in 2003 
Minnesota had a lawyer-to-population ratio of 1 attorney per 255 per-
sons and Wisconsin had a ratio of 1 attorney per 396 persons, which is 
a 63 percent lower rate of attorney coverage in Wisconsin (American 
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Bar Association 2003; U.S. Census Bureau 2003). This larger ratio in 
Minnesota could lead to a greater awareness of certain legal rights to 
file	 complaints	with	 regulatory	 boards.	Moreover,	 filing	 a	 complaint	
with	an	occupational	certification	board	could	be	the	first	step	in	filing	
a negligence suit against a member of the occupation. In all the oc-
cupations for which data in these two states are available, where one 
of	the	occupations	is	certified	and	the	other	is	licensed,	Wisconsin	had	
a lower complaint value. Even for physicians, which is the longest li-
censed occupation in both states, Minnesota has a complaint rate that 
is about twice as high as Wisconsin, even though Wisconsin’s popula-
tion is larger. There does not seem to be a meaningful difference in the 
complaint	rate	of	the	certified	occupations	relative	to	the	base	rate	of	
the complaint rate for physicians in Minnesota, which is a state that 
Figure 2.1  Regulatory Complaints in Wisconsin Compared to Minnesota
NOTE: These values are the summation of the rate of complaints to licensing boards in 
Wisconsin	divided	by	the	number	of	complaints	to	certification	boards	in	Minnesota	
for physical therapists, respiratory care providers, and physician’s assistants during 
1999–2002. Physicians are licensed in both states.
SOURCE: Data from Broat et al. (2004) and Wisconsin Department of Regulation and 
Licensing, 2004 and 2005.
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certified	 its	occupations	relative	 to	Wisconsin	 that	gave	 the	same	oc-
cupations a license to practice.
Figure 2.2 shows changes in the number of complaints to state 
boards	for	these	three	occupations,	which	were	certified	in	Minnesota	
but licensed in Wisconsin, relative to physicians, who were licensed 
in both states. In Wisconsin, physical therapists became fully licensed 
with their own board in 1993, physician assistants moved from being 
certified	to	licensed	in	1997,	and	respiratory	care	providers	became	li-
censed in 1992 (Wisconsin Act 107 1993; Wisconsin Act 67 1997). The 
initial low levels of complaints in the early period of licensing in Wis-
consin are consistent with the hypothesis that initially tougher regula-
tion increases quality as measured by this complaint data, but that over 
time these quality impacts diminish or level off, and the level of com-
plaints	are	similar	to	the	certified	occupations	in	Minnesota	by	the	end	
of the time period. The data plots show that the complaint rate declined 
for physicians, the universally licensed occupation in both states, from 
1994 to 2001. In contrast, for the three licensed occupations, physical 
Figure 2.2  Changes in Complaints in Certified and Licensed Occupations 
in Minnesota and Wisconsin, 1994–2001
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therapists, respiratory care providers, and physician assistants, in Wis-
consin the complaint rate increased slightly over the same period. In 
Minnesota, where respiratory care providers and physician’s assistants 
were	 certified	 over	 the	 entire	 period	 and	 for	 physical	 therapists	who	
were	 certified	until	 1999,	 there	was	 a	 small	 decline	 in	 the	 aggregate	
complaint rate during the same period. At a minimum, licensed occupa-
tions showed no greater ability to reduce constituents’ complaints to li-
censing	boards	about	the	service	provided	compared	to	complaints	filed	
in	a	regime	where	these	same	occupations	were	certified	for	most	of	the	
period. From the data provided in Figures 2.1 and 2.2 for these health-
related	occupations,	there	does	not	appear	to	be	significant	benefits	for	
consumers	of	licensing	relative	to	certification.	
SUMMARy AnD COnCLUSIOnS
The goal of this chapter has been to present the development of 
occupational licensing as a labor market institution and show how this 
institution works within a state. Although the issue of occupational 
regulation often operates under the public policy radar screen, it has a 
long history in many different societies over time. There have been long 
periods where this institution has been pervasive and other times when 
there has been little to no occupational regulation by the government. 
One of the major issues for regulators and the public is whether the pub-
lic interest theory of regulation has greater weight relative to the capture 
theory. If the public interest theory is dominant, occupational regulation 
reduces the likelihood that incompetent practitioners will enter an oc-
cupation and the public is protected from potential abuse. One outcome 
is that quality rises. But, if an occupation uses the regulatory process 
to limit competition and maintain or enhance the relative earnings of 
practitioners, with little impact on the quality received by consumers, 
then this labor market institution should be limited. 
During different time periods, the impact of licensing may have 
resulted in both outcomes. Evidence suggests that licensing has positive 
impacts immediately following its implementation through the stan-
dardization of the quality of the service that is expected of practitioners. 
During this period, the ability to capture any economic monopoly rents 
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may be limited as the occupation focuses on quality and providing voice 
to practitioners during the regulatory process. However, the returns to 
this process diminish over time, and the occupation focuses its efforts 
on restriction of supply through entry tests and other legal barriers that 
can limit the number of practitioners who enter the occupation from 
other	regions.	The	apparent	benefits	of	occupational	regulation—pro-
viding higher quality as measured by a reduction in complaints—are 
not obvious, at least in the long run.
As an illustration of this process, this chapter examines Minnesota, 
a state that is in the middle of U.S. states in terms of its level of occu-
pational regulation, using both the number of regulated occupations and 
the percentage of the workforce that is licensed. This state has experi-
enced moderate growth in the number of occupations that are licensed, 
but the percentage of the state workforce that is covered by regulation 
has continued to grow, in large part as a consequence of the regulated 
occupations being in the fastest growing sector of the economy. In this 
state, occupations that spend the most on political campaigns are also 
the most regulated, evidence that is consistent with the political capture 
theory. The evidence from Minnesota’s neighboring state of Wisconsin 
shows	that	licensing	in	that	state	versus	certification	in	Minnesota	pro-
vides	no	obvious	benefits	to	consumers	as	measured	by	complaints	to	
regulatory	boards.	The	apparent	benefits	of	occupational	licensing	rela-
tive	to	certification	are	not	obvious,	at	least	in	the	long	run.
Studying data from just one state provides an in-depth look at regu-
lation that includes the details of the licensing process. For example, 
focusing on a single state allows for a deeper understanding of new 
occupations seeking licensing. It also allows for a detailed examina-
tion of the allocation of meeting time for licensing boards. Further pro-
posals to the state legislature for changing licensing provisions can be 
examined by observing how occupational lobbyists allocate funds for 
political purposes. The quality of services for licensed and unlicensed 
occupations can be examined in detail through state level analysis of 
nearby states. This depth of analysis does not give us enough breadth to 
examine the questions of quality versus restricting competition raised in 
this book. We now turn to a broader examination of the quality impacts 
of occupational licensing, followed by an examination of the potential 
restrictions of competition across states. The overarching questions of 
the policy implications of licensing are examined in detail in the chap-
ters that follow. 
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notes
 1. For a more detailed history of licensing in the United States and in Europe, see 
Occupational Licensing Legislation in the States (Council of State Governments 
1952).
 2. There was a decline in the number of licensed occupational boards from the mid-
1990s to 2004, a consequence of the consolidation of boards with few members 
following a report by the State Legislative Auditor recommending that occupa-
tions with few members be merged with larger boards.
	 3.	 The	higher	percentage	of	licensed	workers	in	Minnesota	reflects	data	gathered	
from state records from the regulatory agencies, which includes many occupa-
tions that are not listed by the Census Bureau in their listing of three-digit oc-
cupational titles. Consequently, estimates from the Department of Labor and the 
Census	Bureau	reflect	a	substantially	downward-biased	value	relative	to	having	
state data from each regulatory agency. Nevertheless, the estimates presented in 
this	paper	 reflect	a	consistent	estimate	since	 they	use	 the	same	data-gathering	
approach for occupations and the same national database of the decennial cen-
suses.
	 4.	 Leadership	 is	 defined	 as	The	 Speaker	 of	 the	House,	 House	Majority	 Leader,	
House Majority Whip, House Assistant Majority Leader, House Minority Lead-
er, House Minority Whip, House Assistant Minority Leader, Senate Majority 
Leader, Senate Assistant Majority Leader, Senate Majority Whip, Senate Mi-
nority Leader, and Senate Assistant Minority Leader. Political party leadership 
was acquired from the Minnesota House of Representatives (2004) and Senate 
Web sites. Committee membership was gathered from three bienniums using The 
Minnesota Legislative Manual (Minnesota Secretary of State 1997, 1999, 2001; 
Broat et al. 2004).
	 5.	 Physical	therapists	moved	from	certification	to	licensure	in	Minnesota	during	the	
period of analysis. The inclusion of this profession in the analysis is explained 
later in the methodology section.
 6. The data collected for the number of complaints in Wisconsin come from 
D. O’Connell of the Wisconsin Department of Licensure and Regulation (per-
sonal communications, November 4, 2004, to Clint Pecenka). Conversely, data 
for the number of complaints in Minnesota were taken from the biennial reports 
of the regulation authority, in the case of the analyzed occupations, biennial re-
ports of the Minnesota Board of Medical Practice (1993–2002). In all three occu-
pations, the data available dictated the analysis of the years 1993–2002. During 
this time period, the data measure the number of complaints reported in each 
year (Broat et al. 2004). 
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3
Quality and the Demand for 
Occupational Licensing 
Don’t try this at home! Man does own root canals.
David Kruithoff is no dentist. He’s a hired hand on a fruit farm 
outside of Lakeview, about an hour northeast of Grand Rapids. But 
that didn’t stop him from performing two root canals on himself, 
then fashioning an entire set of replacement teeth.
 —Tom Rademacher, Ann Arbor News, February 9, 1997
Although licensing is intended to increase quality of services and 
reduce the availability of substitutes, the newspaper story above illus-
trates an unintended consequence of the licensing of dental services, 
namely using do-it-yourself remedies. The individual highlighted in 
this newspaper column had no dental health insurance and stated that 
the cost of going to a dentist was just too much for his limited budget. 
Most of the research on the regulation of occupations has emphasized 
barriers to entry, but relatively little empirical work has examined the 
quality of output or the demand-side response by consumers to these 
quality effects. This chapter focuses on why and how service outcomes 
are affected by licensing statutes or other administrative procedures. 
It also examines how regulation of some occupations results in better 
outcomes for individuals with better insurance coverage but has little 
impact	for	individuals	who	have	few	other	work-related	benefits.	An-
other aspect examined is the interaction of the changes in technology 
and capital requirements within the regulated service on standardiza-
tion and the quality of service delivery to consumers. This is an advan-
tage of regulation that many professional associations argue guarantees 
a higher average level of service with licensing.
Initially, this chapter presents theoretical rationales for why indi-
viduals seek to license their occupations, and why policymakers are 
likely to grant this form of regulation for the members of the trade. 
The	next	section	shows	how	licensing	can	have	both	benefits	and	costs	
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for the consumers of the regulated service, and it presents new evi-
dence regarding who gains from regulation. The following portion of 
the chapter gives a review of previous studies of the quality and price 
impacts of licensing on consumers. This section focuses on how licens-
ing may serve as a method of screening potential practitioners that can 
have	beneficial	outcomes.	
WHy ARE OCCUPATIOnS REgULATED?
Licensing is assumed to affect demand through controls on entry, 
and this impacts quality (Benham 1980). The expectation from eco-
nomic theory is that licensing may create windfall gains or rents, and 
that these prospective gains in income provide an important impetus for 
licensure. The threat of loss of rents is a major reason why removal of 
licensure is so strongly resisted by members of a regulated occupation. 
Another	 benefit	 to	 practitioners	 is	 the	 ability	 of	 licensing	 to	 provide	
some hedge against downside risks because of the organization’s ability 
to reduce competition differentially when conditions are bad (Wheelan 
1999). Licensed occupations are able to limit supply in response to mar-
ket conditions through changing licensing statutes or through extending 
the required training program for entry or reducing the numbers who 
pass an entrance exam. Moreover, Ballou and Podgursky (1998) argue 
in the case of teachers that lengthening the period of time that it takes 
to	become	a	 teacher	 results	 in	otherwise	qualified	applicants	 seeking	
other unregulated occupations that have fewer legal restrictions. The 
end	result	 is	 that	 lower-qualified	individuals	with	fewer	 labor	market	
opportunities become teachers.
A	major	theoretical	justification	for	licensing	is	that	there	are	mar-
ket failures due to asymmetric information on quality between produc-
ers and consumers that regulation can correct. Such failures can occur 
if	it	is	more	difficult	for	consumers	than	sellers	to	determine	the	quality	
of a service offered. Generally, licensed occupations claim that they 
will successfully cope with such undesirable market failures. Many of 
the occupations provide training programs to their new and continuing 
members	that	highlight	the	important	benefits	to	the	public	of	licensing	
their occupation (Benham 1980). 
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The structure of the market may also result in the demand for li-
censing being lower than optimum because of potential “free rider” 
problems that occur because consumers purchase professional services 
infrequently (Cox and Foster 1990). Consequently, an individual con-
sumer may incur high costs learning about a particular profession and 
determining which type of regulation is in their best interests. More-
over, the costs of taking action may be high, since there are large costs 
associated with informing and organizing a large group of consumers to 
take action. Many may not join groups to obtain the optimum amount of 
occupational regulation because they think that others may take group 
action. This is the case if the purchase price of the service was low. As a 
result consumers would rarely demand either occupational licensure or 
higher forms of regulation or lobby against restrictions. 
In contrast, the “capture theory” suggests that the individuals in 
the occupations often expend considerable resources in an attempt to 
convince	legislators	that	regulation	will	benefit	the	public.	The	capture	
theory of occupational regulation argues that licensing is a response 
by professionals who seek to protect themselves from competition. If 
demand for the service is relatively inelastic, then higher prices will 
lead to higher incomes. Moreover, occupational regulation also could 
be viewed as a form of career insurance. If regulation reduces competi-
tion, members of the regulated occupation are less likely to be forced 
out and trained for another occupation. The prediction from microeco-
nomics is that the less the elasticity of demand for the occupation’s 
services,	 the	 greater	 the	 benefit	 of	 regulation	 to	 the	members	 of	 the	
occupation (Stigler 1971). Consequently, the theory would predict that 
the	benefits	of	regulation	to	dentists,	for	example,	would	be	greater	than	
that for barbers or cosmetologists because the availability of substitutes 
for dental care, even including those who give themselves root canals, 
would be lower than for cutting hair. 
The demand for regulation by the individuals in licensed profes-
sions is less likely to be affected by the kind of “free-rider” problem 
faced by consumers. Individuals in the occupations have a greater in-
terest in and knowledge of regulation affecting their line of work than 
most consumers of licensed services, and the occupational associations 
have a greater ability to act together. Consequently, the costs of orga-
nizing behind a type of regulation for members of an occupation are 
relatively	 less	 than	 for	 consumers,	 and	 the	 benefits	 to	 individuals	 in	
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the occupation are likely to be higher. Even though there are incentives 
for both consumers and producers of the service to demand regulation, 
consumers are rarely the moving force behind occupational regulation, 
possibly because of the issues cited above. Members of the occupations 
generally demand licensing laws at least in part due to the potential 
benefits	of	higher	pay	and	job	security.	
Although these theories give reasons for why persons in occupa-
tions may want to become regulated, they do not give the rationale for 
the demand for licensing by states or other political entities, such as 
cities or counties (Wheelan 1999). Competing theories for the existence 
of	licensing	from	the	public	perspective	generally	involve	conflicts	be-
tween “public interest” and “rent-capture” rationales for regulation. If 
the public interest is the dominant rationale for licensing, occupations 
with the greatest risk to the public—either to the person employing the 
service or to a third party—should be the most likely to be regulated. On 
the other hand, a political rationale of the demand for licensing requires 
that the professional association be well-organized and well-funded to 
carry out a licensing campaign at the appropriate political level. Al-
though most licensing is at the state level, construction-related regu-
lations impacting plumbers, painters, and carpenters often occur with 
divergent standards at the city or county level (Shimberg, Esser, and 
Kruger 1973). Moreover, such a campaign is likely to be more success-
ful if the consumers are individuals rather than larger institutions such 
as hospitals (Graddy 1991). In his analysis of which occupations are 
licensed	in	the	state	of	Illinois,	Wheelan	finds	support	for	both	the	pub-
lic interest and rent-capture theories discussed above. Occupations with 
higher insurance premiums, which indicate greater risk to the public, 
are more likely to be regulated, indicating support for the public inter-
est model. However, an organization’s number of members and budget, 
as well as client type (personal versus institutional), all show support 
for the rent-capture rationale for licensing the profession. For example, 
for physicians, Paul (1984) states that “licensing legislation was the re-
sult of organized physicians employing the political system for limiting 
entry and the concomitant increasing of returns to incumbent medical 
practitioners.” A further illustration of this process is the growth in sec-
ondary housing mortgage markets, and the more than sixfold increase 
of mortgage brokers from 8,500 in 1988 to more than 53,000 in 2004. 
The	state	occupational	regulation	of	mortgage	loan	officers	grew	from	
Kleiner.indb   46 1/9/2006   2:44:34 PM
Quality and the Demand for Occupational Licensing   47
a few in the late 1980s to 24 in 2004 (Reed 2005; Wholesale Access 
Mortgage Research and Consulting Inc. 2005).
An	alternative	explanation	for	the	rationale	for	benefits	and	costs	of	
attempting to enter an occupation comes from the “club model,” which 
purports	to	show	the	rationale	for	nonprofit	organizations	engaging	in	
exclusive behavior and having especially high time costs of entry (Ian-
naccone 1992). Occupations can limit entry as a method to “signal” 
quality and to show both those in the occupation and outsiders that in-
dividuals are committed to the work of the occupation (Spence 1973). 
“Signaling”	explains	apparent	inefficiency—time	and	money	“wasted”	
to acquire a college degree or “irrational” attachments to honesty, loyal-
ty,	or	the	giving	of	“inefficient	presents”	such	as	certificates	or	licenses	
rather than cash (Frank 1988). This in part explains the high entry costs 
and initiation rights that are often required of licensed occupations as 
well as the exclusive nature of this form of regulation, where individuals 
not	in	the	“club”	are	precluded	from	working	in	the	field.	Further,	these	
time costs can screen out people whose participation in the occupation 
otherwise would be marginal, while at the same time increasing partici-
pation among those who remain, thereby increasing the perceived qual-
ity of the individuals in the occupation. Individuals who want to enter 
an occupation must exhibit the resiliency of the potential shame costs 
of	the	stigma	of	failing	an	exam	and	the	self-sacrifice	of	schooling,	time	
spent studying for and taking licensing exams, residency requirements, 
and oaths of loyalty and honesty (Kandel and Lazear 1992). 
A	further	explanation	of	the	societal	benefits	and	costs	of	licensing	
can be found in the theory presented by Hirschman (1970) and then ap-
plied by Freeman and Medoff (1984) to explain how unions can have 
both a positive “voice effect” on productivity and a negative “monopoly 
effect.” A similar approach also could be applied to occupational regu-
lation. The monopoly face of licensing is generally presented as the 
principal outcome of regulation by most economists (Rottenberg 1980). 
However, to the extent that licensing requires (through continuing edu-
cation) that its members discuss and promote positive aspects of their 
work experience, disseminate information about how to do the job bet-
ter,	 require	 job-specific	 training,	promote	ethical	standards,	or	devise	
methods of adjudicating disputes between consumers and producers, all 
of these policies have the ability to promote “high performance work-
place practices” within the occupation. On the other hand, using the 
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government to restrict supply in order to increase prices for the services 
offered, which in turn increases wages, would be the central element of 
the “monopoly face” of occupational licensing. A third element deals 
with the extent to which regulation impacts exiting from the occupation 
if the economic or social standing of the work substantially declined. 
Perhaps	 the	 “club	model”	discussed	above	 requires	 sufficiently	 large	
time commitments upon entry, and this may result in relatively few per-
sons leaving these licensed occupations over time. Unlike unionization, 
where	employees	can	lose	their	jobs	in	the	unionized	setting	and	find	
other ones in the nonunion sector, licensed workers may be more likely 
to maintain their regulated status throughout their working lives. 
This variety of explanations for why occupations seek to become 
regulated provides many reasons for having this labor market institu-
tion. Each suggests why occupational licensing may either ensure qual-
ity for consumers or provide practitioners with greater monopoly rents 
and higher labor market status. Whether any of these explanations of 
the	benefits	or	costs	of	regulation	dominate	needs	to	be	examined	with	
data and analysis.
HOW LICEnSIng AFFECTS QUALITy 
If there are incentives for occupations to restrict supply and create 
barriers to entry, then what are the consequences for consumers of the 
regulated service? Figure 3.1 shows the anticipated process of how oc-
cupational regulation may impact service quality. Starting with the box 
to	the	left	labeled	“Regulation,”	the	figure	shows	how	regulation	oper-
ates through state-level pass rates, more restrictive licensing statutes, 
and reciprocity agreements with other states to restrict the entry of new 
practitioners. For example, licensing boards react to changes in con-
sumer demand by changing administrative procedures through the pass 
rate for new entrants or by establishing residency requirements for per-
sons	coming	from	other	states	(Kleiner	1990;	Maurizi	1974).	The	figure	
shows that the consequences of restricting entry to an occupation in any 
period occurring in the second box, labeled “Flow of licensed practi-
tioners,” are to reduce supply and increase the prices of the regulated 
service, as shown by the plus sign beside the box marked “Prices.” 
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Similar	regulatory	factors	that	are	shown	in	the	figure	are	presumed	
to	influence	the	quality	of	the	service.	Assuming	that	lower-quality	prac-
titioners are prohibited from entry because restrictions are increased, as 
shown on the bottom portion of Figure 3.1 labeled “Quality,” the mean 
quality of the service received is increased, since the remaining practi-
tioners entering the occupation are of higher quality as measured by test 
scores and evidence of “greater moral character.” A further illustration 
of the impact of increasing entry restrictions on the quality of practitio-
ners is shown in Figure 3.2. As the pass rate is reduced or the educa-
tional requirements are increased, the mean quality of practitioners in 
the occupation is increased. An increase in requirements increases the 
minimum competence from level A to B. As a consequence of licens-
ing, the average quality of practitioners shifts to the right from point C, 
the average quality when restrictions are at A, to D when restrictions 
are	at	level	B	along	this	bell-shaped	curve	in	the	figure.	With	this	pre-
sumed enhancement in quality, the use of services would increase as 
perceived quality of the service grew among consumers. In the absence 
of any theory or evidence to the contrary, I assume that the stringency 
of professionally administered quality controls such as licensure is the 
best proxy for quality as recognized by the consumer of the service. 
This factor alone would increase service quality as shown in Figure 
3.1, as increases in net quality to consumers (through the plus sign of 
flows)	 and	 lead	 to	 overall	 enhancement	 of	 net	 quality	 to	 consumers.	
On the other hand, higher service prices would reduce the overall ser-
Figure 3.1  Regulation’s Impact on net Quality
SOURCE: Adapted from Kleiner and Kudrle (2000).
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vice rendered, as fewer consumers would use the service as price rises. 
Consequently,	 those	 who	 receive	 the	 service	 would	 benefit	 through	
higher-quality services, but lower-income individuals might not receive 
the service because prices would rise under licensing. The net effect of 
regulation on service quality is therefore theoretically unclear. 
Professor Carl Shapiro presents a theoretical model in which he 
argues	that	licensing	benefits	those	who	can	afford	higher-quality	ser-
vices, typically individuals with higher incomes or those with insurance 
coverage for the service, and consequently the real service price is low 
(Shapiro 1986). Table 3.1 presents econometric evidence of a statistical 
application of this theory for dental services. The estimates show results 
that are consistent with the general theoretical model of who gains from 
tougher licensing. The data use medical and demographic information 
from a sample of 464 new enlistees into the U.S. Air Force (Kleiner and 
Kudrle 2000). The data contained complete information from their ini-
tial exams in the U.S. Air Force, along with self-reported demographic 
and economic information, as well as their dental histories. The demo-
graphic and economic values of individuals in this sample are consistent 
with those of individuals of a similar age from the Current Population 
Survey (CPS) from the 1990s. The dependent variable in this analysis 
is the dollar value of untreated deterioration divided by the total depre-
ciation of the individuals’ dental condition. The table is divided into 
two	columns.	The	first	shows	regression	estimates	where	the	dependent	
Figure 3.2  Impact of Increasing Standards on Competence and Quality
SOURCE: Adapted from Holen (1978).
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variable results are truncated. These use Tobit estimates of the impact 
of tougher licensing requirements for dentists for individuals who have 
insurance coverage. The estimates in the table include demographic 
controls for individual and household characteristics. The second col-
umn gives estimates for persons who did not have coverage with the 
same statistical control variables. The results in column one show that 
individuals in states with relatively high regulation for dentists and in-
surance coverage have lower untreated dental deterioration. In column 
two the estimates show that higher regulation has no statistically sig-
nificant	impact	on	service	outcomes	when	there	is	no	insurance	cover-
age. Perhaps for individuals whose price of dental services is high, they 
choose to use lesser amounts of these services. Further, these estimates 
are consistent with earlier results showing that individuals with higher 
education and larger incomes have lower untreated dental deterioration 
in the same national sample of new U.S. Air Force recruits (Kleiner and 
Kudrle 2000). These results show that individuals with lower perceived 
prices through insurance or higher incomes are better off with tougher 
state regulations within dentistry. 
Similarly, a study by Maurizi (1980) shows that higher standards of 
regulation of construction contractors serve to enhance quality for large, 
relatively well-off consumers. Although the net impacts of occupational 
licensing may be negative for all users of the service, for certain seg-
ments of the population, namely those individuals with higher incomes 
or insurance coverage, this form of regulation results in higher quality. 
Moreover, licensing may further serve to exacerbate the variation in the 
relative quality of service received or “consumption” by lower-income 
Table 3.1  Estimates of the Impact of Tougher Licensing Regulations and 
Dental Insurance Coverage on the Dollar value of Untreated 
Dental Deteriorationa
With insurance  
coverage (N = 269)b
Without insurance 
coverage (N = 195)b
High regulation −0.14c −0.03
(0.06) (0.09)
a Sample includes 464 new recruits into the U.S. Air Force.
b Estimates include controls for income, education, and gender. Standard errors, in 
parentheses, include corrections for group bias. 
c Indicates	statistical	significance	at	the	95%	confidence	interval.
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individuals relative to those with higher incomes or for individuals cov-
ered by insurance (Attanasio et al. 2002).
RESULTS OF STUDIES On THE BEnEFITS OF 
OCCUPATIOnAL REgULATIOn 
The basic relationships shown in Figure 3.1 would suggest that the 
quality of a service would be negatively related to the pass rate in a 
state, but that these regulations may also raise the skill of the service 
provider, since that person must spend additional time learning occu-
pation-related skills. Studies of demand have attempted to overcome 
the problem of variability in outcomes by making quality adjustments 
based on occupation human capital characteristics of the persons pro-
viding the service. However, there is no assurance that the services ac-
tually received by consumers are positively correlated with these proxy 
measures of input productivity, and the distinction between the num-
ber of inputs employed and the quality of outputs received may not be 
consistent. For example, a less-competent dentist may require multiple 
attempts	to	fill	a	tooth	to	the	same	standard	that	a	more-skilled	dentist	
could accomplish at once. Furthermore, there is little to no published re-
search on the relationship between performance on the licensing exam 
and an individual’s ability to perform on the job.1 Even for occupations 
with lower general education requirements (e.g., cosmetology), job-
specific	training	is	usually	longer	than	one	year,	with	an	apprenticeship	
followed by a state-licensing exam.
Nevertheless, several research studies have attempted to develop 
methods of estimating the impact of licensing on quality or the demand 
for licensed services. Table 3.2 shows information from many major 
academic studies of the impact of licensing on quality and on consum-
ers.2	For	the	benefits	of	licensing	there	are	a	disproportionate	number	
of studies on regulation in dentistry and education. This is partly be-
cause, for many years, dentistry had large variations in state licensing 
requirements	and	unique	state-specific	requirements,	such	as	the	“gold	
foil”	method	of	filling	teeth	that	was	required	in	California.	Moreover,	
outcome measures like cavities were easy to identify and quantify. Dol-
lar values across political jurisdictions were generally available. Two of 
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Table 3.2  Studies on Benefits of Licensing in the United States:  
Quality and Demand Effects
Authors Occupation Finding
Holen (1978) Dentists Licensing reduces the likelihood of 
adverse outcomes and increases the 
quality of care.
Maurizi (1980) Contractors Circumvention of minimum 
competency requirements, which 
allows lower-than-minimum-
quality contractors to obtain 
licenses, may reduce the potential 
quality effects of licensing.
Carroll and Gaston 
(1981)
Electricians, dentists, 
plumbers, real estate 
agents, optometrists, 
sanitarians, and 
veterinarians
Licensing increases the quality of 
individual practitioners but lowers 
the overall quality of services 
received by decreasing the total 
stock of practitioners.
Shapiro (1986) Licensed occupations Licensing	benefits	the	segment	
of consumers that values quality 
highly.
Kleiner and Petree 
(1988)
Teachers Licensing has uncertain effects on 
student achievement scores.
Kleiner and Kudrle 
(2000)
Dentists Tougher licensing has no effect on 
the overall quality of outputs, but 
higher	income	groups	benefit	from	
tougher standards.
Angrist and Guryan 
(2003)
Teachers State-mandated teacher testing has 
no effect on teacher quality.
Kane, Rockoff, and 
Staiger (2005)
Teachers Little difference in student 
achievement between students 
taught by licensed, unlicensed, or 
alternative	certified	teachers	in	the	
same schools in New York City.
Kane and Staiger 
(2005)
Teachers No evidence that licensed teachers 
are more effective than those 
without traditional credentials in 
raising student achievement in Los 
Angeles.
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the	cited	studies	in	Table	3.2	show	conflicting	outcomes	of	the	impact	
of	licensing	on	the	quality	of	care.	For	example,	Holen	(1978)	finds	that	
licensing reduces the likelihood of adverse outcomes and increases the 
quality	of	care,	but	Carroll	and	Gaston	(1981)	find	it	diminishes	quality,	
and	Kleiner	and	Kudrle	(2000)	find	no	effect.	Since	Holen	and	Carroll	
and Gaston use the same data source gathered from the naval recruits, 
the differences in the outcomes rely largely on different measures of 
outcomes. Holen uses a measure of the condition of the teeth itself, 
such as cavities or if there are broken or chipped teeth. On the other 
hand, Carroll and Gaston use a measure of an oral hygiene index, which 
focuses on the soft tissue and includes measures such as gum disease. 
The Kleiner and Kudrle study uses measures of dental health, which 
incorporate Holen’s measure as well as the ones by Carroll and Gaston, 
and also uses a “quality-adjusted” pass rate as well as statutory factors. 
Kleiner and Kudrle’s analysis also uses a broader number of controls 
for economic and demographic factors. Using these updated and more 
refined	measures	of	dental	condition,	the	characteristics	of	the	individu-
als	in	the	study,	and	measures	of	regulation	by	the	states,	they	find	no	
impact of tougher state licensing laws and administrative procedures on 
measures of dental condition. 
Studies of other occupations listed in Table 3.2 range from construc-
tion contractors to teachers and suggest that tougher forms of regulation 
have murky effects on quality or the demand for the service (Angrist 
and Guryan 2003; Kane, Rockoff, and Staiger 2005; Kleiner and Petree 
1988;	Maurizi	1980;	Shapiro	1986).	For	contractors,	Maurizi	finds	that	
allowing lower-quality contractors to obtain licenses would reduce the 
quality-enhancing impacts of this type of labor market regulation. In 
education, the growth of occupational licensing requirements over the 
past two decades has resulted in uncertain effects on student test scores 
in New York City and Los Angeles (Kane, Rockoff, and Staiger 2005; 
Kane and Staiger 2005), a generally recognized measure of “quality” 
in education. Carrolll and Gaston (1981) study seven widely varying 
licensed	occupations	and	find	that	licensing	has	either	a	negative	or	no	
impact on the quality of services received by consumers. However, us-
ing a theoretical model of the impacts of licensing, Shapiro argues that 
licensing should be thought of by income segments of the consumer 
market for licensed services. The argument is that wealthier consum-
ers	who	value	quality	more	highly	gain	the	benefits,	but	lower-income	
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individuals with lesser relative demand for quality services would lose 
from tougher licensing standards by having less access to the service 
(Shapiro 1986). 
Another factor in the growth of the demand for licensing is its dis-
proportionate prevalence in medical service delivery. Consumption of 
medical services grew by 25 percent as a percentage of all consumer 
purchases from 1984 to 1995 (Ford and Ginsburg 2001). Moreover, the 
prices of medical services have risen more rapidly than overall prices 
in the economy (Triplett 2001). An important factor in the growth of 
this sector has been that technological change has grown much more 
rapidly in the medical industry than it has for other services in the econ-
omy, leading to a need for more standardized labor inputs (Fixler and 
Ginsburg	 2001).	 Licensing	 has	 fulfilled	 this	 demand	 for	 a	minimum	
requirement of standardization as a complementary input to the rapid 
technological change in this industry. 
In	one	of	the	few	field	studies	of	the	impacts	of	licensing	on	qual-
ity, the FTC examined the relationship between licensing and the over-
prescription of services (Phelan 1974). In this study, televisions with 
known defects were used to determine the incidents of oversubscribed 
services in three locations: Washington, D.C., which has no licensing of 
television repair; New Orleans, Louisiana, which licenses individuals; 
and San Francisco, California, which licenses the facility but not the 
individual.	One	of	the	findings	was	that	“the	Louisiana	Licensing	Law	
does	 not	 protect	 the	 consumer	 from	what	 has	 been	 defined	 as	 ‘parts	
fraud’” (Phelan 1974). The estimates from the study found that parts 
fraud was about 20 percent in San Francisco, compared to about 50 
percent in New Orleans and Washington, D.C. Therefore, licensing of 
individuals may not be an optimal method of consumer protection rela-
tive to no licensing or the regulation of a business.
In	another	field	study	on	optical	care	conducted	by	the	FTC,	Kwoka	
(1984)	finds	that	the	average	quality	of	eye	care	is	lower	in	regions	with	
restrictions	on	advertising.	Moreover,	Liang	and	Ogur	(1987)	find	that	
licensing rules that restrict the use of dental hygienists and assistants 
increased the average price of a dental visit by 11 percent in 1970 and 
7 percent in 1982. They suggest that, if these price increases do not 
produce	any	quality	benefits,	then	consumers	are	worse	off.	There	could	
be	benefits	of	such	regulations	if	having	higher-quality	dentists	perform	
screening exams on patients enables the discovery of dental disease or 
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problems that left untreated could result in long-term problems of teeth 
and gum deterioration. Generally, the licensing literature attributes the 
total	increase	in	the	price	of	the	service	to	inefficiencies	of	regulation	
and	economic	rents.	However,	part	of	this	increase	could	reflect	an	in-
crease in quality or a shift outward in the demand curve for the service 
with a resulting increase in price.
Overall,	few	of	these	studies	of	demand	and	quality	show	signifi-
cant	benefits	of	occupational	regulation.	However,	a	most	convincing	
study would provide a randomized experiment of consumers going to 
unregulated versus regulated service providers and then measure the 
outcomes of the service. Unfortunately, this type of analysis has not 
been implemented. Instead most analyses of licensing reviewed in this 
chapter analyze more highly regulated regimes relative to less-regu-
lated ones. In these cases the results show that licensing has modest 
to no effects on the demand for the service or on the quality of service 
received by consumers. From this evidence there is little to show that 
occupational regulation has a major effect on the quality of service re-
ceived by consumers or on the demand for the service other than thor-
ough potential price effects. 
QUALITy EFFECTS AS MEASURED THROUgH 
InSURAnCE PREMIUMS
One method of determining whether licensing has an impact on the 
quality of a service is through the premiums charged to individuals in 
regulated and unregulated states. The rationale for this evaluation is 
that if licensing serves to keep out incompetent potential practitioners 
relative to states that do not have licensing, then there would be a reduc-
tion in lawsuits, which in turn could lead to lower premiums. In discus-
sions	with	officials	at	 the	Chubb	Insurance	Company,	 their	view	was	
that licensing makes an occupation more visible and sets up rules and 
regulations	that	make	lawsuits	easier	 to	file.	The	impact	of	 this	more	
structured procedure would drive up premiums. The greater visibility of 
the	occupation	and	the	greater	ability	to	file	lawsuits	due	to	licensing’s	
structure	compensate	for	any	benefits	from	the	quality	aspects	of	licens-
ing from the perspective of the insurance industry. 
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In order to analyze whether licensing reduces malpractice insurance 
rates, I examined three occupations that are regulated in some states 
and	not	in	others.	In	the	first	case	I	examined	occupational	therapists,	
which	are	licensed	in	approximately	half	of	all	states.	I	then	filed	online	
for malpractice insurance for an occupational therapist, age 35, with 
greater than three years of experience for the highest level of cover-
age. The exercise showed there was no difference in the rates in the 
states that licensed occupational therapists versus those states where 
the	 occupation	was	 certified	 or	 unregulated.	 Secondly,	 I	 then	 looked	
at practical and vocational nurses, which require licensing in 46 states. 
I then checked the malpractice insurance rates for a 35-year-old full-
time nurse through the Nurses Service Organization. The company is 
the nation’s largest provider of professional liability insurance cover-
age for nurses, with over 650,000 nursing professionals insured nation-
ally. The premiums in the four states (Arizona, Arkansas, Maryland, 
and Washington) that did not license practical and licensed vocational 
nurses were no higher than the ones that licensed them. The last group 
examined was clinical psychologists, who are generally licensed. Using 
the same methodology, there was no difference in the malpractice rates 
across states. However, the insurance company had an explicit policy 
that they would only insure psychologists with a master’s degree and 
a license or someone who had a PhD in psychology. This was the only 
case where there was evidence that the insurance industry valued a li-
censed professional relative to an unlicensed one in the data that was 
examined for this analysis.
In order to further examine the impact of licensing on malpractice 
insurance, I present the results from additional statistical evidence on 
occupations that are regulated in some states and not in others. Us-
ing data for pastoral counselors, marriage and family therapists, and 
professional counselors, Cordes (2005) examined whether insurance 
premiums are lower in states that license these three occupations. Pro-
fessional counselors are the largest of the three occupations, with more 
than 52,000 members (American Counseling Association 2005). Mar-
riage and family therapy has less than half that with an estimated 23,000 
members (American Association for Marriage and Family Therapy 
2005). By far the smallest of the three occupations analyzed is pastoral 
counseling, with just over 3,000 individuals linked to the primary asso-
ciation (American Association of Pastoral Counselors 2005). The data 
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used in the analysis were taken from insurance premiums published 
in tables on the Internet by the American Professional Agency (2005). 
The organization is the largest writer of mental health liability insur-
ance in the United States (American Professional Agency 2005). The 
level of regulation varies greatly across these three occupations. For 
example, only four states license pastoral counselors, but more than 
40 states license both professional counselors and marriage and family 
counselors. By analyzing these three occupations both individually and 
in aggregate, the analysis attempts to statistically examine the impact 
of being in a state that licenses an occupation on malpractice insurance 
rates for 2005 (Cordes 2005). Cordes is careful to use the same level 
of malpractice coverage for each state as well as similar age and expe-
rience data to calculate state rates. Using this data, Cordes estimates 
regression	equations	and	finds	that	“Ultimately,	the	estimates	both	for	
individual professions and in the comprehensive model do not show a 
significant	relationship	between	the	key	variables	of	licensing	or	certi-
fication	regulation	and	malpractice	insurance	premiums”	(Cordes	2005,	
p. 23). Using insurance malpractice premiums as a measure of quality 
shows no impact of licensing on reducing the risk of a high payout as 
measured by the insurance industry for any of these three occupations 
or for the other occupations for which I could obtain insurance premium 
data. 
One argument that licensing may enhance quality goes as follows: 
when an occupation becomes regulated, documented standardization 
may make it a target of lawsuits. The evidence that premiums do not go 
up may suggest that licensing does increase quality to compensate for 
the increased visibility of the occupation to attorneys. However, there 
are no data to support the hypothesis that lawsuits disproportionately 
target regulated occupations because of licensing. Consequently, from 
the available data and analysis there is no evidence that licensing en-
hances quality as measured by complaints to state boards or through 
lower malpractice insurance premiums. Nevertheless, perhaps with 
more information on insurance claims or greater detail on the types of 
complaints to state boards, a more complete answer on the quality ef-
fects of licensing could be estimated.
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ESTIMATES OF THE PRICE IMPACTS
Most estimates of the impacts of licensing policies on price of 
the service show positive impacts (Cox and Foster 1990). Table 3.3 
shows the effect of licensing practices on prices for various services. 
These practices range from restrictions on interstate mobility by lim-
iting reciprocity to restrictions on advertising and other commercial 
practices (Bond et al. 1980; Feldman and Begun 1978; Shepard 1978). 
The impact of licensing-related practices on prices ranges from 4 to 35 
percent, depending on the type of commercial practice and location. 
The rationale for these impacts on raising prices could be that govern-
ment regulations reduce uncertainty or the likelihood of poor service or 
“lemons” in the market (Akerloff 1970). As a consequence, consumers 
perceive the service to be of higher quality and demand more of the 
service, driving up the price. On the other hand, regulations could be 
a form of rent capture by the incumbent practitioners by limiting entry 
or restricting price information in the market for the service (Friedman 
1962b, p. 223). By government granting a monopoly in the market for 
the service, the long-term impact would be lower-quality service and 
higher	prices.	From	the	empirical	studies	of	licensing,	it	is	difficult	to	
tell which of these effects dominates in the determination of the rise of 
prices for licensed services. However, a consequence for regulated oc-
cupations with high incomes, like dentists and lawyers, is the ability to 
raise prices through the impacts of regulation with few readily available 
substitutes. This monopoly power may reallocate income from lower-
income customers to higher-income practitioners. 
An alternative explanation of these price increases often given by 
the occupations’ professional associations is that the method of deliver-
ing services for the profession has changed over time, allowing a group 
of experts to supervise, govern, and recommend changes that would 
standardize the practices. The result would be that average quality per 
practitioner	would	go	up,	and	this	would	be	reflected	in	higher-quality	
services	as	 reflected	 in	price	 rises.	Further,	capital	expenditures	have	
increased, requiring higher prices to capture a return on investment for 
either a sole practitioner or for an HMO (Cutler and Berndt 2001). On 
the	other	hand,	standardization	may	also	stifle	innovation	or	new	tech-
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Table 3.3  Studies on Price Effects of Licensing
Authors Occupation Finding
Benham (1972) Optometry Advertising restrictions increase the price of 
eyeglasses by 25 percent.
Cady (1976) Pharmacy Price advertising restrictions increase prices by 
approximately 5 percent.
Feldman and Begun 
(1978, 1980)
Optometry Prices are 9–16 percent higher in states 
that restrict advertising by opticians and/or 
optometrists, with larger effects in states that 
restrict advertising by both occupations.
Shepard (1978) Dentistry Reciprocity restrictions raise the price of 
dental services approximately 15 percent.
Bond et al. (1980) Optometry Average eye exam and eyeglass prescription 
is 35 percent more expensive in cities 
with restrictive commercial practices for 
optometrists.
Bond et al. (1980) Legal Restrictions on advertising result in a 5–11 
percent increase in price, depending on the 
particular legal service rendered.
Conrad and Sheldon 
(1982)
Dentistry Restrictions	on	the	number	of	branch	offices	
and the use of dental hygienists each result in a 
4 percent increase in price.
Kwoka (1984) Optometry Restrictions on advertising and commercial 
practices, such as an optometrist working for 
an	optical	firm,	increase	price	by	20	percent	
with no decline in quality.
Haas-Wilson (1986) Optometry Commercial practice restrictions, which 
restrict the employment of optometrists by 
nonprofessional corporation, the locations 
of	optometrists’	offices,	the	operation	of	
branch	offices,	and	the	use	of	trade	names	by	
optometrists employed by nonprofessional 
corporations, result in a 5–13 percent increase 
in price with no commensurate increase in 
quality.
Liang and Ogur (1987) Dentistry Restrictions on the number of hygienists that 
a dentist may employ increase the average 
price of a dental visit 7 percent. The restriction 
cost consumers approximately $700 million in 
1982.
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Authors Occupation Finding
Kleiner and Kudrle 
(2000)
Dentists Tougher licensing, as measured by the pass 
rate or the overall measure of restrictiveness 
of the state, is associated with an increase 
in prices. A state that changed from low or 
medium to highest restrictiveness could expect 
to see an 11 percent increase in the price of 
dental services.
Federal Trade 
Commission (2002)
Opticians The average price of a six-lens multipack 
purchased via mail order is 19 percent less 
than the average price for lenses purchased 
from ophthalmologists, optometrists, and 
optical chains.
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niques of practice by not allowing new procedures to be introduced 
because	they	fly	in	the	face	of	standard	procedures.
A further reason for the price increases is that the complexity of the 
science and practice in most of these occupations has skyrocketed over 
the past 50 years (Cutler and Berndt 2001). The complexity requires 
that only individuals with high levels of training and expertise can de-
termine whether other individuals are competent to perform in the oc-
cupation. Beyond being a boon to industrial psychologists, who must 
develop and administer these government-required exams, members of 
the occupation are involved in the development of the exams and other 
requirements to determine the minimum required level of competence 
and continuing education requirements. To the extent that these indi-
viduals can identify this expertise, the quality of work in the occupation 
is higher, but consumers may have a higher standard and quality level 
than	they	would	want,	relative	to	a	regime	of	certification.	
	To	illustrate,	college	professors	are	certified	through	their	educa-
tional attainment but not licensed. Consequently, universities can hire 
non-PhD	 teachers	 and	 researchers	without	 financial	 or	 criminal	 pen-
alties by the government. Further, members of the occupation have a 
voice in the determination of the minimum level of competence for 
continued employment. Although there are also opportunities for abuse, 
the argument for this type of system allows for oversight, but individu-
als without PhDs can be part of the system without government penal-
ties. If quality is not maintained, the status of the educational institution 
falls, with a subsequent decline in the attendance of high-ability stu-
dents and research funding. 
SUMMARy AnD COnCLUSIOnS
This chapter has provided a background for analyzing the potential 
benefits	of	occupational	licensing	as	a	labor	market	institution	and	its	
effects on the demand for the regulated service. The theories of the 
demand for occupational regulation show quality-enhancing policies 
that improve the perception of the service in the eyes of the consumer 
and allow the public to eliminate individuals who are not competent to 
perform a service. Giving the members of the occupation a voice in the 
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organization of service delivery is expected to enhance the productivity 
of the members of the regulated occupation. Further, establishing long 
training periods and rigorous entry standards provides evidence of a 
strong commitment to the profession. In addition, for those states where 
the occupation is well-organized and well-funded, they are more likely 
to obtain statutory regulations for the occupation. Theory suggests that 
regulation is able to increase the quality of practitioners by limiting 
the number of lower-quality practitioners through testing and statutory 
requirements. This outcome may be moderated by some persons with 
other opportunities choosing another occupation rather than spending 
the time seeking licensing. Consequently, the average quality in the oc-
cupation is generally higher, but there are fewer licensed practitioners 
to service consumer demand, which drives up prices or the wait time 
for the service. However, whether consumers gain from occupational 
licensing is a question that is still open to empirical analysis, but thus 
far, the preponderance of evidence suggests no impact.
Licensing appears to be complementary with growth in technol-
ogy. As capital and technological growth has increased in occupations 
like medicine and dentistry, higher-quality labor and standardized 
labor inputs are required. One method of this standardization is the 
granting of monopoly power to the professions to ensure this higher 
average level of service quality reduces the number of poor perform-
ers.	Through	continuing	education	requirements,	additional	certifica-
tion for specialization, and testing for basic skills, licensing provides 
a standardized labor input that may be complementary with increasing 
technology and innovation. 
The	analysis	of	studies	of	licensed	occupations	finds	that	the	impact	
of regulation on the quality of service received by consumers is murky, 
with most of the studies of this issue showing no effects on average 
consumer well-being relative to little or no regulation. On the other 
hand,	most	 of	 the	 studies	 of	 licensing	find	 that	 prices	 are	 higher	 for	
services with higher levels of regulation. From these studies of occupa-
tional regulation, it appears that higher-price effects dominate potential 
modest impacts on quality. Consequently, occupational licensing’s ef-
fect is generally negative on consumer well-being. However, for high-
er-income consumers regulation may result in higher-quality services. 
An additional reason for the increase in prices is that there have been 
technological changes within many of the regulated occupations and 
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that	these	prices	reflect	the	increased	training,	greater	technology,	and	
innovations that have occurred in the occupations. 
However, one important counterfactual has not been analyzed: the 
impact of no regulation on contributing to a major catastrophic outcome 
such as the spread of disease or the collapse of a building because of in-
competent	workers	or	inspectors.	Consequently,	the	benefits	of	regulat-
ing who works may still be positive if it reduces the chances of a large 
loss to the public relative to other ways of guarding public health and 
safety. Although there are many anecdotes that document worker neg-
ligence or incompetence that have led to major serious injury or even 
deaths, there is little evidence that licensing would have eliminated seri-
ous tragedies in any systematic manner.3 
notes
 1. Since licensure tests are not trying to measure performance but rather compe-
tence, there has been virtually no work on this topic by psychologists (Sackett 
2004). The American Psychological Association (1999) notes that for licensure 
testing,	one	relies	on	“content	validity”	(does	the	test	sample	a	specified	“content	
domain”) as opposed to “criterion-related validity” (does the test correlate with 
subsequent performance). 
 2. Given the diversity of occupations and methods used, meta analysis would be 
a	difficult	and	perhaps	even	inappropriate	way	to	obtain	an	overall	value	of	the	
demand or quality effects of licensing.
 3. Examples of worker incompetence include a Staten Island ferry crash during 
October 2003, and a New York City subway crash in June 1995, both of which 
involved licensed workers who failed to follow established standards for the op-
eration of the machinery.
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4
Licensing, Labor 
Supply, and Earnings 
Advocates of teacher professionalization are unapologetic about 
the prospects of higher salaries. In their view, the nation has un-
dervalued the services teachers provide and has not spent enough 
to recruit and retain good teachers. If high standards compel state 
and local governments to increase teacher salaries, that is only 
what they ought to have done anyway. In short, proponents of pro-
fessional self-regulation argue that the reforms they advocate rep-
resent a “win-win” solution to some of the nation’s educational 
ills: good for teachers and good for the rest of the country.
—Dale Ballou and Michael Podgursky in “Gaining Control 
of Professional Licensing and Advancement” (2000, p. 82)
As this analysis suggests, advocates of “teacher professionalization” 
seek to not only increase the quality of education, but also to raise the 
earnings of the members of the occupation through tougher regulations.
The task of licensing is generally placed with state licensing boards, 
which usually consist of individuals in the occupation with an under-
standable incentive to restrict entry and drive up earnings. Moreover, 
choosing only the most able to practice also may serve to increase the 
average level of human capital within the occupation. This chapter dis-
cusses the why and how of occupational regulations’ ability to restrict 
supply and the implications for the earnings of practitioners. Although 
our method of analysis cannot tell conclusively that any earnings effects 
are due solely to supply- or demand-driven factors, the analysis estab-
lishes certain facts regarding licensing and earnings for certain occupa-
tions. One of the methods of analysis uses the counterfactual of how 
much individuals in these occupations would earn if they did not have a 
license. Moreover, further analysis examines how changes in regulatory 
statutes and administrative procedures impact earnings.
A perspective on occupational licensing suggests that it is “diagnos-
tic and inexpensive to administer, they impose minimal costs on those 
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who are actually competent, but present a serious obstacle to those who 
are not” (Camerer et al. 2003). Although this may be the case with a 
driver’s license as discussed in Chapter 1, it is not the case for licensed 
occupations. Entering an occupation such as dentistry or law requires at 
least seven years beyond high school, at least three of which are spent 
in	 occupation-specific	 training.	 Pass	 rates	 can	 vary	 by	more	 than	 25	
percent by state, and exams often are given only twice a year. Failure 
to pass an exam may result in considerable shame and guilt costs on 
individuals, either discouraging them from entering the occupation or 
prompting them to choose another state in which to practice (Kandel 
and Lazear 1992). Unlike a driver’s license, where individuals do not 
have the choice with whom they will interact on the road, consumers 
generally can choose with whom they obtain a regulated service. 
The focus of this chapter is to analyze the impact of occupational 
licensing on the supply of practitioners and estimate the impact of li-
censing on earnings. The structure of the chapter initially provides a 
brief theoretical background of the impact of changes in the supply of 
licensed occupations on both state-regulated and unregulated occupa-
tions. Next, a case study of two occupations—dentists and physicians—
is examined to show how changes in the supply of practitioners can 
impact earnings. A review of the literature is provided on the impact 
of changes in the supply of regulated occupations on earnings. The rest 
of the chapter is devoted to examining how licensing impacts earnings 
for large groups of licensed occupations using data from the census and 
the National Longitudinal Survey of Youth (NLSY), as well as statu-
tory and pass rate data from the states. The concluding section focuses 
on comparisons between both regulated and unregulated occupations, 
and how tougher licensing laws and administrative procedures impact 
earnings.
THEORETICAL BACkgROUnD
A basic microeconomic analysis of licensing argues that regulation 
restricts entry into one occupation and can create an oversupply in oth-
ers (see Filer, Hammermesh, and Rees 1994). Although licensing may 
impose costs to consumers as shown in Chapter 3, the examination in 
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this chapter focuses mainly on supply implications of licensing. Fig-
ure 4.1 illustrates the potential effects of licensing. Panel A shows the 
implementation of licensing on the supply of labor for occupation 1 
shifting to the left from S to S1 with	a	fixed	demand	for	labor DL. The 
consequences for occupation 1 are a reduction in employment from E 
to E1 and an increase in earnings from W to W 1. If the newly regulated 
occupations contain a large number of workers, then there is also an 
effect on the unlicensed occupations. In Panel B, workers from Panel A 
who are now unable to legally do work in occupation 1 shift the supply 
curve for occupation 2 to the right from S* to S**. The implications for 
occupation 2 are an increase in the employment of unregulated workers 
from E* to E** and a reduction in the wage of individuals in the occupa-
tion from W* to W**.
The implications of the model presented in Figure 4.1 suggest that 
licensing not only has the effect of raising wages and reducing employ-
ment in the regulated occupation but also reducing wages and increas-
ing employment in the unregulated occupation. The consequences of 
occupational licensing are not only within the regulated occupation but 
also	can	serve	to	dampen	wage	benefits	for	workers	in	other	occupa-
tions. Therefore, comparisons of the labor market effects of licensing 
also need to examine the effects on unlicensed occupations. Empirically 
analyzing the full effects of licensing should examine similar unlicensed 
occupations as the counterfactual for the labor market consequences of 
regulation. The next section gives an example of the impact of labor 
supply and earnings by comparing two highly skilled licensed occupa-
tions where general regulation and other conditions in the market for 
health care may have contributed to supply shifts. 
LICEnSE TO DRILL: DIFFEREnCES In EARnIngS OF 
DEnTISTS AnD PHySICIAnS
Although	the	fictional	James	Bond	may	have	had	a	more	expansive	
license to “kill” in numerous novels and movies, the American Dental 
Association’s ability to restrict supply in part through licensing for den-
tists has contributed to a lucrative and growing source of income for 
individuals in this profession. A classic and often cited study completed 
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Figure 4.1  Impact of Implementing Occupational Licensing in the 
Regulated and Unregulated Sectors
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through the National Bureau of Economic Research by economists Mil-
ton Friedman and Simon Kuznets estimates that the 33 percent differ-
ence in the higher earnings of physicians relative to dentists was due to 
more than just a year’s difference between the requirements to become 
a doctor versus a dentist (Friedman and Kuznets 1945). They estimate 
that the difference in earnings between doctors and dentists should be 
about 17 percent based on human capital and other observable factors, 
but that the additional 16 percent residual gap is in large part a conse-
quence of physicians’ relative ability to restrict labor supply. Milton 
Friedman’s book Capitalism and Freedom argues that physicians were 
able to obtain substantial earnings gains over dentists during the 1920s 
and 1930s because they were able to limit the number of new student 
enrollments in medical school (Friedman 1962a). However, more re-
cently there has been a reversal of these trends.
There was a more than 23 percent growth in the number of new 
physicians from 1990 to 2000 (Scopp 2003). In contrast, there was 
no growth in the total number of dentists over the same period. Den-
tal school enrollment increased by only 1 percent per year during the 
1990s, and the number of dentists in the United States remained con-
stant over the decade as a result of retirements and individuals leaving 
the occupation (American Dental Education Association 2004; U.S. 
Census Bureau 2000). 
Why did the number of dentists remain constant during the 1990s? 
In large part this stable supply was a part of the larger boom and bust 
cycle in the production of dentists during the last century. During the 
1960s federal policies were established to fund an increase in the num-
ber of health care specialists, including dentists. Dental enrollments 
increased substantially over the next two decades (Field 1995). This 
funding for expansion resulted in an increase in the number of dentists 
in the United States both through the creation of new dental schools and 
increases in the enrollment capacity of existing schools. With a reces-
sion of the early 1980s, there was a decline in the demand for dentists 
and in their earnings (Field 1995). During this decline, the American 
Dental Association and state licensing boards attempted to “regulate” 
the number of new dentists, resulting in a reduction in the supply of new 
dentists (Field 1995). A major producer of dental graduates, the Univer-
sity of Minnesota, reduced its entering class by almost 30 percent from 
the early 1980s to 2000.
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Another element of the lack of increase in the number of dentists 
was the closing of several large dental schools such as those at North-
western University, Washington University, and Georgetown Univer-
sity. Administrators at Northwestern University stated that a large part 
of their decision to close their dental school was that the cost to oper-
ate expensive clinics as required by the state and recommended by the 
American Dental Association was prohibitive (Hagen 2001). In con-
trast, physician-training clinics generally were subcontracted to local 
hospitals and were not part of the administrative costs of operating the 
medical school. It is unclear why these schools did not raise tuition for 
dental education to cover the higher costs of training for dentists rela-
tive to doctors. With the decline in the number of dental schools and a 
reduction in new entrants at the remaining ones, as well as the normal 
attrition and retirements, the absolute number of dentists in the United 
States remained stable from 1990 to 2000, even though the overall pop-
ulation increased.
Did the decline in the number of dentists and the growth in the num-
ber of physicians have any impact on the relative earnings of individu-
als in these occupations? Figure 4.2 gives the relative hourly earnings 
of dentists and doctors age 20 to 65 from 1990 and 2000 from the 5 per-
cent sample from the U.S census.1 In 1990 physicians’ hourly earnings 
were 98 percent that of dentists. However, doctors earned more than 
dentists for almost every age beyond 36. In part this is because younger 
physicians were still earning training wages as interns and residents 
in their early 30s, whereas dentists were usually already in full-time 
practice. The growth in the number of physicians relative to the number 
of dentists during the decade of the 1990s is one likely explanation for 
this reversal in relative earnings in these two professions. As Figure 4.2 
shows, by 2000 dentists’ hourly earnings, which include bonuses and 
returns to private sector practices, were above those of doctors for al-
most all age groups except for individuals over the age of 63, when den-
tists often retired but physicians’ earnings continued to rise. Data from 
this	figure	show	that	physicians	were	making	only	82	percent	as	much	
as dentists by 2000, with the earnings of dentists above those of physi-
cians at most age levels. The relative decline in dentists’ labor supply, 
as well as other changes in the way dental services are provided, which 
included state regulations for having dentists on site when hygienists do 
their work, contributed to increases. In addition, dentists provided more 
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“fee for service” relative to doctors whose fees were often constrained 
by HMOs and Medicare. The next sections give information on statisti-
cal studies that examine the impacts of occupational regulation on earn-
ings and labor supply.
STUDIES On THE IMPACT OF LICEnSIng 
The area of occupational regulation that has received the most at-
tention by researchers has been the question of the extent to which li-
censing restricts entry, as well as the impact of these restrictions on 
earnings and the supply of individuals in these occupations. Table 
4.1 summarizes the results of many of the major studies on this topic. 
Panel	A	presents	the	key	findings	of	studies	that	focus	on	the	earnings	
of teachers, physicians, dentists, lawyers, barbers, and cosmetologists. 
The results show considerable variation in the effects of regulation. For 
the higher-education and higher-income occupations working mainly in 
Figure 4.2  Hourly Earnings of Physicians and Dentists, by Age, 
1990 and 2000 ($)
SOURCE: U.S. Census Bureau (2000).
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Table 4.1  Studies on Earnings and Labor Supply Effects of Licensing in 
the United States
Authors      Occupation Findings
A. Earnings effects
White (1980) Registered nurses Licensing has no impact on pay.
Kleiner and Petree 
(1988)
Teachers Licensing has no impact on 
teacher pay.
Anderson et al. 
(2000)
Physicians and 
alternative medicine 
practitioners
Physicians in states with stricter 
regulations on alternative 
medicine	earn	significantly	higher	
incomes.
Kleiner (2000) Dentists, lawyers, 
barbers, and 
cosmetologists
Earnings are higher for licensed 
occupations that require more 
education and training relative 
to comparable unlicensed 
occupations.
Kleiner and Kudrle 
(2000)
Dentists Practitioners in the most 
regulated states earn 12 percent 
more than those in the least 
regulated states.
Tenn (2001) Lawyers Low rates of interstate in-
migration and outmigration, a 
common effect of licensing, is 
associated with high wages.
Angrist and Guryan 
(2003)
Teachers State-mandated teacher testing 
increases teacher salaries.
B. Supply effects: including employment and migration effects
Thornton and 
Weintraub (1979)
Barbers Licensing of barbers has little 
impact on the number of 
individuals entering the trade.
Boulier (1980) Dentists Lack of national reciprocity 
restricts migration, resulting in a 
net loss in consumer welfare.
Pashigian (1980) Eight licensed 
occupations, with an 
emphasis on lawyers
The most pronounced effect of 
licensing is the reduced interstate 
mobility of members in licensed 
occupations. Restrictions on 
the use of reciprocity reduce 
interstate mobility still more.
Kleiner.indb   72 1/9/2006   2:44:36 PM
Licensing, Labor Supply, and Earnings   73
Authors      Occupation Findings
White (1980) Registered nurses Licensing has no impact on 
employment levels.
Carroll and Gaston 
(1981)
Electricians, dentists, 
plumbers, real estate 
agents, optometrists, 
sanitarians, and 
veterinarians
Licensing lowers the total stock 
of practitioners.
Kleiner, Gay, and 
Greene (1982)
Accountants, 
architects, engineers, 
lawyers, dentists, 
pharmacists, 
physicians, surveyors, 
insurance agents, 
real estate agents, 
registered nurses, 
practical nurses, 
barbers, and 
cosmetologists
Licensing acts as a barrier to 
mobility, causing a misallocation 
of labor resources across states. A 
system of universal endorsement 
would increase gross inmigration 
of	the	identified	practitioners	by	
over 60 percent.
Table 4.1  (continued)
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the quasi-private sector, like physicians, dentists, and lawyers, licensing 
appears to have large effects through either limiting entry or restricting 
movement to the state. However, for other occupations such as teach-
ers, nurses, and cosmetologists, the impact of licensing on earnings is 
murky,	with	some	studies	finding	small	effects	and	others	finding	none.	
Panel B gives the employment and state migration effects of licensing. 
Again the results vary by occupation. For barbers and nurses the impact 
of regulation on labor supply is small. However, for other occupations, 
licensing’s impact on employment in a state by limiting the movement 
of practitioners across states or counties can be substantial. This migra-
tion	effect	appears	to	be	of	sufficient	magnitude	to	result	in	a	geograph-
ic misallocation of interstate occupational resources and perhaps has a 
long-term effect on the geographic allocation of human capital. 
Similar to the variation of the impact of unionism on relative wag-
es across occupations and industries, there are also differences in the 
impact of licensing on earnings largely based on the characteristics of 
the occupation (Lewis 1986). To the extent that a pattern exists, it ap-
pears that occupations that deal directly with customers or patients or 
are allowed to work independent of other licensed occupations are most 
likely	to	receive	the	largest	economic	benefits	from	occupational	licens-
ing. For example, dentists, in part through a reduction in the supply of 
new entrants into the occupation from 1990 to 2000, received larger 
pay increases than any other major regulated occupation. Lawyers, 
through restrictions on interstate mobility, also have been able to obtain 
economic	benefits	for	practitioners	(Tenn	2001).	Physicians,	by	limit-
ing the supply of alternative medicine providers, have been able to en-
hance the earnings of the members of their occupation (Anderson et al. 
2000). On the other hand, occupations such as teachers and nurses have 
not	been	able	to	significantly	enhance	the	earnings	in	their	profession	
through licensing, perhaps as a consequence of the market structure of 
their employment relationship. Unlike doctors, dentists, and lawyers, 
nurses and teachers work primarily for large institutions like hospitals 
or school boards. The work of nurses and dental hygienists requires the 
oversight of doctors and dentists. Hospital and school administrators 
have incentives to reduce costs within their organization and likely will 
put pressure on legislatures to ease licensing restrictions to ensure an 
ample supply of practitioners. Moreover, for nurses and teachers the 
primary mode of determining wages, hours, and other terms and condi-
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tions of employment is through labor relations and collective bargain-
ing with an employer. 
An occupation that has been at the forefront of the growth of tougher 
licensing is public school teachers. This is a relatively new phenomenon 
in comparison with the other occupations in our analysis, with most of 
the states beginning to engage in tougher licensing standards during the 
1980s. Moreover, licensing with state-administered exams only became 
the norm during the 1990s. Although some analysis has suggested that 
the recent regulation of teachers has had little quality effect as measured 
by human capital or student achievement, there has been little analysis 
of the impact of regulation relative to similar occupations (Angrist and 
Guryan 2003).
EARnIngS OF LICEnSED vERSUS  
UnLICEnSED OCCUPATIOnS 
One way to analyze the impact of licensing on regulated occupa-
tions is to compare the earnings of the licensed occupation relative to 
similar occupations that are not regulated. George Stigler, in his of-
ten-cited	paper	covering	the	theory	of	regulation,	devoted	a	significant	
amount of his analysis to occupational licensing and found that licensed 
occupations earned more than unregulated ones using data from the 
1960 census (Stigler 1971). His estimates show that unregulated occu-
pations earned one-third less than regulated ones, and that unregulated 
occupations earned 12 percent less than partially regulated ones. Un-
fortunately, there were no control variables to account for differences in 
human capital or regional differences. In order to examine this issue in 
greater detail, I compare the earnings of persons who are accountants, 
cosmetologists, dentists, physicians, lawyers, and teachers to individu-
als who work in unlicensed occupations and are listed in the census 
within the same one-digit job family. This implies that they have similar 
job requirements. The focus of the analysis is to examine the counter-
factual of what would be the impact on the earnings of individuals in an 
occupation if that occupation ceased to be regulated while maintaining 
other general education and experience-related factors. 
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Appendix C presents a listing of the licensed and unlicensed com-
parison occupations in our sample by census two- and three-digit oc-
cupation code. The comparison occupations have similar education and 
work skill sets as the regulated ones. Based solely on observable gen-
eral human capital factors, these occupations are similar. 
Table 4.2 gives the regression estimates of the impact of licens-
ing	on	earnings	using	different	statistical	specifications	of	the	earnings	
equation for these listed occupations. In self-reporting on census forms, 
some	individuals	overstate	their	occupational	affiliations,	especially	in	
unlicensed occupations. For example, chemical technicians, who do 
not have bachelor’s degrees, may answer that they are chemists on the 
census form. Therefore, the analysis is presented both for individuals 
who	claimed	to	be	in	the	occupation	and	for	individuals	who	identified	
themselves as being in the occupation and stated that they also had the 
minimum level of education generally required for the work. These al-
ternative	specifications	give	the	results	of	a	truncated	sample	with	only	
those individuals who meet the minimum expected level of education 
for that occupation. 
The expectation is that there are characteristics of individuals who 
chose an occupation that would cause them to select one occupation over 
another. Consequently, the table gives results of estimates of the impact 
of licensing with the general human capital variables and the inclu-
sion of a self-selection correction variable, which adjusts the estimates 
for potential omitted variables,2 which may result in persons choosing 
a regulated versus an unregulated occupation (Heckman 1979). In all 
these	specifications	 licensing	 is	estimated	as	a	dummy	variable,	with	
one denoting a licensed occupation and zero an unlicensed one. Ac-
countants are included in this analysis since CPAs are licensed in all 
states, but most accountants do not have a CPA. Column one shows the 
impact of licensing when basic human capital variables are controlled 
for, as well as self-selection issues for entering a licensed occupation in 
this regression model.3 These estimates include all who claimed to be 
in the occupation in the census in 1990 and 2000, a sample size of more 
than one million. The results show that being in a licensed occupation 
enhances the hourly earnings of the regulated occupations by about 10.0 
percent.	The	coefficient	value	on	licensing	is	precisely	estimated	and	is	
statistically	significant	at	the	99	percent	confidence	level	using	group-
corrected for the standard errors. In the second column estimates are 
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Table 4.2  Estimates of the Aggregate Impact of Licensing on Hourly 
Wages for Selected Occupations in 1990 and 2000
Variables Total census sample
Limited by 
minimum education
Licensed 0.10
(0.02)
0.12
(0.06)
Age 0.05
(0.02)
0.07
(0.03)
AgeSQ 0.00
(0.00)
0.00
(0.00)
Female −0.37
(0.12)
−0.39
(0.13)
White −0.15
(0.11)
−0.19
(0.18)
UScitizen 0.03
(0.04)
0.25
(0.14)
Ln(pGsp)a 0.64
(0.18)
0.79
(0.25)
Ln(Population) −0.07
(0.08)
−0.10
(0.09)
Year2000 −0.15
(0.10)
−0.14
(0.13)
Education 0.12
(0.02)
Mills ratio −0.03
(0.06)
−0.04
(0.15)
Constant 3.63
(1.98)
5.88
(2.34)
Number of observations 1,044,141 740,227
R2 0.37 0.15
NOTE: Group corrected standard errors are in parentheses. Occupations include per-
sonnel and labor relations managers; accountants and auditors; purchasing agents 
and buyers, farm products; computer systems analysts and scientists; actuaries; 
statisticians; mathematical scientists, n.e.c.; chemists, except biochemists; teachers, 
prekindergarten and kindergarten; teachers, elementary school; teachers, special edu-
cation; librarians; economists; sociologists; social workers; clergy; lawyers; biologi-
cal and life scientists; physicians; dentists; veterinarians; optometrists; podiatrists; 
registered nurses; pharmacists; postsecondary teachers, subject n.s.; judges; public 
relations specialists; dental hygienists; licensed practical nurses; bartenders; waiters 
and waitresses; maids and housemen; barbers; hairdressers and cosmetologists.
a pGsp is per capita gross state product.
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developed from a truncated sample of only those individuals who have 
completed general education at the minimum level associated with the 
occupation. For example, the minimal level of education for teachers 
is a four-year college degree, whereas graduate education is required 
for attorneys and physicians. The sample size using minimum educa-
tion cutoff criteria by occupation is still large, with more than 740,000 
individuals	in	the	sample.	Again,	this	coefficient	value	is	large,	showing	
a 12 percent impact, yet it is measured with somewhat less precision 
and	 is	 statistically	 significant	 at	 the	 5	 percent	 confidence	 level.4 The 
results from Table 4.2 show that being in a licensed occupation has a 
moderately large impact on the hourly earnings of the individuals in 
the occupation, with magnitudes similar to those obtained by being in a 
union	(Lewis	1986).	With	these	reduced-form	estimates,	it	is	difficult	to	
know if the impacts on earnings are a result of supply restrictions gener-
ally promoted by professional associations that represent these licensed 
occupations	or	the	additional	general,	specific,	or	continuing	education	
requirements that enhance the productivity of the individuals in these 
regulated occupations.
Another methodological approach that uses occupations analyzed 
in	Table	 4.2	 is	 to	 find	 the	 impact	 of	 licensing	 on	 earnings	 for	 those	
individuals who switched from being in an unlicensed occupation to 
a regulated one and vice versa (Mincer 1986). Most of the estimates 
presented in this chapter refer to the average impact of regulation, but 
this type of analysis could be interpreted as the marginal impact of 
changing to a regulated occupation from an unregulated one. In order 
to do this, I examine individuals in the NLSY who switched from an 
unlicensed occupation to a licensed one for years 1984 to 2000. In ad-
dition, I examine individuals who went from a regulated occupation 
to an unregulated one. The expectation is that individuals who change 
their jobs or occupations do so in an attempt to make an economic gain. 
This research approach attempts to control for individual human capital 
characteristics as well as other unobservables that cannot be captured 
within a regression framework. The results of these estimates are pre-
sented in Table 4.3. They show that full-time workers, who are not in 
school and change their occupations, have large percentage increases in 
their	wages	in	their	first	year	of	employment.	For	example,	switching	
to an unlicensed occupation from a licensed one results in a 26 percent 
increase in earnings, but the switch from an unlicensed occupation to a 
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licensed one is associated with a 43 percent increase in hourly earnings. 
If the general switching of occupations estimate is 26 percent, then the 
overall	licensing	impact	is	17	percent	in	the	first	period	following	the	
change.5 The larger estimate can be interpreted as the marginal effect 
of	moving	into	a	licensed	occupation	similar	to	findings	of	physicians	
who became licensed in Israel relative to those who did not (Kugler 
and Sauer 2005). Additional estimates for “new” lawyers in the United 
States	find	that	tougher	licensing	raises	their	starting	earnings	by	almost	
37 percent (Pagliero 2004). In summary, these approaches indicate that 
the gains in changing to a licensed occupation are larger relative to 
changers who move in the other direction. These results indicate that 
the marginal effect of becoming licensed is larger than the average im-
pacts shown in cross-section estimates.
Although the estimates provided in Table 4.2 give overall results of 
the impact of licensing on earnings for an aggregate group of occupa-
tions, they do not provide results for individual occupations relative to 
a relevant comparison group. In order to provide more detailed results 
of the impact of licensing, Table 4.4 gives estimates by regulated oc-
cupation along with its related unlicensed comparison. The estimates 
continue to use census data and information on the overall regulatory 
status of the occupation. The table provides analysis for the following 
licensed occupations: physicians, dentists, teachers, lawyers, and cos-
metologists, along with the occupations that have similar educational 
and skill requirements but are not licensed. Accountants are not includ-
ed in this portion of the analysis since we are examining only occupa-
tions where all or most of the individuals are assumed to hold a current 
Table 4.3  Percentage Change in Hourly Wages after Switching 
Occupations Using nLSy, 1984–2000a 
Median percentage wage change
Percent gain 
due to licensing
From licensed to 
nonlicensed (1)
From nonlicensed 
to licensed (2)
Persons who change 
occupations at 
least once
26% (n = 99) 43% (n = 119) 17%
a Estimates include only full-time workers who are not in school, and are adjusted by 
the	wage	deflator	by	year.
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or provisional license in order to work.6	The	specifications	presented	
are for the truncated sample of individuals who met the minimum edu-
cation requirements. These results are consistent with those in Table 4.2 
and	show	that	licensing	usually	has	positive	and	statistically	significant	
impacts on hourly earnings. Nevertheless, there are substantial varia-
tions in the magnitudes of the results, with dentists showing the larg-
est licensing impact on earnings relative to its comparison occupation, 
while	teachers	have	the	smallest	coefficient	values.	Perhaps	public	sec-
tor administrators and school boards are able to lobby legislatures to ob-
tain exemptions from strict regulations and thereby increase the supply, 
which	modifies	the	ability	of	public	sector	unions	to	obtain	significant	
pay increases for their members. Clearly, the choice of the comparison 
occupations	may	also	 influence	 the	 results,	and	I	am	not	able	 to	find	
whether supply shifts in the regulated occupation or the unregulated oc-
cupation are contributing to the earnings impacts of regulation. 
Table 4.4  Parameter Estimates of the Impact of Licensing on Hourly 
Wages Relative to Similar Unlicensed Occupationsa
Occupation Parameter estimates
Physicians 
Biological and life scientists 0.407
Dentists 
Biological and life scientists 0.643
Teachersb 
Public relations specialists 0.000
Lawyers 
Economists 
Sociologists
0.048
0.454
Cosmetologists 
Bartenders 
Waiters and waitresses 
Maids and housemen
0.042
0.063
0.112
a Estimates include individuals with minimum level of education and the controls 
listed in Table 4.2. 
b The sample for teachers is limited by state average starting salary in the year before 
the 2000 census year.
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These results suggest that occupations that have a market structure 
that serves individual clients like physicians and dentists seem to gain 
more from licensing than individuals who work in occupations whose 
primary	 employer	 is	 a	 school	 board	 or	 corporate	 or	 nonprofit	 entity	
(Wheelan 1999). There is some evidence that large employers who are 
organized can lobby state legislatures to obtain more relaxed licensing 
provisions or exemptions from licensing laws that allow them to do the 
work of licensed practitioners. In the case of teachers and administra-
tors,	this	means	allowing	provisional	teaching	certificates	for	teachers.	
For example, in Texas almost 20 percent of the teachers in the public 
schools	had	provisional	certificates	rather	than	licenses,	which	allows	
school boards to hire them as teachers with the understanding that they 
must eventually become licensed. 
For teachers, the effects of licensing are virtually zero on the log 
of	hourly	 earnings	based	on	 the	 specification,	 and	are	 small	 for	 cos-
metologists. The rationale for regulation having a counterintuitive ef-
fect may be twofold. First, state regulators or state occupation or la-
bor force planners, who are often members of the occupation, may not 
have chosen the optimal supply of persons in the occupation in order to 
maximize earnings. For them, restricting entry even further may have 
resulted in a greater growth of earnings in the occupation. Second, even 
though restricting supply may be in the best interests of the occupation, 
state legislators may not allow certain statutes to be passed, or they may 
monitor licensing regulatory bodies that are responsible for setting pass 
rates or otherwise serving as a “port of entry” into the occupation. Con-
sequently, occupations that are similar but do not limit supply through 
state regulations may have similar earnings.
Although Tables 4.2 through 4.4 present statistical evidence of the 
effect of being licensed on earnings, they do not answer the question of 
what would have been the earnings of the regulated occupation if they 
had the characteristics of the unregulated occupation. A way to think 
about this “experiment” is to assume that there was a “trading places” 
of the regulated and unregulated individuals. To further show the earn-
ings effect, I present an earnings gap analysis that estimates what li-
censed persons would have earned if they had been in an unregulated 
occupation. This approach builds on the analysis of what would have 
been the earnings outcome if all the measured characteristics of one 
group were given to the other group, except licensing. For example, 
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using this approach assumes that the market rewards individuals differ-
ently for each year of schooling, age, or experience based on whether 
the individual was licensed. In order to do the statistical analysis of 
developing a counterfactual for this issue, a decomposition analysis 
is	 specified.7 This procedure does a statistical “trading places” using 
the regulated and the unregulated occupations. Since there is relatively 
little mobility between the two groups, the assumption of noncompet-
ing groups for these two occupations is plausible. For each person in 
the regulated occupation, the model predicts what would have been the 
earnings of the individual if they were not regulated at each position of 
the earnings distribution.8 Therefore, the expectation is that the earnings 
in the unregulated occupation would be to the left of the actual distri-
bution of the regulated occupation, depicting what would have been 
the distribution of earnings if the individual in the licensed occupation 
became unlicensed. 
A caveat to the decomposition analysis is that individuals who 
have greater unobservable ability characteristics, such as better social 
skills or aptitudes, may choose to enter a licensed occupation where 
the economic returns are higher than ones that require similar abilities 
but are unregulated. Since there is a large queue of persons wishing to 
enter these regulated occupations, part of the returns to individuals in 
licensed occupations may be the higher-quality labor market skills of 
persons in regulated occupations that consumers perceive as higher-
quality services (see Chapter 3). Another reason for the higher earnings 
of licensed occupations lies in the regulated occupations’ ability to re-
strict supply and thereby increase the earnings of its members. Howev-
er, there may be labor market mistakes by the occupational association 
through overestimating the demand for the service and consequently 
increasing the number of practitioners. The increase in supply of prac-
titioners could be accomplished through lobbying by occupational as-
sociations, such as the American Medical Association or the American 
Dental Association, to increase new entrants into the occupation or by 
relaxing immigration requirements. The process could occur over time 
through recommendations to professional schools and state legislatures 
to expand entering classes or change mobility constraints across politi-
cal boundaries. In addition, regulatory planners, licensing board mem-
bers who are responsible for administering the exam, and the organiza-
tions representing the professions who seek tougher state statutes may 
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allow too many persons into the occupation, thereby reducing earnings 
in the occupation relative to unregulated labor markets, whose earnings 
are dominated through the supply of individuals in the occupation and 
demand conditions. Similar to some industries where union wages are 
lower than nonunion wages, there may be occupations where regulated 
wages are below those in similar unlicensed occupations.
The statistical approach for the decomposition analysis uses a semi-
parametric estimate of the impact of earnings for each group along each 
stage of the earnings distribution. The analysis allows for a graphical 
representation of the total distribution of individuals in both the reg-
ulated and unregulated occupations. In this case the graph shows all 
hourly income earners of the licensed occupation superimposed on a 
figure	that	shows	how	much	the	individuals	would	have	made	if	they	
were unregulated. This approach shows the impact of licensing at each 
point	 along	 the	hourly	 earnings	distribution.	The	 coefficients	 are	de-
rived from the estimates in Tables 4.2 and 4.4, where the basic method 
estimates two standard log wage regressions using the variables in these 
tables, one for licensed and one for unlicensed. Predicted wages for 
licensed individuals are generated from each regression, and the dif-
ference is the value of earnings for each occupation if that occupation 
were not regulated for each point along the earnings distribution.9 The 
main advantage of this methodology is that the entire wage distribution 
is analyzed, allowing the licensing factor to have different effects at dif-
ferent points along the distribution. Thus, unlike traditional decomposi-
tion analysis, which usually presents differences at the mean of a dis-
tribution or quartile regressions, the decomposition technique is unique 
in that it uses semi-parametric estimates that allow one to decompose 
the changes in the entire log wage distribution. The semi-parametric 
decomposition method also allows one to gauge how much of the total 
discrepancy between two wage distributions can be explained by this 
type of occupational regulation.
The drawbacks of this approach are the assumptions of no spill-
overs between the licensed and unlicensed occupations. Another draw-
back of the approach is that the estimation and interpretation of the 
results	can	be	difficult.	In	addition,	the	method	provides	point	estimates	
of the wage distributions, but there are no standard errors, and rigorous 
hypothesis testing has not been developed, outside of using bootstrap-
ping techniques with simulations (Budd and McCall 2001).
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Figure 4.3 shows graphical representations of the decomposition 
analysis	 for	 five	 licensed	 occupations—physicians,	 dentists,	 lawyers,	
teachers, and cosmetologists—relative to the comparison group of unli-
censed occupations by the states, which includes biological and life sci-
entists, economists, sociologists, public relations specialists, bartend-
ers,	waiters	and	waitresses,	and	maids	and	housemen.	The	figures	for	
the semi-parametric results are consistent with the regression estimates 
presented	in	Tables	4.2	and	4.4.	These	figures	show	that	regulation	rais-
es earnings along most segments of the earnings curve for all of the oc-
cupations examined, both relative to their comparison occupation (i.e., 
the dashed lines) and in comparison to what they would have earned 
if the occupation were not regulated (i.e., the dotted lines). The results 
are consistent with the regression estimates in the previous tables in the 
chapter, showing that licensing raises earnings relative to occupations 
that were unregulated. 
The semi-parametric approach shows more clearly and in detail the 
results of the differences along each part of the estimated wage distribu-
tion in Figure 4.3. However, the size of the regulation impact varies by 
both the licensed and unlicensed occupation used in the comparisons. 
For example, the spread for dentists relative to its comparison occupa-
tion is much larger than for teachers in comparison to its “opportunity 
cost” occupation. Using all of the statistical approaches in the chapter 
thus far shows consistent results; namely, being in a licensed occupation 
has a positive effect on earnings relative to similar unregulated occupa-
tions and relative to being unlicensed. Nevertheless, this analysis does 
not examine whether licensing impacts occupations that are licensed in 
some states but not in others. Consequently, I now turn the analysis to 
the impact of statutes and administrative procedures on the earnings of 
practitioners who are not regulated in many states. 
PARTIAL STATE REgULATIOn OF OCCUPATIOnS
For most of the occupations regulated in the United States, there is 
licensing in some states but not in others. One issue is whether being 
in a state that regulates an occupation through licensing has any impact 
on the earnings of the individuals relative to states that do not regulate 
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Figure 4.3  Semi-Parametric Estimates of the Impact of Licensing on 
Hourly Wages
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Figure 4.3  (continued)
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the occupation. Table 4.5 shows the impact of being in a state that li-
censes an occupation relative to ones that do not, using similar human 
capital and state level statistical control variables as presented in Table 
4.2. These estimates are for more than 2.7 million partially regulated 
workers from the 2000 census, and they show that licensing has a sta-
tistically	significant	impact	on	hourly	earnings	of	more	than	4	percent.	
This estimate is smaller than the ones presented in Table 4.2, which 
compared licensed occupations relative to unlicensed ones. Part of the 
smaller impact may be due to spillover of higher wages from regulated 
states to unregulated ones. Organizations representing the occupations 
who operate in regulated states may apply an administered wage across 
state lines to maintain wage contours for the profession (Dunlop 1993), 
possibly resulting in the narrowing of wage differences across states for 
the same occupations.
These results support the view that licensing enhances the earnings 
of the individuals in regulated occupations, but they do not indicate 
whether this increase in earnings is a consequence of the restriction of 
supply of regulated practitioners, enhanced human capital gathered as 
a consequence of higher educational standards, or enhanced reputation 
capital which is perceived by consumers as existing in a regulated oc-
cupation (discussed in Chapter 3). Nevertheless, these results provide 
additional evidence that states that, by choosing to regulate an occupa-
tion, it may also drive up the hourly earnings of the practitioners in that 
state. This analysis does not answer the question of whether already 
universally licensed occupations can get higher earnings by making 
those regulations tougher through statutory provisions or through ma-
nipulating administrative procedures like the pass rate. 
SMALL DIFFEREnCES In LICEnSIng RULES THAT  
MAy MATTER 
Two major types of institutional licensing variables often impact 
the earnings of licensed occupations. First, statutory factors such as 
general	 and	 specific	 levels	 of	 education	 required	 to	 become	 licensed	
tend to vary by state. These include measures of good moral character, 
citizenship,	residency	in	the	state	for	specific	periods	of	time,	and	rec-
Kleiner.indb   89 1/9/2006   2:44:40 PM
90   Kleiner
ommendations from current practitioners. States can vary in the strin-
gency with which they each set the requirements for practicing in an 
occupation. Second, states can set their own pass rates for individuals 
to be granted entry into the occupation within the state. 
A further set of requirements is established for individuals who at-
tempt to move to a state from elsewhere. These requirements include 
similar	general	and	specific	statutory	education	requirements	as	those	
entering the occupation but with several exceptions. Oftentimes this 
means	retaking	certain	specific	parts	of	the	original	licensing	exam	to	
enter the occupation. As an alternative to retaking the state exam, some 
Table 4.5  Impacts of Partial State Licensing on Hourly Wages for 
Regulated Occupations
Variables Cross-section regressiona
Licensed in state 0.04
(0.01)
Age 0.08
(0.00)
AgeSquared 0.00
(0.00)
Female −0.30
(0.01)
White 0.08
(0.01)
UScitizen 0.08
(0.02)
Ln(pGsp)b 0.51
(0.05)
Ln(Population) 0.03
(0.01)
Education 0.08
(0.00)
Constant 1.15
(0.24)
Number of observations 2,756,892
R2 0.25
NOTE: Group-corrected standard errors are in parentheses.
a Estimates are for 2000.
b pGsp is per capita gross state product.
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states require working with a licensed practitioner to ensure that the 
out-of-state applicant follows current state procedures. Often, require-
ments are waived if the individual has worked in the occupation for a 
lengthy	period	of	time,	such	as	five	years.	Reciprocity	agreements	mean	
that states can establish virtual “treaties” with other states to allow them 
to accept each other’s licensed practitioners without additional educa-
tion or tests. The statutes and agreements with other political entities 
vary from accepting any applicant from another state who has a valid 
license at one end of a continuum to endorsement or acceptance of ap-
plicants if they meet the entry requirements in force at the time of initial 
licensure or currently in force within the state, to reciprocity only with 
states that have signed agreements (Kleiner, Gay, and Greene 1982; 
Tenn 2001). States vary a great deal by occupation in how they allow 
licensed practitioners from other states or countries to enter and work 
within their political jurisdiction.
To quantify the statutory factors that impact licensing, a composite 
index is used to obtain a quantitative value of the relative restrictiveness 
of each state’s licensing provisions. The indices chosen were a sum-
mated rating scale and a Rasch index. The Rasch index uses a Guttman-
type ordering of each of the statutory values. The seeming ordering of 
the statutes of licensing practices suggests a ranking of states by their 
licensing activity: those with high levels of statutory rigor or intensity 
for the toughest statute would have the highest ranks, those with lower 
levels of statutory intensity for that feature would be next, followed by 
those with high levels of statutory intensity for the second most restric-
tive	law,	and	so	on.	One	latent	variable	model	that	fits	these	data	well	
is Rasch-type models (Wang 1997).10 This index is developed so that 
it estimates the effect of regulation on both earnings and supply using 
a logit form to estimate the latent ability (statutory progressiveness) of 
respondents (states). An even simpler way to summarize the data for 
the statutes is to form a summated rating by adding together the levels 
attached to different responses (Bartholomew 1996). With a 0/1 coding 
for	the	presence	or	absence	of	a	practice,	a	state	with	five	statutes	gets	
a 5, while one with three statutes gets a 3 scale, and so on. The model 
uses both Rasch and summated ratings to estimate the value of the stat-
utory provisions of the legal measures. The estimates show a similar 
distribution of states by the Rasch and the summated rating measure 
of licensing. The two summary statistics give similar scalings with a 
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simple correlation of around 0.6. The Rasch estimates are used in the 
empirical analysis, but the results hold for the summated ratings scale 
as well. They also hold for factor analytic methods that form a single 
factor eigenvalue for these legal measures.
Using the summated rating approach adds up the values of each 
of the statutory requirements for licensure to form one measure of the 
restrictiveness of entry into the occupation. Based on the relative re-
strictiveness of the state statutes, the states were then divided into high, 
medium, and low regulation states for each occupation. Another mea-
sure of restrictiveness was the pass rate in the state. The assumption is 
that the lower the pass rate, the more restrictive the state is regarding its 
licensing administrative procedures. In other studies pass rates are esti-
mated	to	be	the	most	significant	regulatory	factor	in	the	determination	
of earnings (Kleiner and Kudrle 2000). Both the statutory regulations 
and the pass rate on the state-administered exam serve to restrict entry 
and create potential barriers to working in an occupation. 
Table 4.6 shows results of estimates of the impact of statutory index 
values and pass rates on the hourly earnings for cosmetologists, den-
tists, lawyers, physicians, and teachers.11 There are two sets of control 
variables. One group holds constant for human capital factors such as 
race, gender, education, age, age-squared, and citizenship. The second 
set of control variables accounts for demand factors in the state that 
may impact earnings, including population and per-capita gross state 
product in the state.12 Column one presents the impact of tougher licens-
ing using a Rasch index measure of regulation, and it includes a dummy 
variable control for the year of the observation for those occupations for 
which there is data for 1990 and 2000. The second column presents the 
impact of the statutes on earnings for the upper one-third of the states in 
terms of their relative restrictiveness using the summated rating scale, 
and they also include a dummy variable control for the year of the ob-
servation. The last column shows the impact of the pass rate on earnings 
of the practitioners. The results show that tougher licensing statutes had 
positive	and	significant	impacts	on	the	level	of	earnings	of	practitioners	
for	two	of	the	five	occupations,	namely	for	cosmetologists	and	physi-
cians. However, for the pass rates, there was no statistical impact on the 
earnings of the practitioners for either lawyers or cosmetologists. Simi-
larly, changes in the statutory provisions over the decade do not have an 
impact on the change in earnings of these licensed practitioners. Pos-
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sibly these estimates were due to the changes in the provisions that were 
small and occurred late in the decade and therefore were likely to have 
only modest effects. Or, perhaps there was not impact because these 
legal provisions paled in comparison to administrative factors such as 
the pass rate.
Table 4.6  Estimates of the Impact of Tougher State Regulations on 
Hourly Wagesa
Occupation
Regulations 
(Rasch) Regulations (high) Pass rate
Cosmetologists 0.00
(0.01)
0.08
(0.04)
0.00
(0.00)
Sample size 6,374 6,374 3,078c
Dentistsb 0.01
(0.02)
0.02
(0.04)
Sample size 6,567 6,567
Lawyers 0.00
(0.01)
−0.02
(0.02)
0.00
(0.00)
Sample size 65,599 65,599 65,599
Physicians 0.00
(0.00)
0.03
(0.01)
Sample size 53,033 53,033
Teachers −0.01
(0.02)
−0.03
(0.03)
Sample size 196,313 196,313
NOTE: Group-corrected standard errors are in parentheses.
a With the following controls: Age, Age squared, Gender, Education, Race, UScitizen, 
Ln(per capita Gross state product), Ln(Population), and Year 2000.
b Using only the census year 2000 sample.
c Using only the census year 1990 sample.
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COnCLUSIOnS
This chapter examines the impact of being licensed and of varia-
tions in state statutes on earnings for several regulated occupations, 
with a focus on the supply-side impacts. A basic labor market model 
shows that a reduction in the supply of licensed practitioners increases 
earnings of regulated workers but may lower the earnings of individuals 
in the unregulated occupations. An example is shown for the changes 
in the earnings of physicians and dentists. The supply of physicians 
increased during the 1990s, whereas the number of dentists remained 
constant. Dental earnings increased relative to those of physicians at 
almost every age of their working lives. 
 To develop more general results, this chapter examines the impact 
of being in a licensed occupation on the hourly earnings of universally 
regulated occupations relative to similar unlicensed counterparts using 
data from the 1990 and 2000 census. For the occupations examined, 
being in a licensed occupation appears to increase earnings between 
10 to 12 percent, which is at the lower bound of the impact of other 
labor market institutions, such as unions. For individuals whose occu-
pation is licensed in some states and not in others, the impact of being 
licensed	 is	much	smaller	 (4	percent).	The	chapter	also	examines	five	
universally licensed occupations (doctors, dentists, teachers, lawyers, 
and cosmetologists) and compares them to similar occupations that are 
unlicensed. The estimates show that, with the exception of teachers, all 
have some positive earnings effects relative to their selected “oppor-
tunity cost” occupations. To provide more precision to the results, the 
analysis shows semi-parametric estimates of the impact of being in a 
licensed versus unlicensed occupation and the effect of licensing along 
all	 points	 of	 the	 earnings	 distribution	 using	 the	 specifications	 of	 the	
estimates and simulation methods. Finally, this chapter examines the 
impact of variations in state licensing laws and pass rates on earnings. 
The results show the impacts are small—on the order of 3 to 8 percent 
for doctors and cosmetologists in relatively highly regulated states, and 
they are zero for teachers and lawyers.
Licensing increases the economic status of most practitioners. 
Policymakers need to examine whether these increases are a result of 
increased quality caused by greater training and higher-quality services, 
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or a consequence of restricting competition through the limiting of en-
try into the occupations, or both. The evidence provided in Chapter 3 
suggests	that	the	benefits	of	licensing	are	mainly	for	individuals	who	
have	insurance	benefits	or	are	relatively	wealthy.	Consequently,	policy	
options	like	certification	with	retesting,	which	is	the	case	with	driver’s	
licenses,	may	be	sufficient	to	result	in	the	quality	benefits	without	the	
potential negative effects of restricting competition. The next chapter 
examines in greater detail the trends in licensing laws and administra-
tive procedures, and how these laws impact consumers, workers, prac-
titioners, and the public.
notes
 1.   An issue using census data for high-income occupations is that the results are 
“top-coded,” which means that individuals above certain income levels receive 
the value between $75,000 and $175,000 from 1980 to 2000 depending on the 
census year. The estimates below of doctors and dentists for census years show 
the following percentage of individuals were top-coded from 1980, 1990, and 
2000. The rate of dentist to physician top-coding in 2000 relative to 1990 biases 
the estimates in Figure 4.2 toward dentists gaining even more income relative to 
physicians from 1990 to 2000.
Dentists % Physicians % Top-coded limit ($)
1980 13.32 18.25 75,000
1990 12.50 23.40 140,000
2000 20.01 26.14 175,000
	 2.	 Estimates	without	the	self-selection	variable	showed	similar	significant	licensing	
impacts ranging from 8 to 15 percent.
 3. The instrumental variable used to identify the equation for the inverse Mills ratio 
used to implement the selection variable was the nonlabor income in the house-
hold minus the individual’s income, with dummies for the relationship to the 
head	of	the	household.	See	Neuman	and	Oaxaca	(2003)	for	a	similar	specifica-
tion.
  4. Estimates using separate male and female equation models showed similar im-
pacts of licensing on earnings.
	 5.	 Using	a	fixed-effects	research	design	shows	the	switching	occupation	impact	as	
34.5 percent, and under this assumption, the licensing impact on earnings drops 
to 8.5 percent.
 6. There were 1,733,220 persons who stated that they were accountants in the 2000 
census, and there were 577,000 persons who are licensed CPAs in the United 
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States	(American	Institute	of	Certified	Public	Accountants	2004).	Nevertheless,	
licensing laws govern the behavior of individuals doing accounting tasks. Con-
sequently, accountants were not included in this section of the analysis. 
 7. A basic mathematical presentation of the form of the decomposition analysis can 
be stated as follows: 
  Wl	=	αl	+	Σβjlw Xjlw and  Wnl	=	αnl	+	Σβjnlw Xjnlw ,   
  where W is earnings and X is a vector including all observable factors such as 
education and experience. The subscripts nl signify nonregulated occupations, 
and l	signifies	a	regulated	occupation.	Using	the	standard	algebra	of	the	decom-
position	analysis,	the	simplified	equation	becomes:	
  __    __                __     __         __
  Wl	−	Wnl	=	Σ[βjlw(Xjlw	−	Xjnlw)]	+	[(αl	−	αnl)	+	Σ(βjlw	−	βjnlw)Xjnlw]
  (Filer, Hammermesh, and Rees 1994).
  8. Probabilities that different characteristics appear in regulated and nonregulated 
occupations are calculated from logit models and incorporated into kernel den-
sity estimation so that counterfactual distributions can be constructed. With these 
counterfactuals, one can analyze, for example, what the wage distribution would 
have looked like in 2000 if the individual were unlicensed and thereby assess the 
relative importance of that factor in explaining the observed changes in wage 
outcomes due to that factor (DiNardo, Fortin, and Lemieux 1996).
  9. The procedure for generating the semi-parametric estimates is a nonparametric 
kernel density estimation. The kernel function is simply a weighting function 
so that observations closer to the point of interest are weighted more heavily 
than observations farther away from this point. For graphical display, the density 
function estimate is calculated for a number of equally spaced evaluation points. 
In the analysis that is presented, the observations of interest are individuals’ log 
real wages, using a Gaussian kernel function with 200 evaluation points and a 
bandwidth of 0.05. A major advantage of this methodology is that we can exam-
ine the entire wage distribution in contrast to standard summary measures such 
as	a	discrimination	coefficient	or	a	Gini	coefficient.
 10. Rasch-type models have the following properties: they are unidimensional, re-
quire discrete observations, require statistical independence, and can be estimat-
ed using maximum likelihood techniques (Andrich 1988). If the latent variables 
are continuous, then the standard technique is factor analysis using the largest 
positive Eigenvalue.
 11. These estimates are in a reduced form that includes both supply and demand 
variables that impact earnings of practitioners in these occupations. 
 12. Each of the state-level controls has standard errors adjusted for group bias in the 
regression estimates.
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5
State Regulatory Policies and the 
Economy-wide Impacts of Licensing 
In a clash between state licensing regulators and a conservative 
branch of the Pennsylvania Amish, one of its members was fined 
$1,000 for practicing dentistry without a license. For the last 
thirteen years, Crist Zook has been pulling the teeth of his Amish 
neighbors. While he did not get a university education he read up 
on Dentistry, acquired instruments and found a source of prescrip-
tion painkiller Novocain. Zook was always available and had a 
good safety record.
—Sunday Patriot News, Harrisburg, Pennsylvania, August 
13, 1995
This newspaper report shows the potential clash of state licensing 
policies and religious practices. As more occupations seek to become 
licensed or to increase statutory requirements and job control, confron-
tations are likely to occur between groups seeking nonlicensed services 
and laws restricting those services. To illustrate, dental hygienists seek 
to practice without the supervision of a licensed dentist, but dentists 
have lobbied extensively for restraints on the ability of hygienists to 
practice alone or even to whiten teeth without the presence of a licensed 
dentist (Simms 2004). Moreover, dental hygienists are seeking legal 
restraints on what type of work nonlicensed dental assistants can do 
within	a	dental	office	since	they	often	do	the	tasks	of	regulated	hygien-
ists (Hallman 2004). The growth of licensing has resulted in numerous 
conflicts	not	only	among	licensed	and	nonlicensed	workers,	but	among	
occupations that are licensed and do similar work for consumers, such 
as dentists and hygienists. With the greater use of Internet transactions 
for regulated products and services, there has been a growing contro-
versy over state licensing regulations and federal concerns about restric-
tions on interstate commerce (Kleiner 2002). As many occupations seek 
to become regulated, this phenomenon continues to require additional 
ways of looking at this traditional issue with new data and analysis. 
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The stated objectives of licensing laws are to increase competence 
and	reduce	negligence	of	practitioners	(Office	of	the	Legislative	Audi-
tor, State of Minnesota 1999). The goal of this chapter is to present the 
basic facts on state licensing and the direction of regulatory legislation 
and administrative practices for certain universally regulated occupa-
tions, as well as to provide a rationale for and estimates of the potential 
societal	gains	or	 losses	 from	licensing.	The	first	 section	details	some	
basic facts on state-by-state licensing. The next section examines the 
changes in the statutory requirements and administrative procedures to 
practice for accountants, attorneys, cosmetologists, dentists, and teach-
ers in large states and nationally. The concluding section presents a 
method of estimating impacts of licensing on wages and employment as 
well as providing an assessment of potential losses to society. The sum-
mary to the chapter discusses the rationale for licensing in advanced in-
dustrial societies and suggests how looking at other nations’ regulation 
of occupations may provide useful insights into these questions. 
STATE DATA On THE nUMBER OF LICEnSED 
OCCUPATIOnS AnD THE nUMBER OF WORkERS
The difference between a good and bad haircut is two days. 
 —James Ragan, Department of Economics, Kansas State 
 University, March 12, 20041 
The above quote suggests that quality issues for licensed barbers 
are	relatively	small	and	that	licensing	benefits	to	consumers	of	barber-
ing services also are likely to be small, yet barbering is licensed in all 
50 states. Licensing in the United States is state-by-state rather than 
national, as in other countries such as France. To fully understand the 
impact of licensing, it is important to know about the basic facts and 
trends of this form of regulation. As a consequence of this structure of 
regulation in the United States, there is much variation in the number 
of occupations regulated and the percentage of the workforce in each 
state that must have a state-sanctioned permit to work. One reason for 
this disparity across states may be the ability of the advocates for the 
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occupation to obtain regulation for the members of the occupation (Rot-
tenberg 1980; Wheelan 1999). Issues like the extent of political organi-
zational	commitment	and	the	financial	contributions	to	political	parties	
by the profession may have important impacts on whether the occupa-
tion can convince members of the state legislature that they should be 
licensed. Often the number of persons in the occupation in the state can 
help determine whether the members of the occupation are successful 
in obtaining state licensing. If the policy of a national profession is to 
have its occupation universally licensed, then the state chapters often 
make this topic their main political goal. This was the case when respi-
ratory therapists sought to obtain licensing status in all states (Wheelan 
2005).
Table 5.1 shows the number of occupations that are licensed, by 
state, using data from the Department of Labor’s Labor Market In-
formation Survey, as stated at its Web site: http://www.acinet.org/ 
acinet/default.asp. These data were matched with occupations listed in 
the 2000 census. If the occupation given by the state enumeration was 
not listed in the 2000 census, it was dropped from the listing. As a re-
sult, the values in Table 5.1 understate the actual number of occupations 
that are regulated in each state.2 The listing of licensed occupations by 
state shows much variation in the number of regulated occupations. To 
illustrate, California and Connecticut license more than 150 occupa-
tions, but Kansas regulates fewer than 50. The median state, Nevada, 
regulates about 88 occupations at the state level. The states that have the 
5 highest numbers of licensed occupations average about 146 regulated 
occupations,	but	the	bottom	five	states	average	about	53	licensed	occu-
pations. Therefore, the most regulated states license almost three times 
the number of the least regulated ones. The data from this table only 
provide information from the state level, but counties and cities often 
impose additional requirements or have their own additional listing of 
occupations that are licensed within their political jurisdiction.
One of the important political questions in occupational regulation 
is why states like Iowa regulate 82 occupations but neighboring Kansas 
only licenses 47. A deeper examination of the labor force composition 
and the political environment of the two states and the political aware-
ness of the occupational associations may provide some insights into 
the reasons for the variation in licensing coverage for these two states. 
Figure 5.1 maps the percentage of the workforce covered by licensing 
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Table 5.1  number of Occupations Licensed, by State, and Their Relative 
Rank, 2000
State
Number of  
licensed occupations Rank
California 178 1
Connecticut 154 2
Arkansas 140 3
Maine 139 4
Michigan 118 5
Wisconsin 117 6
Tennessee 114 7
North Carolina 113 8
New Hampshire 112 9
Rhode Island 112 10
New Jersey 109 11
Oregon 108 12
Ohio 107 13
Florida 106 14
Vermont 106 15
Massachusetts 105 16
New Mexico 101 17
Idaho 99 18
Alaska 96 19
Illinois 94 20
Minnesota 94 21
Nebraska 94 22
Oklahoma 93 23
Washington 92 24
Maryland 89 25
South Dakota 89 26
Nevada 88 27
Kentucky 87 28
Georgia 83 29
Indiana 83 30
Iowa 82 31
Louisiana 81 32
Delaware 80 33
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State
Number of  
licensed occupations Rank
Virginia 80 34
Utah 79 35
Montana 78 36
New York 73 37
West Virginia 72 38
Texas 71 39
Wyoming 67 40
Alabama 64 41
North Dakota 63 42
Colorado 62 43
Missouri 60 44
Hawaii 60 45
Mississippi 55 46
South Carolina 55 47
Arizona 54 48
Pennsylvania 53 49
Kansas 47 50
SOURCE: America’s Career InfoNet (2005).
Table 5.1  (continued)
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laws,	by	state,	using	categories	of	low,	medium,	and	high.	This	figure	
shows that the most regulated states are on the East and West Coasts, 
and in the heavily industrialized states in the Midwest. The only major 
exception is the state of Arkansas, where many occupations became 
regulated during the 1980s. 
WORkFORCE COvERAgE OF LICEnSED OCCUPATIOnS 
By STATE
Although knowing the number of occupations that are licensed is 
useful as a proxy for the status of occupational regulation in a state, 
it does not give the coverage of the workforce that is directly subject 
to state regulation. Table 5.2 shows the percentage of the employed 
workforce that is covered by licensing laws in each state. There is a 
comparable amount of variation in the percentage of the workforce that 
Figure 5.1  Percent of Workforce Licensed, by State, 2000
NOTE: Alaska and Hawaii are in the “Medium” category.
SOURCE: America’s Career InfoNet (2005); U.S. Census Bureau (2000).
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Figure 5-1:  Percent of Workforce Licensed by State 
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Medium (16–25%)
High (26% and above)
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Table 5.2  Percent of Workers Covered by Licensing, 2000
State Licensed Total Percent
Alabama 263,800 2,015,620 13.09
Alaska 75,320 330,420 22.80
Arizona 296,140 2,399,600 12.34
Arkansas 345,360 1,209,260 28.56
California 4,802,460 15,820,040 30.36
Colorado 523,000 2,338,540 22.36
Connecticut 528,560 1,757,260 30.08
Delaware 78,780 399,120 19.74
Florida 1,666,140 7,501,560 22.21
Georgia 555,580 4,023,880 13.81
Hawaii 113,700 598,920 18.98
Idaho 120,200 621,800 19.33
Illinois 1,697,540 6,165,300 27.53
Indiana 367,120 3,066,380 11.97
Iowa 234,480 1,525,080 15.37
Kansas 161,860 1,360,260 11.90
Kentucky 223,920 1,868,560 11.98
Louisiana 274,080 1,969,200 13.92
Maine 137,520 657,000 20.93
Maryland 567,260 2,780,060 20.40
Massachusetts 737,360 3,339,880 22.08
Michigan 1,368,620 4,841,900 28.27
Minnesota 352,860 2,667,700 13.23
Mississippi 74,980 1,228,500 6.10
Missouri 344,760 2,763,020 12.48
Montana 92,300 457,900 20.16
Nebraska 203,040 885,400 22.93
Nevada 198,460 1,022,100 19.42
New Hampshire 165,820 676,720 24.50
New Jersey 777,260 4,219,380 18.42
New Mexico 193,340 824,940 23.44
New York 1,430,980 9,061,380 15.79
North Carolina 943,340 4,017,060 23.48
North Dakota 40,500 328,860 12.32
Ohio 1,153,480 5,647,700 20.42
Oklahoma 306,700 1,630,940 18.81
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Table 5.2  (continued)
State Licensed Total Percent
Oregon 327,200 1,716,180 19.07
Pennsylvania 956,120 5,967,660 16.02
Rhode Island 129,920 535,920 24.24
South Carolina 325,960 1,910,720 17.06
South Dakota 72,320 380,420 19.01
Tennessee 590,260 2,754,020 21.43
Texas 1,350,160 9,883,880 13.66
Utah 186,480 1,093,480 17.05
Vermont 79,480 332,280 23.92
Virginia 625,500 3,684,300 16.98
Washington 360,700 2,988,680 12.07
West Virginia 142,220 767,060 18.54
Wisconsin 694,920 2,847,320 24.41
Wyoming 28,620 254,620 11.24
Total 27,286,480 137,137,880 19.90
SOURCE: America’s Career InfoNet (2005); U.S. Census Bureau (2000).
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is licensed by states as for the variation in the number of occupations 
regulated by the states.  
Although the national average for the percentage of the workforce 
that is licensed is 19.9 percent in 2000, there is much variation in the 
percentage of the workforce that is regulated. For example, California 
licensing coverage is about 30.4 percent of its workforce, but Missis-
sippi regulates only 6.1 percent of its workforce through licensing. The 
ratio of licensed employment coverage to total employment of the top 
five	states	(average	is	28.9	percent)	to	the	bottom	five	states	(average	is	
10.6) is more than 2.7 times as large, which is similar to the variation 
in the results shown in Table 5.1. Generally, states with high population 
density or heavily industrialized states such as California, Connecticut, 
and Illinois tend to have higher levels of occupational licensing than 
more rural or lower-income states like Mississippi or Wyoming. 
Larger and more urbanized states seem to be more likely to have 
stronger organizations that represent occupations, and they can obtain 
regulation for their members as a form of “rent capture” for their oc-
cupations.	Moreover,	urbanized	states	may	want	to	obtain	the	benefits	
of credentialing that licensing provides, since many of the commercial 
interactions that occur in more densely populated areas are impersonal 
transactions with little repeat business, and this may require more regu-
lation as a form of consumer protection. Consumers of the service and 
legislators also may see the regulation of these services through licens-
ing as a method of quality control through the elimination of “lemons 
from the market” (Akerlof 1970). 
TREnDS In THE REgULATIOn OF  
LICEnSED OCCUPATIOnS 
There has been a consistent upward trend in the growth of the 
number of laws or administrative procedures that regulate occupations 
(Kleiner and Gordon 1996). However, for some occupations that have 
been regulated for a long time, the trend has been toward fewer re-
strictions. On the other hand, newly regulated occupations generally 
have seen an increase in the level of statutory regulations over time. 
Figure 5.2 summarizes these trends for several universally licensed oc-
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cupations over a 20-year period, using an index value for accountants, 
attorneys, cosmetologists, dentists, and teachers. The statutory regula-
tions examined vary by occupations but generally include a residency 
requirement, reciprocity with other states or the endorsement of quali-
fications	from	other	states,	minimum	score	requirements	in	order	to	re-
take other sections of the exam, years of experience required to take or 
receive a license, and the number of continuing education requirements 
needed to maintain the license. 
Accountants have increased requirements for entry by the states as 
shown in Figure 5.2. Unlike many of the other occupations that are li-
censed in all states, individuals can perform many accounting functions 
for	pay	without	having	 a	 license.	However,	 to	provide	official	 infor-
mation	on	the	financial	state	of	a	company	requires	a	certified	public	
accountant (CPA) license. These laws mandate that individuals meet 
state requirements that include age, residency, general education, and 
accounting-specific	information.	Reciprocity	with	other	states	is	given	
if the individual has 5 or 10 years of CPA experience. One of the major 
changes in the licensing of CPAs has been the requirement that indi-
viduals must have 150 hours of relevant university-level classes, effec-
tively increasing requirements for the license by one year. 
For	attorneys,	the	plot	in	the	figure	measures	an	index	of	the	state	
requirements	for	the	following	qualifications:	residency,	accepts	attor-
neys who are admitted to the bar in other states, uses the multistate 
bar exam, requires graduation from an American Bar Association–ap-
proved school, and requires that law students register with the State 
Board of Bar Examiners. The requirements for cosmetologists contain 
fewer	general	and	specific	education	requirements	and	are	 less	rigor-
ous, but the summary still measures whether the state requires mini-
mum	levels	of	general	education,	specific	education,	an	apprenticeship	
in lieu of education, whether there is reciprocity, and if the state has a 
minimum passing score. Even though the requirements are lower than 
for the other occupations, barbers and cosmetologists generally require 
at least nine months of schooling and apprenticeships that last approxi-
mately	a	year	and	a	half.	The	trends	in	the	figure	also	measure	these	re-
quirements. Teacher index requirements for licensure include whether a 
professional	education	degree	is	required,	a	second	stage	certificate	or	a	
master’s degree, whether an exam is required to enter a teacher prepa-
ration program, reciprocity, and if a major is required for secondary 
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Figure 5.2  Time-Series Statute Index for Five Universally  
Licensed Occupations
NOTE: Summary index includes minimum scores applicant must have on failed 
sections in order to retain conditional approval and years of experience required to 
1)	receive	a	CPA	certificate,	2)	sit	for	CPA	exam,	or	3)	receive	permit	or	license	to	
practice, 150 hours continuing education/graduate education, and semester hours of 
accounting classes. Largest seven states by population are California, Florida, Illinois, 
New York, Ohio, Pennsylvania, and Texas.
SOURCE: Digest of State Accountancy Laws and State Board Regulations, various 
years.
Accountants
National average vs. average for largest seven states
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NOTE: Summary index includes residency, whether a state has a provision for admission 
on motion, whether a state accepts out-of-state Multi-state Bar Examination scores, 
whether an applicant must have received a J.D. from an American Bar Association-
approved school to qualify for admission on motion, and whether a state requires law 
students to register with the State Board of Bar Examiners. Largest seven states are 
California, Florida, Illinois, New York, Ohio, Pennsylvania, and Texas.
SOURCE: Comprehensive Guide to Bar Admission Requirements, various years, and 
A Review of Legal Education in the United States, Law Schools, and Bar Admission 
Requirements, various years.
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Figure 5.2  (continued)
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COSMETOLOgIST
national Average vs. Average for Top Seven States
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Cosmetologists
National average vs. average for largest seven states
NOTE: Summary index includes education, cosmetology education, whether an ap-
prenticeship is permitted in lieu of education, reciprocity, and minimum passing score. 
Largest seven states are California, Florida, Illinois, New York, Ohio, Pennsylvania, 
and Texas.
SOURCE: Milady’s Guide to Cosmetology Licensing, various years, and author’s com-
pilation of state statutes, various years.
Figure 5.2  (continued)
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DEnTISTS
national Average vs. Average for Top Seven States
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Dentists
National average vs. average for largest seven states
NOTE: Summary index includes education and reciprocity/endorsement. Largest sev-
en states are California, Florida, Illinois, Ohio, New York, Pennsylvania, and Texas.
SOURCE: Facts about States for the Dentist Seeking a Location, various years, and 
author’s complilation of state statutes, various years.
Figure 5.2  (continued)
Su
m
m
ar
y 
in
de
x 
av
er
ag
e
Largest 
seven states
Kleiner.indb   110 1/9/2006   2:44:42 PM
State Regulatory Policies and the Impacts of Licensing   111
Figure 5.2  (continued)
TEACHERS
national Average vs. Average for Top Seven States
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Teachers
National average vs. average fo  largest s en states
NOTE: Summary index includes full-time student teaching, whether a professional ed-
ucation degree is required or not accepted, whether a state that requires a second-stage 
certificate	requires	a	master’s	degree	or	5th	year	for	that	certificate,	whether	an	exam	
is	required	to	enter	a	teacher	preparation	program	or	obtain	initial	certification,	reci-
procity, and whether secondary school teachers require major/minor in subject taught. 
Largest seven states are California, Florida, Illinois, New York, Ohio, Pennsylvania, 
and Texas.
SOURCE: National Association of State Directors of Teacher Education and Certifica-
tion Manual, various years; Eissenberg and Rudner (1988); and Childs and Rudner 
(1990).
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school teachers. For dentists, the requirements are that the individuals 
have an undergraduate degree plus at least 48 months of dental school 
training. Figure 5.3 shows national pass rates, which are collected by 
the national associations, for CPA accountants and cosmetologists dur-
ing the 1980s and 1990s.
The results in both Figures 5.2 and 5.3 show much variation in the 
changes in the stringency of licensing requirements over time for these 
five	 occupations.	 For	 example,	 dentists’	 legal	 requirements	 have	 de-
clined, but there has been little overall change in the toughness of the 
statutes for cosmetologists and attorneys. On the other hand, accoun-
tant and teacher requirements have increased. The largest jump in the 
toughness of licensing requirements occurred for teachers. The average 
state	only	had	one	of	the	five	key	licensing	provisions	in	1984,	but	the	
average state had increased its requirements to between 2.5 and 3 of 
the	licensing	provisions	by	2000.	This	largely	reflected	the	push	toward	
state-level	exams	and	the	greater	difficulty	in	moving	across	states	by	
teachers, much of which was promoted by teacher unions. In contrast, 
the	number	of	licensing	restrictions	fell	for	dentists,	largely	reflecting	
the move to multistate testing and the greater acceptance of out-of-state 
dentists over this time period. The trends in licensing in the largest sev-
en	states	by	population	generally	reflect	the	trends	in	the	laws	in	other	
smaller	states	as	shown	in	the	figures.	Either	through	the	influence	of	
the lobbying organizations that represent the occupations or through ef-
forts at standardization across states during this period, there were simi-
lar	trends	across	these	five	occupations	in	the	kinds	of	legal	provisions	
that were enacted across the United States in large and small states.
LICEnSIng AnD ECOnOMIC LOSSES TO SOCIETy
Have these state regulations on occupations impacted the economy? 
The previous chapters showed that, for most licensed occupations, there 
is a wage premium that ranges from 4 percent for partially licensed oc-
cupations to 12 percent for occupations that are licensed relative to their 
nonlicensed counterparts. Based on the results presented in Chapter 3, 
licensing is associated with an increase in the price of the regulated ser-
vice in most cases. Although there may be gains to the individuals in the 
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Figure 5.3  national Pass Rates for Accountants and Cosmetologists 
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SOURCE: National Association of State Boards of Accountancy, Candidate Performance 
on the Uniform CPA Examination (national data compiled since 1982); and Milady’s 
Guide to Cosmetology Licensing, various years.
Kleiner.indb   113 1/9/2006   2:44:43 PM
114   Kleiner
regulated occupation through higher wages, there also may be losses to 
society through lost output. When an occupation becomes regulated, 
wages and prices usually go up (Rottenberg 1980). If there is a standard 
downward sloping demand curve, then increases in the price of the ser-
vice may result in both a reallocation of income from consumers to the 
purveyor of the service and the loss of the services to society through 
lower employment and fewer services.  
Figure 5.4 shows the basic underlying modeling approach to the 
assumption that licensing results in potential “dead-weight losses” to 
society	(Blanchflower	and	Freeman	1992).	Before	the	implementation	
of licensing, wages are W and employment is at E. If licensing is imple-
mented across all states for the occupation or if licensing is adopted in a 
state, then wages increase to W' and employment is reduced to E'. If the 
service wage and price go up, consumers purchase less of the service. 
As a result, the white rectangle area between W and W' under the curve 
goes to the practitioners, but the shaded triangle area is lost output due 
to occupational regulation. Within this standard economic model of 
regulation, there are gains to the practitioners through higher wages. 
However, some who may have been in the occupation may suffer wage 
loss	as	a	consequence	of	licensing,	as	consumers	find	substitutes	or	en-
gage in “do-it-yourself” remedies. Furthermore, there are likely to be 
152
Figure 5.3  Potential Lost Service Output as a Result of the Implementation of 
Occupational Licensing
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overall losses to society in the form of lost output, which is part of 
the “welfare triangle loss” in Figure 5.4. This loss is the difference be-
tween the increased earnings of the practitioners due to licensing and 
lost	employment	multiplied	by	their	forgone	earnings	in	this	figure.	An	
outcome of this potential loss is that licensing results in fewer choices 
and higher prices for consumers. The full effect of licensing on employ-
ment may be mitigated by regulation, which increases the quality of the 
service provided. Nevertheless, the impact of licensing would result in 
lost employment and service output to society.
A simple method of calculating potential lost output as a conse-
quence of licensing can be estimated using the approach in Figure 5.4 
and related statistical information in this book. For example, there is 
little evidence that overall quality or output is increased as a conse-
quence of licensing. Although for certain groups, for example, those 
with higher incomes or generous insurance coverage, tougher licensing 
does result in better services. In Chapter 4 the estimates show that indi-
viduals in licensed occupations earn about 10 to 12 percent more than 
their nonlicensed counterparts. Furthermore, if licensed occupations 
comprise about 20 percent of the total workforce, licensing drives up 
economy-wide costs to consumers by about 2 to 2.4 percent relative to 
a labor market where no one was licensed. Compared to total wage in-
come in the United States of $5.8 trillion in 2000, the estimated reallo-
cation of earnings from consumers to licensed practitioners is between 
$116 billion and $139 billion in 2000 dollars using this approach. Us-
ing economy-wide average or medium estimates derived by Hammer-
mesh (1993) of the elasticity of labor demand of 0.3, the “dead-weight 
loss” to society of licensing is between $34.8 and $41.7 billion per year 
(Hammermesh 1993).3 This value can also serve as a background for 
what	might	be	an	alternative	 to	 licensing,	such	as	 the	certification	of	
occupations, which allows individuals to practice without government 
sanctions but without the ability to use the occupational title. This ex-
ample of the magnitudes of the effects of licensing under these assump-
tions suggests that this form of labor market regulation has moderate 
quantitative impacts on the costs and quantity of services. However, 
the	benefits	of	licensing,	such	as	signaling	quality	and	providing	some	
perceived protection to potentially large downside consumer losses by 
eliminating	the	least	qualified	potential	practitioners,	may	be	worth	the	
added cost of licensing to society by giving consumers perceived pro-
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tection against the worst-case outcome scenario (Kahneman and Thaler 
1991).
COnCLUSIOnS 
 Licensing in the United States has taken many varied forms, based 
in large part on the occupation that is being regulated. Some occupa-
tions, such as cosmetologists, have relatively few requirements for 
working. Others, including dentists, have long training periods with 
many state-level requirements for entry into this profession. However, 
a larger source of variation in occupational regulation occurs among 
the states. Some states, like Mississippi, regulate relatively few occu-
pations that include less than 10 percent of its workforce, but others, 
such as California, license up to 178 occupations that include more than 
30 percent of its workforce. Generally, more urbanized states license 
higher percentages of their workforces. Trends in licensing also vary a 
great deal. For example, the number and intensity of the requirements to 
become a teacher have greatly increased. Twenty-seven states required 
applicants to pass a standardized test to be licensed to teach in public 
schools in 1987, but the number had grown to 41 by 1999 (Angrist 
and Guryan 2003). Other occupations, such as dentistry, have reduced 
their requirements over the past 20 years. There does not seem to be a 
large difference in the kinds of statutes—or in the trends in their adop-
tion—in large states relative to smaller ones. 
An economic approach to examining the impact of licensing shows 
that it results in a movement up the demand curve for labor, which re-
duces employment and causes a potential economic loss to society. Us-
ing estimates from the U.S. economy and licensing data gathered from 
this book, licensing results in a “dead-weight” loss to the U.S. econo-
my of approximately $34.8 to $41.7 billion per year in 2000 relative 
to a labor market without licensing. This should be balanced against 
the	benefits	of	licensing,	such	as	signaling	quality	and	providing	some	
downside protection to consumers as a consequence of the poor quality 
of	the	least	qualified	potential	practitioners.
Since licensing has been among the fastest growing labor market 
institutions in the United States over the past half century, more data 
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have become available to track its growth and impact. The patterns of 
growth have been similar to other patterns in the labor market, such 
as industrialization and unionization. In those states that are heavily 
urbanized, licensing has generally become more pervasive. One reason 
for this phenomenon is the greater organization of the professions and 
their ability to put pressure on legislatures to seek licensure or, as in the 
case of teachers, increase the requirements for entering the occupation. 
Nevertheless, there is a need for signals of quality in the labor market, 
which an institution like licensing provides to consumers of regulated 
services.	Two	key	policy	questions	are	whether	certification	would	re-
duce the economic losses that licensing has through its monopoly ef-
fects	on	restricting	entry,	and	whether	certification	is	a	politically	viable	
alternative to the tougher state-mandated alternative of licensing. 
Are the licensing impacts in the United States unique, or do oth-
er	democratic	industrialized	nations	also	find	the	need	to	license	their	
workforces in a similar manner? The next chapter examines and com-
pares the licensing requirements in the largest countries in the EU with 
the United States. This comparison is useful in examining the extent 
to which licensing and its impacts are unique to the United States or 
determining whether this analysis and its policy implications can be 
expanded to other industrialized nations. 
notes
  1.  I want to thank Jim Ragan for this quote, which he attributed to his Uncle Virgil 
(following a haircut from said uncle).
  2. An example of the understatement of the estimates in Table 5.1 is the state of 
Minnesota, which listed 188 licensed occupations in 1999, but they included 
sports licenses and obscure occupations, such as crop hail adjuster and weather 
modifier,	 for	which	 no	 census	 categories	 are	 listed	 (Office	 of	 the	 Legislative	
Auditor, State of Minnesota 1999).
   3. Other simulated estimates using values of personal consumption expenditures 
as the basis of the reallocation estimates produced similar outcomes for the real-
location effects and “dead-weight loss” results.
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Comparing Licensing in the United 
States and the European Union 
Millions of Europeans, from bartenders to soccer stars, have to 
deal with what might be called the certification complex—a re-
quirement that they be certified to pursue their jobs in a time-
consuming process dating back to 19th-century apprenticeships. 
Economists say it is a big reason behind Europe’s high unemploy-
ment and lagging productivity. 
 —John Miller, Wall Street Journal, August 16, 2004 
 
As the above quote suggests, the regulation of occupations is per-
ceived	to	be	a	major	factor	in	the	lack	of	efficiency	in	the	labor	market	
and a contributor to lagging productivity and high unemployment in 
Europe. Is this the case, and do the European methods of regulating 
occupations have different outcomes from those in the United States? 
The focus of this chapter is to present the basic data on and analysis of 
the labor market impact of licensing in the three largest EU countries: 
France, Germany, and the UK. Prior to 2003, these nations comprised 
more	than	51	percent	of	the	EU	workforce	(Statistical	Office	of	the	Eu-
ropean Communities 2004). This analysis will be used to compare the 
impacts of licensing in the EU relative to the United States. 
For licensed occupations in both the United States and the EU, the 
government is able to control who gets to work and how the task is 
done. However, licensing follows divergent paths in both cases and re-
sults in varied labor market outcomes. In most EU countries, licensing 
is national and, for most professions, there is no licensing exam beyond 
passing the classes in order to graduate from an accredited school.1 How-
ever, the regulatory trade-off in the EU is that, for most occupations, 
practitioners are regulated more heavily after they are working. Unlike 
the generally market-oriented focus of U.S. occupational licensing laws 
following entry, the level of fees, method of payment (e.g., contingency 
or hourly), and advertising are all regulated by the government in the 
EU (Garoupa 2004). Consequently, there is likely to be much greater 
Kleiner.indb   119 1/9/2006   2:44:43 PM
120   Kleiner
variation in earnings of licensed practitioners in the United States be-
cause of fewer post-entry regulations of licensed practitioners. In addi-
tion, earnings of licensed individuals in the EU are likely to mimic the 
overall earnings distribution in the EU, with relatively high minimum 
earnings and lower upper bounds for workers. Generous social safety 
nets and relatively higher taxes in the EU result in a much narrower 
wage and earnings distribution than in the United States (Filer, Ham-
mermesh, and Rees 1994). Moreover, for most occupations in medical 
specialties, such as physicians and dentists, a large proportion of prac-
titioners work for the government or are limited by government pay 
scales. Finally, for many of the regulated occupations, subsidies by EU 
governments for education in medical and other specialties often result 
in	a	justification	for	regulations	that	limit	earnings.	The	remainder	of	
this chapter documents the regulations that licensed practitioners work 
under and estimates the impact of licensing on earnings in comparison 
to unregulated occupations in the three largest countries in the EU.
OCCUPATIOnAL REgULATIOn In THE EU
The nations in the EU have only recently focused public policy 
attention on the economic and labor market consequences of occupa-
tional licensing (Paterson, Fink, and Ogus 2003). Occupational regu-
lation across countries has been divided into two general categories: 
structural regulation and behavioral regulation. Examples of structur-
al regulation include entry restrictions and the granting of exclusive 
rights to perform certain services. These types of restrictions would 
likely be promulgated by the organizations associated with the occu-
pation and would be a form of public interest regulation. Examples of 
behavioral regulation include rules regarding the level or structure of 
professional fees and limitations on advertising (Commission of the 
European Communities 2004). For this type of regulation the “social 
planner” would likely restrict the upper bound for prices, but the oc-
cupational association may view this as acceptable if the lowest price 
that	could	be	charged	were	sufficiently	high	to	satisfy	the	majority	of	
the members of the occupation. This process may be similar to unions 
setting the minimum negotiated wage for a large number of employees 
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at	a	sufficiently	high	level,	but	this	policy	may	come	at	the	price	of	a	
truncated upper wage (Freeman and Medoff 1984).
This type of regulation in the EU impacts both the price and the 
level of employment. Regulation in the United States occurs through 
the restriction of entry or employment, but the price or wage can be set 
by the market for the service. Restrictions in the EU occur both through 
regulations on entry and through limitations on prices. Consequently, 
the restrictions are likely to manifest themselves in wait time and short-
ages for the service. Table 6.1 shows attitudinal data for users of health 
services for the UK and United States, and it shows that perceptions of 
wait times and shortages for appointments and the time to see health 
professionals are substantially higher in the UK relative to the United 
States (Commonwealth Fund 2002). This table shows patient attitudes 
Table 6.1  Survey Perceptions of “Wait Time” and Shortages for Uk and 
U.S. Patients
Most frequently cited problems UK U.S.
High cost of health care 6 48
Shortages 33 5
Waiting times 39 3
Need for increased number of  
health professionals
15 2
Having to wait for an appointment, 
long waiting times for type of care
75 40
NOTE: The International Health Policy Survey (Commonwealth Fund 2002) consisted 
of	 interviews	with	adults	with	health	problems	in	each	of	five	countries:	Australia,	
Canada, New Zealand, the UK, and the United States. To identify these adults, the sur-
vey screened initial random samples of adults 18 or older who met at least one of the 
four following criteria: reported their health as fair or poor; had serious illness, injury, 
or disability that required intensive medical care in the past two years; had major sur-
gery in the last two years; or had been hospitalized for something other than a normal, 
uncomplicated	delivery	of	a	baby.	These	questions	resulted	in	a	final	sample	of	750	or	
more “sicker adults” in each country who were eligible to participate in the full survey 
(AUS,	844;	CAN,	750;	NZ,	750;	UK,	750;	U.S.,	755).	This	final	survey	sample	repre-
sents one-fourth to one-third of the adults initially contacted. These sicker adults are 
among the most intensive users of the health care system and are particularly vulner-
able to variations in quality and outcomes of care. Harris Interactive, Inc. and country 
affiliates	conducted	the	interviews	by	telephone	between	March	and	May	2002.
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toward the wait time for medical services, which are the most heavily 
regulated occupations in both the United States and the EU. On the oth-
er hand, complaints about price are much greater in the United States 
(48 percent) relative to the UK (6 percent). Unfortunately, the survey 
results are not available for Germany or France, but the available re-
sults show that complaints about a shortage of health professionals are 
15 percent in the UK relative to 2 percent in the United States. Overall 
the data in this table show that, at least for the UK, putting greater con-
straints on both employment and prices can lead to shortages, which 
manifest themselves in longer waiting times for patients. 
Unlike the Department of Labor and Census Bureau data in the 
United States, which allow for the tabulation of an estimate of the num-
ber of regulated occupations, there is no central agency that gathers data 
on the number of persons who are licensed by country in the EU. It is 
therefore	difficult	to	estimate	the	number	of	occupations	licensed	in	the	
EU or the density level of licensing as a percentage of the workforce 
in Europe. Consequently, my examination of licensing in the EU will 
be focused on a country-by-country basis with an emphasis on spe-
cific	occupations	rather	than	the	relatively	large	number	of	occupations	
that were examined for the United States. Nevertheless, estimates are 
provided of the overall impact of licensing for a group of regulated 
occupations across the UK, France, and Germany, and these are likely 
to be representative of the larger body of licensed occupations in these 
nations. 
The focus on the port of entry for joining a licensed occupation is 
on the educational establishments rather than passing licensing exams 
following the completion of schooling. An example of the method for 
becoming licensed in the EU is provided through the licensing process 
for dentists in the UK. To work as a dentist in the UK, one must obtain 
a license from the General Dental Council (GDC) and be put “on the 
register” (Jetha 2002). A candidate must graduate from a dental school 
accredited by the GDC or be subject to EU regulations on mobility of 
professionals across countries. If an individual is from a non-UK or 
non-EU dental school, a licensing exam is required to be listed on the 
GDC registry. Requirements for becoming a dentist include being in 
dental	school	at	least	five	years,	which	is	up	from	four	years.	In	con-
trast, U.S. dentists must obtain an undergraduate degree and then go 
to dental school for four years. In the UK, dentists can work either for 
Kleiner.indb   122 1/9/2006   2:44:43 PM
Comparing Licensing in the United States and EU   123
the national health insurance or as a private dentist. Within the national 
health insurance, there are proscribed numbers of patients per day, and 
this often leaves little time per patient. 
Unlike the United States, where dentists and their perceptions of la-
bor	market	conditions	often	influence	dental	licensing	boards,	the	num-
bers who enter the occupation in a particular year in the UK, and the 
number of overall entrants, are largely determined by the demands of 
the national health insurance through the national government acting as 
a planner (Kleiner 1990; Maurizi 1974). As shown in Figure 6.1, even 
though there are booms and busts in the number of applicants, perhaps 
following the “Cobweb model” of either too many or too few prac-
titioners based on the previous year’s market conditions, the number 
of admittances remained constant over time from 1980 to 2001 (Jetha 
2002). It is unclear if the constant number of admittances to dental 
school is impacted more by the dental association or by general health 
policy through the national health insurance in Britain. To the extent 
that there were shortages, any increase in demand for dentists was dealt 
Figure 6.1  Applicants and Admissions in Uk Dental Schools, 1980–2001
SOURCE: Jetha (2002).
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with largely through an increase in foreign dentists practicing in the UK 
(Jetha 2002).
For	most	of	the	medical	fields	in	the	EU,	the	process	of	entering	a	
government-regulated occupation is similar. The port of entry, which is 
usually an educational establishment, determines the number of prac-
titioners, with generally no state-sponsored exam following gradua-
tion from the national government-approved curriculum. In the United 
States,	constraints	on	entry	often	are	more	difficult,	as	a	consequence	
of longer years of schooling and entry tests following graduation. In 
the EU, however, licensing regulations are focused on the practice of 
the occupation. In a ranking of regulatory policies of EU professions 
in	comparison	with	the	United	States,	Garoupa	(2004)	finds	that,	based	
on	 criteria	 of	 “libertarian,	 efficiency,	 and	 consumer	 protection,”	 the	
United States has the “best regulatory framework” for improving mar-
ket performance. Other examinations of licensing for EU nations have 
been developing indices of regulation for a number of occupations to 
include accountants, architects, engineers, and pharmacists, in addition 
to physicians and lawyers (Paterson, Fink, and Ogus 2003). These fac-
tors include entry, fees, organizational forms, advertising, and conduct 
restrictions for doctors and lawyers. In the medical professions, more 
than 50 percent work for the government in the UK, whereas only 20 
percent work for the government in the United States (Robinson and 
Dixon 1999). Moreover, for France and Germany, prices are largely 
established by the state-funded health care system, resulting in a reduc-
tion in hourly earnings (Busse and Riesberg 2004; Sandier, Paris, and 
Polton 2004). A ranking of EU countries by levels of licensing restric-
tions, using behavioral restrictiveness for doctors and lawyers, is shown 
in	Figure	6.2.	The	figure	shows	that	 the	United	States	has	 the	lowest	
level of occupational restrictiveness relative to the EU nations on be-
havioral restrictions for these universally regulated occupations. 
Recently, the EU has stated that their goal for regulated occupations 
is	to	examine	price	fixing,	recommended	prices,	advertising	regulations,	
entry requirements, reserved rights, and regulations governing business 
structure (Commission of the European Communities 2004). The gen-
eral rule is that when a nation in the EU delegates “its policy-making 
power	to	a	professional	association	without	sufficient	safeguards,	that	is	
without clearly indicating the public interest objectives to respect, with-
out retaining the last word and without control of the implementation, 
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the Member State can also be held liable for any resulting infringement” 
(Commission of the European Communities 2004, p. 6). The focus of 
the EU rules is on attempting to ensure that the government and not the 
professional associations have the major voice in the regulation of the 
professions. Nevertheless, current policies on occupational regulation 
are generally much more restrictive than those in the United States fol-
lowing entry into the occupation.2
The professional occupations are of particular interest in the EU 
since this sector is growing at a much faster pace than overall employ-
ment, much like in the United States. From 1980 to 1990, employment 
in this more highly regulated category (in the OECD countries report-
ing data) grew by an average of 55 percent, six times faster than the 
overall national employment growth of 9 percent (Biggar and Wise 
2000, p. 44). More recently, professional occupations in the EU during 
NOTE: Estimates modify the index in Garoupa (2004) to include only post-entry re-
striction on work, using only integer values, and having lower values indicates fewer 
restrictions. Nations evaluated include the United States, Netherlands, Spain, Norway, 
Belgium, France, England and Wales (E&W), Portugal, Germany, and Austria. 
Figure 6.2  Measures of Post-Entry Restrictions for Doctors and Lawyers 
in the United States and the EU
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the	first	half	of	2003	continued	to	outpace	overall	employment.	Overall	
employment grew at an annual rate of 0.7 percent while employment in 
occupations that were regulated in the service sector grew by 5 percent 
(Commission of the European Communities 2004, p. 8). In part, as a 
consequence of this employment growth among more highly regulated 
occupations, the EU is monitoring licensing among member countries 
through its commission on competition. 
As part of these reforms in the labor market, mobility for most oc-
cupations has grown (Jeffery 2001). In 2003, the EU made it easier for 
individuals in most occupations to move between nations without addi-
tional regulatory constraints by requiring mutual recognition of occupa-
tional requirements, similar to endorsement among states in the United 
States (Lonbay 2004). However, language and cultural factors are more 
likely to serve as barriers to geographic mobility in the EU relative to 
the United States (Krueger 2000). An occupation that is exempted from 
these reduced barriers is attorneys, who still maintain national require-
ments without “endorsement” across EU countries. 
gOvERnMEnTAL LIMITATIOnS On REgULATED 
OCCUPATIOnS In THE EU
Although mobility across nations has become easier within the EU, 
there still remain constraints on the behavioral aspects of working in 
the EU. Many of the countries in the EU maintain restrictions on ad-
vertising, fees, relationships with other businesses, foreign providers of 
services, and location of business or practice (Bertrand and Kramarz 
2001). Unlike in the United States, where professions come under an-
titrust legislation as discussed in Chapter 2, the basic legislation on re-
strictive trade practices in the UK does not apply to professional ser-
vices, but professional conduct may fall under the monopoly provisions 
of the legislation. 
The Director General of Fair Trading (DGFT) in the UK considers 
that the principles of competition policy and law should be applied to 
the business and market activities of all professions as they apply to 
other business activities. There have been several transformations in UK 
laws governing occupational regulation that have reduced regulations. 
Kleiner.indb   126 1/9/2006   2:44:44 PM
Comparing Licensing in the United States and EU   127
Moreover, government policy is to increase competition, and some of 
the professions have themselves embarked on reforms designed to fos-
ter greater competition in their various business activities.
In France, the Conseil de la concurrence, the major regulatory agen-
cy, has stated that professional organization rules may not authorize 
violations of the rules of competition law, notably those against price-
fixing	agreements.	The	Conseil	has	condemned	a	boycott	by	local	ar-
chitects intended to maintain fee levels. And the Conseil has challenged 
three local bar associations’ fee schedules, emphasizing that they had 
an anticompetitive effect even when they may not have been adopted 
for an anticompetitive purpose. The authority for this action was estab-
lished by a 1987 decision involving fee schedules of architects, which 
was	affirmed	by	the	courts	in	1992.	A	closely	aligned	issue	is	the	regu-
lations	on	opening	new	establishments	in	specific	locations.	In	France,	
local merchants must approve the establishment of a new business, and 
the process is likely to eliminate competition in licensed occupations 
such as attorneys, accountants, and architects on a geographic or loca-
tion-specific	basis	(Bertrand	and	Kramarz	2001).	The	estimates	suggest	
that this regulatory practice reduces overall job growth by 10 percent.
In Germany, regulation of professions occurs both through the gov-
ernment and through industry associations. In part as a consequence of 
heavy regulation and resulting constraints of most occupations, there 
has been a movement toward deregulation. Germany still requires 41 
professions, from well diggers to chimney sweeps, to pass exams to 
get	a	“Meisterbrief,”	or	master	certificate,	before	they	start	a	business.	
Local organizations are required to hire these individuals or face gov-
ernmental	financial	penalties	or	sanctions.	
From 1995 to 2003, Germany has exempted 53 of 94 trades from 
having to pass qualifying exams, reducing the number of licensed work-
ers in the Zentraverband Des Deutschen Handwerks (ZDH), which is 
the occupation/business federation, from 6.3 million in 1995 to 4.8 
million in 2003. Generally, the movement toward deregulation has in-
cluded	lower-risk	jobs	such	as	hairdressers	and	florists.	Nevertheless,	
German businesses, government, and unions see the rules as guarantees 
of the nation’s traditional emphasis on quality products and services 
(Miller 2004).
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ESTIMATES OF THE IMPACT OF LICEnSIng On 
EARnIngS, By COUnTRy 
 There are substantial differences in the method by which licens-
ing impacts workers and wages in the United States and Europe. In the 
United States, there are greater barriers to entry as a consequence of 
longer	general	and	specific	training	periods	and	the	requirement	for	the	
passage of a licensing exam. Moreover, for most professions, the cost 
of education is borne by the individual. In contrast, in most EU coun-
tries, subsidies for education are higher so that debt for entering an oc-
cupation is lower. However, there are greater constraints on behavioral 
issues like advertising and fees. Moreover, the lower levels of wage 
inequality in the EU relative to the United States may make the gains to 
licensing lower in the EU.
In this section I provide estimates of the impact of licensing on 
hourly earnings for three of the largest EU nations: the UK, France, 
and Germany. The methodology used is similar to that employed in 
analyzing	licensing	on	earnings	in	the	United	States	in	Chapter	4.	I	first	
compare certain licensed occupations to their unlicensed counterparts 
in each nation and then provide an overall estimate of the impact on 
licensing in the EU. Unlike U.S. census data, which has large numbers 
of observations, the analysis of the EU nations is based on either admin-
istrative data or surveys that contain smaller sample sizes in large part 
due	to	either	the	difficulty	of	sharing	this	information	with	non-nation-
als or the lack of wage or earnings data from these sources because of 
concerns	regarding	confidentiality	within	their	countries.
United kingdom
The UK has been concerned with and has been working to change 
its competition law governing regulated occupations for more than 30 
years (Siebert 1977). The policy has been to increase competition, and 
many of the professions have implemented programs in order to imple-
ment	directives	on	 the	deregulation	of	 the	professions.	More	 specifi-
cally, the Competition Act of 1998 replaced several more restrictive 
policies on regulated occupations. One important provision was the 
“complex monopoly” provision, under which several persons who are 
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not connected but who together account for at least one-quarter of the 
supply or acquisition of any particular goods or services in all or part of 
the UK can be examined by the Competition Commission. They can be 
investigated if they are engaged in conduct that has or is likely to have 
the effect of restricting, distorting, or preventing competition. This pro-
vision dealt with issues of the structure of services and the linkages of 
accounting	and	law	firms.	One	of	the	policies	focusing	on	licensing	was	
the freedom to advertise and to set prices competitively, which is now 
widely accepted in the regulated professions in the UK.
The analysis for the UK uses data from the Labour Force Survey, 
which is similar to the CPS in the United States. Given the sample size 
of the UK survey and the categorization of occupations within the sur-
vey, the occupations that are examined are somewhat different from 
those in the United States, since occupations with fewer members are 
excluded. The licensed occupations in the analysis include dentists, 
lawyers, pharmacists, physicians, and school teachers. The compari-
sons with unlicensed occupations are based on the same “occupation 
family” by the Dictionary of Occupational Titles in a manner similar to 
the comparisons developed in Chapter 4. The estimation methodology 
also is similar to that presented in Chapter 4, in which earnings of simi-
lar licensed and unlicensed occupations in the United States were ex-
amined. The counterfactual analysis builds on a “thought experiment” 
of what would have been the earnings outcome if all the measured hu-
man capital characteristics of one group were given to the other group, 
except for licensing. For example, using this approach assumes that the 
market rewards individuals differently for each year of schooling, age, 
or experience based on whether the individual was licensed. In order to 
do the statistical analysis of developing a counterfactual for this issue, 
a decomposition analysis is implemented. This procedure presumes 
little movement between occupational groups and that all differences 
between the two groups not accounted for by human capital and other 
factors are a consequence of licensing. For each person in the regulated 
occupation, the model predicts what would have been the earnings of 
the individual if they were not regulated at the mean of the distribu-
tion.3 Given the smaller sample size of the observations in the British 
data, the comparison occupations were more limited than those for the 
United States estimates. 
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Table 6.2 gives the estimates of the impact of being in a licensed 
occupation relative to an unregulated occupation in the UK using data 
from the British Labour Force Survey for medical practitioners, phar-
macists, dental practitioners, teachers, and lawyers. These occupations 
were selected in large part due to data availability within the Labour 
Force Survey. Based on the results in Table 6.2, the UK has relatively 
open markets for licensed occupations, with advertising allowed for 
most professions. The estimates show that, when human capital vari-
ables are accounted for, licensing factors show much variation on earn-
ings, from zero for secondary teachers to as much as 35 to 50 percent for 
dentists. In comparison to the U.S. estimates, the impact of licensing in 
Table 6.2  Hourly Earnings in Selected Licensed and Unlicensed 
Occupations in the Uk
SOURCE: UK Labour Force Survey, 1993–1997, N = 13,562.
Difference due to
Occupation
Actual 
difference
Nonlicensing 
factors Licensing
Medical practitioners
Chemists 0.16 0.04 0.12
Biological scientists  
and biochemists
0.21 −0.01 0.23
Pharmacists, pharmacologists  
Chemists 0.04 −0.02 0.06
Biological scientists  
and biochemists
0.10 −0.10 0.20
Dental practitioners
Chemists 0.35 0.00 0.35
Biological scientists  
and biochemists
0.40 −0.10 0.50
Secondary education teachers
Administrators—
national government
0.07 0.12 −0.05
Lawyers and judges
University, polytechnic 
teachers
0.02 −0.14 0.17
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the UK has similar relative effects, but the absolute percent impacts are 
smaller. For example, the average licensing impact in the United States 
for physicians and dentists relative to their peer occupations as shown 
in Table 4.4 is 41 and 64 percent, but it is between 12 and 50 percent in 
the UK for these two occupations. For the other occupations in Table 
6.2, such as lawyers and pharmacists, the licensing premium is between 
6 and 20 percent. The only occupation for which licensing has no real 
impact in the table is teachers, and this result is similar to the impact 
in the United States. It may be that since teachers work mainly for the 
public or for a large educational organization in the UK, there is a small 
negative impact on earnings due to the ability of employers to argue and 
lobby for a large supply of practitioners that may dominate any impact 
of licensing. Overall, for the regulated occupations in the UK, there 
are more constraints than in the United States, but these results suggest 
that the outcomes result in licensing having smaller but still substantial 
impacts on earnings relative to their comparison group.
France 
Figure 6.2, which compares post-entry restrictions among EU na-
tions, shows that, at least for doctors and lawyers, France has a more 
restrictive system of regulation than either the United States or the UK, 
but it is less restrictive than Germany. A more recent categorization of 
regulation for EU nations for accountants, architects, and pharmacists 
gives evidence that France is substantially more regulated for these oc-
cupations than the UK but slightly less so than in Germany (Paterson, 
Fink, and Ogus 2003). Entry requirements and the way that business can 
be conducted are the common methods of developing these indices. The 
criteria	for	measuring	restrictions	are	through	fixed	prices,	regulation	of	
advertising	and	marketing,	the	regulation	of	location	and	diversification	
on offering services, and restrictions on interprofessional cooperation 
(e.g., restrictions on forms of business). This pattern of relative restric-
tiveness for France is also likely to apply to other regulated occupations 
in the nation. 
Table 6.3 gives evidence on the impact of licensing relative to their 
comparison occupations in France for the years 1990 to 1997 using the 
Enquêtes Emploi. Given the limited sample size of this database, the 
analysis only allows an examination of a few regulated occupations, 
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including doctors, dentists, and teachers. The technique in examining 
licensing is similar to that employed for the UK and the United States. 
For each person in the regulated occupation, the model predicts what 
would have been the earnings of the individual if they were not regu-
lated at the mean of the distribution. The results show that dentists and 
doctors earn more relative to their comparison groups using this data. 
For both doctors and dentists, the estimated impact of licensing is be-
tween 8 and 19 percent relative to its comparison occupations, which is 
below the comparable estimates in both the UK and the United States. 
Greater regulation in the way business is conducted in France likely 
results in these licensed occupations having lower relative earnings. 
Furthermore, most workers in medical occupations work for the gov-
ernment or receive payments from the government in France, and this is 
likely to limit wage growth. The estimates for teachers use a registered 
occupation, social workers, rather than a licensed occupation as a com-
parison	group.	In	France,	social	workers	fit	under	the	category	of	being	
in a registered occupation noted, as “the inappropriate use of the title of 
social	worker	by	unqualified	individuals”	is	illegal	(International	Fed-
eration of Social Workers 2004, p. 21). Nevertheless, they are allowed 
to do the work as long as they do not call themselves social workers. 
Table 6.3  Hourly Earnings in Selected Licensed and Unlicensed 
Occupations in France, 1990–1997
Difference due to
Occupation
Actual 
difference
Nonlicensing 
factors Licensing
Doctor
Higher education teachers −0.05 −0.23 0.18
Programmers 0.35 0.28 0.08
Dentist
Higher education teachers −0.02 −0.21 0.19
Programmers 0.37 0.28 0.10
Teacher
Social workers −0.01 0.00 −0.01
NOTE: N = 15,579.
SOURCE: “Enquêtes Emploi,” National Institute for Statistics and Economic Studies 
(INSEE) (1998). 
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Consequently, teachers, who are licensed, are compared to a “registered 
occupation.” The estimates in Table 6.3 show there is no earnings pre-
mium for teachers relative to social workers. Overall, there appears to 
be a licensing wage premium for these licensed occupations, but the 
impact is smaller than for either the United States or the UK.
germany 
Using the indices of EU occupational licensing, Germany, along 
with Austria, is usually ranked among the most regulated nations in 
the EU (Garoupa 2004; Paterson, Fink, and Ogus 2003). This result is 
mainly a consequence of regulations on practice following entry into 
the occupation. As Figure 6.2 shows, regulations on post-entry market 
restrictions on working are among the highest in Germany relative to 
the other EU nations. Similarly, for other licensed occupations such as 
accountants, architects, engineers, and pharmacists, Germany has the 
highest values in these post-entry restrictiveness indices. More recently, 
Germany has been moving toward deregulating its labor markets as 
evidenced by the reduction in the number of occupations licensed and 
the move toward the adoption of OECD policies on the regulation of the 
professions (Biggar and Wise 2000). 
Unfortunately, the data used for examining regulations for Germany 
contain the fewest number of observations relative to the data available 
for	the	United	States,	UK,	and	France.	The	data	from	the	Qualifikation	
NOTE: N =1,493.
SOURCE:	“Qualifikation	und	Berufsverlauf.”
Table 6.4  Hourly Earnings in Selected Licensed and Unlicensed 
Occupations in germany, 1991
Difference due to
Occupation Actual difference
Nonlicensing 
factors Licensing
Dentist
Computer scientist −0.05 −0.06 0.01
Chemist −0.09 −0.13 0.05
Doctor
Chemist −0.08 −0.09 0.01
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und Berufsverlauf contain only 1,493 observations for the year 1991. 
Nevertheless, in Table 6.4, the approach for the analysis examines each 
person in the regulated occupation, and the model predicts what would 
have been the earnings of the individual if the occupation were not regu-
lated. Given the small sample size, the analysis focuses only on doctors 
and dentists and also has a limited number of comparison occupations 
that are in the same job family. The results show that dentists only made 
between 1 and 5 percent more than the designated control group as a 
consequence of licensing. The licensing premium for doctors relative to 
chemists is less than 1 percent. These estimates suggest that Germany, 
with its higher level of regulation, especially following entry into an 
occupation, has a lower licensing premium for dentists and doctors than 
the other two countries in the EU analysis. The lower impact of licens-
ing on earnings is consistent with results of small returns to education 
effects in Germany. Pischke and vonWachter (2005) speculate that the 
reason for low returns to education may be a result of rigid wages in 
Germany, the existence of the apprenticeship training system, or the 
better academic skills provided earlier in the German system. Neverthe-
less, the returns to licensing in these occupations are also much lower in 
Germany than in the other nations examined in this chapter.
IMPACT OF LICEnSIng On EARnIngS In THE Uk, 
FRAnCE, AnD gERMAny 
The UK, France, and Germany comprised about 51 percent of the 
EU workforce prior to the expansion of the EU in 2003 and represent a 
relatively lightly regulated (UK), a medium-regulated (France), and a 
highly regulated (Germany) nation with respect to the rigor with which 
they regulate occupations. However, to what extent does licensing im-
pact the earnings of a group of regulated and similar unregulated indi-
viduals in these occupations? Table 6.5 shows the impact of licensing 
on hourly earnings in these three countries with standard human capital 
control variables such as age, age-squared, gender, years of education, 
and whether the person had a college degree. The occupations exam-
ined are presented in the note to the table, and the estimates show a 
somewhat smaller variety of occupations than those presented for the 
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United States in Chapter 4. This set of occupations is smaller because 
the	sources	of	data	for	EU	nations	do	not	have	a	sufficiently	large	num-
ber of persons in the occupations for a more expansive analysis. The 
estimates	show	that	licensing	has	a	modest	but	statistically	significant	
1 percent impact on hourly earnings. The estimate is much smaller than 
the 10 to 12 percent impact in the United States and may be a conse-
quence of greater post-entry restrictions on competition that limit prices 
and earnings relative to those occupations that can advertise, charge 
market fees, and establish contingency fees based on outcomes. More-
over,	 the	generally	higher	 taxes	and	social	benefits	 in	 the	EU	reduce	
overall income inequality in the EU, and this also is the case for regu-
lated occupations that have only a slight earnings edge relative to their 
unlicensed counterparts. In addition, a much higher percentage of the 
individuals work for the government or have government-determined 
fees in these occupations in the EU and consequently have narrower 
Table 6.5  Impact of Licensing on Hourly Earnings in the Uk, France, 
and germany
NOTE: With dummy variable controls for country: UK and France relative to Germany 
and	year	of	 the	observation.	The	coefficients	 for	 the	country	dummy	variables	are	
interpreted	in	comparison	to	the	base	country,	Germany.	*Indicates	statistical	signifi-
cance at the 0.05 level. Occupations in the sample include doctors, dentists, accoun-
tants, public administrators, higher education teachers, engineers (chemistry), teach-
ers, social workers, programmers, administrators—national government, personnel 
training managers, chemists, biological scientists and biochemists, medical practitio-
ners (nondoctors), pharmacists, pharmacologists, dental practitioners (not dentists), 
university and polytechnic teachers, etc., secondary education teachers, etc., primary 
and	nursery	education	teachers,	lawyers	and	judges,	chartered	and	certified	accoun-
tants, actuaries, economists, and statisticians.
Coefficient Standard error
Licensed occupation 0.011* 0.006
Age 0.063* 0.002
Age2 −0.001 0.000
Female −0.094* 0.005
Education (year) 0.039* 0.001
University education 0.394* 0.032
Constant 1.55 0.05
R2 0.79
N 28,326
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variance in their range of income. To the extent that there are little to 
no	measurable	quality	benefits,	 the	potential	 “dead-weight	 losses”	 in	
the EU are lower than in the United States. However, economic losses 
could be substantial if the reduction in job growth is similar to the 10 
percent estimate that Bertrand and Kramarz (2001) found as a con-
sequence of regulatory restrictions of businesses. These estimates of 
dead-weight loss could be even higher if the economic value of “wait 
time” for a doctor or other health service professional were included in 
a calculation. Since there is no comprehensive value on the number or 
the percentage of the workforce that is licensed in the EU, these types 
of	calculations	are	difficult.	Moreover,	there	has	not	been	the	large	body	
of research into the quality effects of occupational licensing in the EU 
relative to the studies completed in the United States, so that an overall 
assessment	of	the	impact	of	licensing	for	these	three	nations	is	difficult	
to estimate. 
IMPLICATIOnS FOR OCCUPATIOnAL REgULATIOn 
This examination of licensing in Europe provides a useful compari-
son relative to the United States. The focus of U.S. licensing is on con-
trol of entry and mobility across states, with little attention to the prices 
charged, method of payment, or the barriers to advertising. In contrast, 
it is somewhat easier and usually takes a shorter time for entry into the 
professions in the EU. For most occupations, entering the education 
process occurs immediately after high school, though being accepted is 
highly competitive. Students matriculate into the professions and usu-
ally	finish	their	professional	education,	which	is	subsidized	in	large	part	
by the government, at an earlier age than in the United States. Follow-
ing entry, there tend to be many more constraints on work, including lo-
cation, prices charged, and the lack of opportunity to provide informa-
tion to consumers on the quality of the service through advertising. In 
the licensed health professions, the employer is often the government. 
Consequently,	it	is	not	surprising	to	find	that	earnings	of	professionals	
relative to their comparison group are lower in the UK, France, and 
Germany than they are in the United States. 
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Unfortunately, there have been no analytical examinations of the 
impact that licensing in these nations has on the quality of service re-
ceived in the EU. This stands in contrast to the large number of studies 
that have examined licensing in the United States. For the most part, the 
empirical work shows that licensing has modest to no impact on quality 
relative	to	a	regime	of	certification	or	registration.	Moreover,	there	is	
little evidence that insurance companies in the United States give dis-
counts for malpractice insurance to individuals who are licensed rela-
tive to their unlicensed counterparts.
In summary, the impact of licensing within the three countries ex-
amined in this chapter shows that regulation has a modest 1 percent 
impact on the earnings of the regulated occupations. This stands in stark 
contrast to the 10 to 12 percent impact for regulated to unregulated oc-
cupations or the 4 percent effect for those occupations licensed in some 
states and not in others in the United States. The impact of licensing 
must therefore be viewed in the context of the nation that is regulat-
ing the workers. If national inequality is low and constraints on the 
occupation are high, then price and wage impacts are likely to be mod-
est. On the other hand, the impact of this regulatory policy where there 
are	few	financial	incentives	to	succeed	may	lead	to	less	effort	because	
wage variations are small or the more able seek occupations where the 
financial	constraints	are	less	limited.	In	addition,	innovation,	creativity,	
and employment may be reduced in the regulated sector, as relative 
financial	incentives	for	more	effort	in	the	regulated	sector	are	small,	but	
entry requirements are tough.
 
notes
 1. The state of Wisconsin is unique in that it has a provision that allows graduating 
law students in the two major law schools in the state (i.e., the University of Wis-
consin and Marquette University) to not be required to take the state licensing 
exam	if	they	agree	to	practice	in	the	state	for	at	least	five	years	(Wisconsin	Court	
System 2005). This policy is similar to the procedures to become licensed for this 
occupation in most EU countries.
 2. This lower level of post-entry regulation largely occurred following the Goldfarb 
v. Virginia (1975) decision (discussed in Chapter 2) and its enforcement in a vig-
orous way by the FTC and the Antitrust Division of the Department of Justice.
 3. Given the small number of observations by country in these data, no nonpara-
metric estimates were developed like those for the United States in Chapter 4.
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The Emerging Labor 
Market Institution of 
Occupational Licensing 
 Not long ago the Governor of a Midwestern state was ap-
proached by a representative of a particular trade anxious to en-
list the Governor’s support in securing passage of legislation to 
license their trade.
 “Governor,” the man said, “passage of this licensing act will 
ensure that only qualified people will practice this occupation; 
it will eliminate charlatans, incompetents or frauds; and it will 
thereby protect the safety of the people of this state.”
 The Governor, from long experience, was somewhat skeptical. 
“Gentlemen,” he asked, “are you concerned with advancing the 
health, safety and welfare of the people under the police powers of 
this state or are you primarily interested in creating a monopoly 
situation and eliminate competition and raise prices?”
 The spokesman for the occupational group smiled and said, 
“Governor, we’re interested in a little of each.”
 —Council of State Governments (1952, p.1)
As	 the	 above	 exchange	 illustrates,	 the	 potential	 conflict	 between	
enhancing quality and restricting competition has been at the core of the 
debate	on	the	efficacy	of	occupational	licensing	during	the	post–World	
War II era. The goal of this concluding chapter is to provide a further 
rationale for the existence, impact, and potential policy implications of 
occupational licensing. This concluding analysis examines the issue of 
the	benefits	and	costs	of	 standardization,	which	 licensing	encourages	
through regulatory boards. I provide new evidence on how employment 
growth differs according to whether or not occupations are regulated 
by a state. I then summarize the other major empirical and theoretical 
contributions of the book. To conclude, I present policy implications of 
the analysis presented in this book, with an emphasis on different forms 
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of	 regulation	 that	may	 provide	most	 of	 the	 benefits	 of	 licensing	 but	
without many of the increased costs of this form of regulation.
The development of the regulation of occupations and trades has 
a long and varied history. Workers who do the same tasks have gotten 
together both to improve the quality of work and to restrict the number 
of workers who are available to work at the job since early civilization 
(Gross 1984). As Chapter 2 details, the development in Europe of the 
history of trades and guilds had the effect of limiting social mobility and 
restricting	competition,	yet	it	provided	economic	and	social	benefits	of	
greater human capital investment (Scoville 1969). In the United States 
in the latter part of the nineteenth century, associations representing oc-
cupations were successful in getting the mechanism of the state both to 
establish minimum levels of education and other characteristics neces-
sary for entry into occupations and to limit entry into the occupation. 
Although there is evidence to suggest that these policies were able to 
increase some measures of quality in the periods immediately following 
enactment of the laws, the long-term impact of these licensing laws was 
to give the occupations a monopoly on the tasks in the occupation (Law 
and Kim 2004). Occupational regulation has evolved largely as a state 
or local issue rather than a national policy, unlike the national preemp-
tion of most other labor laws.
As the opening quote of this chapter implies, there is often an im-
plicit political economy trade-off occurring in the regulation of occupa-
tions. A precondition for licensing is the existence of a group of workers 
with a basic skill level, a commonality of tasks, work that has a level 
of substitutability with others, and a density of population that is orga-
nized in the political jurisdiction. The workers want higher wages and, 
because they are in skilled jobs, the consequences of those jobs being 
performed badly can be negative for the consumer or the community. 
The social deal that is struck between the workers and society is that 
there is some quality guarantee in return for restrictions on who can do 
the work, that is, weeding out the “charlatans, incompetents or frauds.” 
The restrictions on entry continue over time and, especially once the 
licensed occupation has coalesced, any pressure for substantial future 
increases in quality may be much weaker, but the restrictions on entry 
generate	work	and	pay	benefits.
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EMERgEnCE OF OCCUPATIOnAL LICEnSIng
In contrast to the decline of labor market institutions and regula-
tions, such as unions and the federal minimum wages during the latter 
half	of	the	twentieth	century	and	beginning	of	the	twenty-first	century,	
occupational licensing has seen a steady growth of coverage to at least 
one-fifth	of	the	U.S.	workforce.	In	contrast	to	unions,	whose	members	
work in industries that are declining while facing strong employer op-
position, licensed occupations exist mainly in the service industries, 
which are growing much more rapidly than the overall economy and 
more rapidly than other industries, such as manufacturing (Eckstein 
and Nagypal 2004; Kleiner 2002). Occupation associations face little 
employer opposition in forming associations at work. Often employee 
associations are welcome within an organization because they bring 
about a sense of professionalism or emphasis on quality that may en-
hance workplace productivity. In some cases they serve as a “works 
council” for the members of the occupation, often discussing with man-
agement both how conditions could be improved at work and how the 
employees in the occupation can contribute to the economic success of 
the organization. By having an organized occupation group within an 
organization, employers can gain information about the enterprise from 
employees without the wage premium that unions exact at the establish-
ment level (Freeman and Lazear 1995).
Through the use of licensing at the local, state, or national level, 
employers’ decisions about hiring regulated employees are taken out 
of competition from unregulated groups who cannot do the work by 
the actions of the government. Consequently, employers who hire, for 
example, teachers, doctors, nurses, librarians, and electricians must 
only employ individuals with certain credentials to do certain tasks. 
This results in the elimination of other options or substitutes in the la-
bor market. Licensed occupations have been able to achieve what very 
few unions (except those that are allowed to have “closed-shop” labor 
agreements) have been able to accomplish by restricting labor supply.1 
Employers are required to hire only persons who are members of the 
licensed group. Consequently, it is not surprising that there are a licens-
ing employment impact and a wage premium. 
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THE BEnEFITS AnD COSTS OF STAnDARDIzATIOn
One	of	the	potential	benefits	of	regulation	is	to	establish	a	common	
body of knowledge or skills within the occupation as well as provide 
consumers with a more homogenous service than would exist without 
regulation. Education levels, testing, and other forms of background 
checks provide this standardization of the job-related quality of human 
resources supplied to the occupation. More recently state boards, in co-
operation with occupational associations, have proscribed standard pro-
cedures that are appropriate for the occupation, such as those for den-
tists and dental hygienists. This process further standardizes the type of 
service that is given to consumers. A major argument for the licensing 
of occupations is that it eliminates the downside risk of seeking services 
from an occupation. If testing and background checks “eliminate char-
latans, incompetents or frauds,” as the opening lines of this chapter im-
ply, then consumers may be willing to pay a higher price for the service 
offered by occupational licensing. 
A review of the body of research from experimental economics and 
psychology shows that consumers value the reduction in downside risk 
more	than	they	value	the	potential	benefits	of	a	positive	outcome	(Kah-
neman, Knetsch, and Thaler 1991). The preference by consumers of the 
status quo or reducing risk of a highly negative outcome has been called 
“loss aversion,” which is an element of “prospect theory” developed 
by Kahneman and Tversky (1979). For example, the utility to society 
may be greater by minimizing the likelihood of a poor diagnosis as a 
consequence of going to a poor doctor because the incompetents have 
been weeded out as a result of licensing. Consequently, the perceived 
benefits	 of	 a	 nonstandard	 but	 potentially	 highly	 positive	 outcome	 of	
going to an unlicensed biomedical research scientist still may not be 
worth it. Using the power of the state to both limit the downside risk of 
poor	quality	care	and	reduce	the	possibility	of	an	upside	benefit	may	be	
a trade-off that maximizes consumer utility or welfare. Evidence of the 
acceptance of this trade-off is the growth of licensing of occupations 
across virtually all states during the past century. Consistent with the 
experimental	economics	research	on	financial	theory,	the	risk	of	a	loss	
has much greater utility than the possibility of a large gain (Kahneman, 
Knetsch, and Thaler 1991). The results in this literature show that the 
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selling price of a product that is the “possession” of an individual is 
much greater than the auction price or the price for which a like posses-
sion could be purchased in the market as a replacement. The avoidance 
of loss may be a major reason for the persuasive arguments for licens-
ing. 
The gains from an unregulated service might include potential ben-
efits	 from	 free	market	 competition,	 such	 as	 lower	 prices	 and	 greater	
innovation, without the constraints of a regulatory body such as a li-
censing board. This upside potential gain can be through the use of 
nonstandard methods or new research that has not yet been approved by 
the licensing agency as appropriate for the service (Rottenberg 1980). 
Deviations from prescribed methods of providing a service are discour-
aged by licensing boards and may even be found to be illegal by a state 
board. For example, not having a dentist on site is illegal when provid-
ing a service such as teeth cleaning. Dental hygienists are not allowed 
to	“practice”	without	a	dentist	on	site,	with	the	“site”	being	defined	by	
statute or the dental board. Although this policy protects against down-
side	losses	of	finding	a	major	problem	that	may	require	immediate	at-
tention, it reduces the ability of the hygienist to provide only the service 
that is most useful to the patient. Moreover, there is little leeway for the 
dental service industry to provide new or innovative services without 
being found in violation of the state licensing laws. It may in some 
cases be an example of the labor relations concept of “featherbedding,” 
in which dentists are on the premises but do little work. 
Voters, through the political process, often prefer to reduce the 
downside of any service. The outcome of “risk aversion” comes at the 
expense of having the upside of any service reduced. This preference 
provides	 consumers	 the	 benefit	 of	 perceived	 higher	 quality	 through	
higher levels of regulation (Leland 1979). However, from the evidence 
I	was	 able	 to	gather,	 there	 is	 no	overall	 quality	benefit	 (measured	 in	
a number of different ways) of licensing to consumers. Consequently, 
the cost of regulation to society is higher prices or longer waits for a 
service. An additional societal cost is the reallocation of income from 
consumers to practitioners of the licensed occupation as well as lost 
output. The cost of licensing is an element that consumers should take 
into account as part of their evaluation of this labor market institution 
relative to other forms of regulation. 
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EMPLOyMEnT gROWTH OF THE SAME OCCUPATIOnS In 
REgULATED AnD UnREgULATED STATES
Chapter 1 noted the overall change in employment of licensed oc-
cupations relative to the workforce in the United States. Overall, the 
values were similar, but with the more rapid growth of service employ-
ment during the 1990s, where most individuals in licensed occupations 
are employed, the expectation was that employment growth would have 
been much higher in the regulated occupations relative to overall em-
ployment. Based on the theory and evidence in the economics of regu-
lation, occupational licensing can reduce employment in the occupation 
within a political jurisdiction such as a state or city. However, by reduc-
ing “lemons” in the market, regulation can also increase the demand for 
the service and thereby increase employment. A more straightforward 
way to analyze which impact is greater is to focus on occupations that 
are licensed in some states and not in others. This analysis would al-
low an examination of the ability of the regulated states to maintain 
employment restrictions and the effect of the increased perceptions of 
quality on employment in comparison to the unregulated states. Three 
occupations in the censuses for 1990 and 2000 meet the criteria of being 
regulated in approximately the same number of states and having about 
the same number of workers in regulated and unregulated states: librar-
ians, respiratory therapists, and dietitians and nutritionists. 
Table 7.1 gives estimates of the employment growth for librarians, 
respiratory therapists, and dietitians and nutritionists from 1990 to 2000 
in those states that regulate these occupations relative to those who do 
not. In 2000, librarians were licensed in 19 states, respiratory thera-
pists in 35 states, and dietitians and nutritionists in 36 states. The re-
sults in the table show that for occupations that experienced declines in 
employment during the decade, such as librarians and dietitians, those 
states that license the occupations saw employment for practitioners 
decline at an even faster rate than those that did not regulate them. For 
example, librarian overall employment declined by approximately 7 
percent over the decade of the 1990s, but this decline was composed of 
a 5.3 percent decline in the unregulated sector and a 9.2 percent decline 
in the regulated sector. Similarly, the overall decline in employment 
for dietitians and nutritionists over the decade was 9.5 percent, but the 
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Table 7.1  Comparing Employment growth of Occupations in Regulated and Unregulated States
Librarians Respiratory therapists Dietitians and nutritionists
1990 2000 1990 2000 1990 2000
Number in occupation 215,680 200,060 63,560 86,956 94,360 85,480
% licensed in occupation 50.2 49.2 49.8 49.5 49.5 47.2
Change in employment (%)
Unlicensed states −5.3 37.6 −5.2
Licensed states −9.2 35.9 −13.7
SOURCE: 1990 and 2000 censuses, regulatory status in 2000.
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decline was 5.2 percent in the unlicensed states and 13.7 percent in the 
licensed states. However, for respiratory therapists, an occupation that 
experienced rapid growth in employment, the differences in the growth 
rates between regulated and unregulated states was only 1.7 percentage 
points. 
In order to provide additional statistical rigor to the analysis, I es-
timated a difference-in-difference regression analysis of the impact of 
licensing on the employment change within occupations that have an 
approximately even division between licensed and unlicensed practi-
tioners based on the estimates in Table 7.1. The approach combines the 
three partially regulated occupations (librarians, respiratory therapists, 
and dietitians and nutritionists) from 1990 to 2000 and compares the 
percent employment change with both fully licensed occupations (law-
yers, dentists, and cosmetologists) and unlicensed occupations (econo-
mists, computer programmers, and glaziers). These occupations were 
selected based on availability of data in the 1990 and 2000 censuses 
and the inclusion of high and relatively lower levels of educational at-
tainment. The results are presented in Table 7.2. The difference-in-dif-
ference approach gives regression estimates and compares the percent 
employment growth due to licensing occupations in some states and 
not others with the growth rates of both fully licensed occupations and 
unlicensed ones for each state. The overall impact across all the occu-
pations in the sample of regulated, unregulated, and partially regulated 
occupations shows that licensing reduces the percentage growth rate by 
a	statistically	significant	20	percent	over	the	1990	to	2000	period.	One	
interpretation of this result is that an occupation that was licensed and 
grew at a 10 percent rate from 1990 to 2000 would have grown at a 12 
percent rate without regulation. These estimates indicate that this form 
of regulation serves as a barrier to employment growth within an occu-
pation rather than enhancing the perceived quality that generates more 
demand for the services within the occupation, which may in turn lead 
to gains in wages, as shown in Chapter 4.
The basic means presented in Table 7.1 show that, for those oc-
cupations where there is a decline in the demand for their services 
and employment is in decline, licensing barriers may serve to further 
discourage new entrants into the occupation. The commonly viewed 
barriers to entry (e.g., additional years of schooling, licensing exams, 
and residency requirements) can serve to further discourage individuals 
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from choosing to enter an occupation in a state. Conversely, when an 
occupation is growing and there are higher expected returns in the form 
of higher pay and job security, then the licensing barriers appear to be 
a lesser constraint. For persons who are considering entering an occu-
pation,	these	licensing	barriers	may	be	perceived	as	a	fixed	cost	to	be	
overcome by meeting the initial barriers. As occupations are growing, 
trade schools and universities also expand their educational programs 
to accommodate the growing demand for individuals in the occupation, 
and they are likely willing participants in the drive to regulate occupa-
tions as long as there are formal education requirements. Nevertheless, 
licensing seems to dampen employment growth as well as accelerate 
decline in employment in regulated states.
MAjOR FInDIngS 
In	this	book,	I	have	identified	how	occupational	regulation	impacts	
both the quality provided to consumers and the major labor market ef-
fects of this institution. Licensing usually emerges from occupational 
associations, like the American Bar Association, when they have the 
political clout and the organizational skills to lobby a state legislature 
and present a strong enough case for regulation. In general, this has 
been the trend for occupations seeking to become regulated. Occupa-
Table 7.2  Difference-in-Difference Estimate of the Impact of Licensing 
on Percent Employment Change for Partially Licensed 
Occupations, 1990–2000
Licensed state (percentage growth rate) −0.20	 
   (0.07)
State controls  Yes
All nine occupation controls  Yes
R2  0.34
Number of state level observations  450
NOTE: Partially licensed occupations included are librarians, respiratory therapists, and 
dietitians and nutritionists. Controls included percent employment changes for uni-
versally licensed occupations: lawyers, dentists, and cosmetologists, and unlicensed 
occupations: economists, sociologists, and glaziers. Standard error is in parentheses.
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tional licensing started to expand in the United States during the 1880s 
and then accelerated during the twentieth century. Following World War 
II, there was strong growth in the number of occupations that became li-
censed, but that growth has diminished as legislatures are requiring new 
occupations	to	present	stronger	cases	on	how	licensing	versus	certifica-
tion or registration of the occupation can protect the public from poor 
or	substandard	services.	Legislatures	are	also	requiring	justification	of	
the potential impact of regulation on the number of practitioners. Nev-
ertheless, the occupations that have recently become regulated, such as 
crane	operators	in	Minnesota,	are	not	necessarily	ones	that	will	benefit	
the public through greater public safety. 
Table	7.3	provides	the	key	findings	of	this	book	in	a	summary	for-
mat. A key theoretical issue is that licensing can initially provide bene-
fits	to	a	profession	and	consumers	through	standardization	of	the	service	
by increasing the likelihood that the individuals delivering the service 
meet certain standards. Consequently, through their elected representa-
tives, consumers have determined that licensing provides the highest 
standard to ensure that “charlatans, incompetents or frauds” will not be 
allowed to provide the service. The result is that other lower-quality and 
lower-priced services are precluded from the market.
A key numerical value provided in this book is the basic estimate of 
the percentage of the workforce that is covered by licensing laws. About 
20 percent of the workforce is covered by licensing laws in the United 
States. However, this value understates the actual value because the 
estimate only includes occupations listed by the Department of Labor 
and the U.S. Census Bureau. Many states have their own occupational 
titles that were not included in the general listing. Further, it fails to 
include city and county licenses, which impact workers in the construc-
tion	trades	and	the	public	safety	and	health	fields.	Nevertheless,	these	
estimates do give a consistent measure of licensing when comparing 
licensing coverage across states and over time. 
Using generally available sources on complaints to regulatory 
boards, malpractice insurance rates, and other direct quality measures, 
I	find	that	 there	is	no	clear	 impact	of	 licensing	on	overall	quality,	al-
though there is some evidence that tougher licensing requirements may 
benefit	individuals	who	have	lower	point-of-sale	prices	through	insur-
ance or greater access to the service. In contrast, there appears to be a 
positive impact for those persons working in a regulated occupation. 
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Table 7.3  Major Findings of the Impact of Occupational Licensing on the 
Enhancement of Quality and the Restriction of Competition
Issue Key	findings
Estimate of percent of 
workforce covered by 
licensing
Department of Labor and U.S. Census Bureau data 
indicate the percent of workforce covered by licensing 
is approximately 20 percent, a growth of 11 percent over 
the past 15 years.
Hypothesized	benefits	 
of licensing
Increased standardization of services and reduction in 
the perceived “loss aversion” by consumers due to poor 
quality service.
Evidence	of	the	benefits	 
of licensing
Some evidence that the insured and higher-income 
individuals gain from stricter licensing, but no 
measurable impact on overall quality.
Price and wage effects  
of licensing
Licensing drives up prices, and the overall wage effect 
relative to unlicensed occupations in cross-section data 
is 10 to 12 percent, but impacts differ widely based on 
methods, occupations, and toughness of restrictions.
Licensing and 
employment growth
Within an occupation, the employment growth rate is 
approximately 20 percent higher in states that do not 
require licensing, but impacts differ widely based on  
the methods and occupations.
State variations in 
licensing
Much variation in the number of occupations licensed 
by states and the percent of the workforce covered by 
licensing laws. Case studies show political spending by 
the occupational associations to be an important factor 
for who gets regulated. 
Redistribution and lost 
output due to licensing
Estimated redistribution effects to regulated occupations 
of between $116 billion and $139 billion in 2000 dollars 
and lost output of $34.8 billion and $41.7 billion per 
year, which is less than 0.1 percent of total consumption 
expenditures.
U.S. and EU comparisons Both the economies regulate entry, but there is often no 
exam beyond university or trade school to obtain a license 
for many of the professions in the EU. EU nations regulate 
prices charged and the organizational structure of the 
professions to a greater extent than in the United States. 
Wage effects for licensing are around 1 percent using 
cross-section estimates, but the impacts vary widely based 
on methods, occupations, and toughness of restrictions.
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For example, switching to a licensed occupation from an unregulated 
one raises wages by 17 percentage points in comparison to switching 
to an unregulated occupation from a regulated one. Working in a regu-
lated occupation raises hourly wages to about 10 to 12 percent relative 
to similar unregulated occupations. This value is at the lower end of the 
range of the union wage premium in the United States. Working in the 
same occupation, but in a state that does not require licensing, raises 
hourly wages by 4 percent relative to an unregulated state. However, 
working in a state with tougher licensing requirements than other states 
within	the	same	occupation	appears	to	offer	no	statistically	significant	
wage premium for the occupations that were examined. Since there was 
no	finding	of	overall	benefits,	but	there	were	increased	costs	of	licens-
ing, the impact of licensing on the redistribution of earnings toward 
regulated occupations is approximately $116 billion and $139 billion in 
2000 dollars, and lost output is between $34.8 billion and $41.7 billion 
per year. However, this is less than 0.1 percent of total consumption 
expenditures annually. This may help explain why occupations are suc-
cessful in lobbying for regulation but see little public opposition.
Table	7.3	also	provides	summary	findings	of	the	impact	of	licensing	
in the UK, France, and Germany with comparisons to the United States. 
The results show that licensing has a smaller impact in the EU than in 
the United States. A comparison of licensed occupations with similar 
unlicensed ones shows that the greater the regulation of the occupations 
in the three EU countries, the lower the wage gap between regulated 
and unregulated purveyors of the service. Using a large number of oc-
cupations	for	the	analysis	in	the	EU,	I	find	that	there	is	a	1	percent	wage	
gap between licensed and unlicensed occupations. In Europe, unlike 
the United States, there are many more constraints on prices charged 
as well as in the organizational structure of licensed occupations. In the 
UK this results in complaints over the wait time to get medical atten-
tion, whereas the complaints in the United States are over the prices of 
health care services. However, nations such as Germany are deregulat-
ing many of their previously licensed occupations, suggesting that the 
regulation of occupations can be reversed (Miller 2004). 
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PUBLIC POLICy IMPLICATIOnS 
globalization and Licensing
One of the immediate implications of different licensing laws in 
the United States and Europe is the impact of the globalization of labor 
markets. Trade agreements like the North American Free Trade Agree-
ment (NAFTA) and the international General Agreement on Trade in 
Services (GATS) often have labor side agreements which call for the 
free mobility of labor across boundaries. Since most licensing laws in 
the United States are focused at the state level, international agreements 
can be voided or at least contested through state licensing laws. On the 
other side of the Atlantic, the nations in the EU have national laws that 
provide legal mobility across countries for most occupations, except at-
torneys. With EU expansion, member states have instituted temporary 
regulations to address mobility for regulated occupations to and from 
the 10 additional member states (Cyprus, the Czech Republic, Estonia, 
Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Poland, Slovakia, and Slovenia) that 
joined the EU on May 1, 2004. Given the generally lower mobility in 
the EU, as well as the language barriers to moving across countries, hav-
ing relaxed licensing standards across countries is not the same threat 
to reduced competition among regulated services that it is in the United 
States.	As	barriers	to	trade	and	financial	exchanges	are	reduced	through	
regional and international trade agreements, it is not surprising to also 
have stated policies that focus on reducing barriers to services among 
more-developed nations. If this is the case, then the United States will 
need to modify its state-focused licensing regime to provide greater 
consistency with the national policies for the regulation of service pro-
viders in other Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Develop-
ment (OECD) nations as well as for less-developed nations.
One example of an occupation that has much at stake in internation-
al agreements is accounting, which has been a lead occupation in the 
GATS negotiations to reduce barriers to trade in professional services 
(White	1999).	Many	argue	that	the	only	real	benefit	to	being	a	Certified	
Public Accountant (CPA) is that the charter allows a CPA to sign an au-
dit opinion. Nevertheless, as large business enterprises generally have 
become more international, their need for more international account-
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ing services has grown. Despite the considerable international presence 
of	the	major	accounting	firms,	virtually	all	countries	maintain	various	
types	of	restrictions	that	impede	the	flow	of	accounting	services	across	
borders. The consequences have been higher costs, poorer service to 
clients,	and	reduced	efficiency,	as	well	as	lower-quality	accounting	and	
auditing standards in many countries (White 1999). 
Policy Alternatives to Occupational Licensing
A common refrain heard from the public upon the discussion of 
policy alternatives to licensing is, “I would never go to an unlicensed 
 . . . ” Licensing has evolved as the preferred option to deal with issues 
of the quality of service rendered by individuals in the occupations. 
From the public’s perspective, this means having the toughest form of 
regulation to protect against individuals who are potentially incompe-
tent	to	perform	specific	tasks.	If	consumers	have	a	high	level	of	“loss	
aversion” relative to potential gains, then having a policy such as li-
censing may be optimal to avoid negative outcomes. On the other hand, 
weaker forms of regulation may provide consumers with many of the 
benefits	of	licensing,	such	as	confidence	that	the	provider	of	the	service	
has met minimal levels of education and skill to perform the task, but 
with fewer of the restrictions on competition associated with licensing. 
One	such	policy	option	is	certification.	It	is	now	the	second	largest	
form of regulation in the United States, with more than 200 occupations 
being	certified	by	at	least	one	state	agency	(Brinegar	and	Schmitt	1992;	
Smith-Peters and Smith-Peters 1994). As detailed in Chapter 2, cer-
tification	grants	title	(occupational	right-to-title)	protection	to	persons	
meeting	predetermined	standards.	Those	without	certification	may	per-
form the duties of the occupation but may not use the title. This process 
maintains the incentives for individuals to invest in human capital but 
allows substitutes if consumers of the service perceive the prices rising 
relative to what consumers want. Another even less restrictive form of 
regulation	is	registration,	which	usually	requires	individuals	to	file	their	
names,	addresses,	and	qualifications	with	a	government	agency	before	
practicing in the occupation. This form of regulation may include post-
ing	a	bond	or	filing	a	fee	with	a	state	agency.	Also,	for	occupations	with	
clear	employer	oversight	and	control,	such	as	loan	officers,	many	oc-
cupations could move from being regulated to being unregulated.
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One	of	 the	benefits	of	certification	 is	 that	 it	 allows	consumers	 to	
choose whether to go to a practitioner who has the appropriate quali-
fications	to	call	themselves	a	practitioner	in	a	particular	field.	In	addi-
tion, it provides a monitor, the government, to police the individuals 
in the occupation who may not have the appropriate credentials to call 
themselves	 “certified.”	 Unlike	 licensing,	 work	 can	 be	 performed	 by	
individuals	who	do	not	meet	all	the	requirements	of	certification,	and	
uncertified	individuals	may	work	in	the	industry	without	penalty	from	
the state. This gives consumers greater choice, and if the limited case 
study evidence from Minnesota and Wisconsin can be generalized, this 
form	 of	 regulation	 provides	 similar	 quality	 benefits	 but	may	 help	 to	
keep prices of services lower than with the tighter barriers to entry and 
mobility imposed by licensing. For those purveyors of a service who 
receive repeat business, and where information is shared with potential 
customers,	licensing,	certification,	or	registration	may	be	unnecessary	
because the information about the service is widely available. Conse-
quently, these occupations are regulated by market forces. 
To	what	extent	does	either	certification	or	registration	provide	the	
protection against “loss aversion” that many consumers and politicians 
say licensing gives and which may be worth the costs of granting mo-
nopoly power to an occupation? In other words, consumers respond 
more to knowledge about bad services than good conditions, which 
suggests that they respond more to information that reduces their util-
ity than to information that increases it and is consistent with prospect 
theory (Kahneman and Tversky 1979). To illustrate, for an uninformed 
consumer that is considering brain surgery, licensing provides the guar-
antee	that	the	provider	of	a	service	has	at	least	finished	medical	school	
and taken a licensing exam. Nevertheless, a doctor who specializes in 
pediatrics, and had never performed major surgery, could legally per-
form	brain	surgery	under	most	state	licensing	laws.	Under	certification,	
anyone	who	is	not	a	certified	brain	surgeon	could	not	argue	that	they	
have completed the course and passed the appropriate exams and claim 
to	be	the	specialist.	If	they	claimed	to	be	certified	and	were	not,	they	
would face legal penalties determined by the state. They could, how-
ever, legally perform the operation with the patient’s consent. Under 
a	 regime	of	certification,	 the	consumer	of	 the	 service	could	have	 the	
surgery	completed	by	either	a	certified	brain	surgeon,	pediatrician,	or	a	
medical technician who has access to the latest technology on brain sur-
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gery. Information on all alternatives would be available to the consumer 
of the service, but medical insurance companies could put constraints on 
consumer decisions based on their knowledge of the procedure and le-
gal liability issues. A central policy question for occupational licensing 
is to what extent the government should protect the consumer against 
bad decisions.
A further example involves the construction business in Minnesota, 
where	crane	operators	are	licensed.	Construction	firms	that	need	a	crane	
operator	must	use	a	licensed	one	or	none	at	all.	Under	certification,	only	
properly	credentialed	individuals	could	call	themselves	certified	crane	
operators, and the state would be responsible for maintaining the list of 
individuals who have the appropriate skills and current knowledge for 
the job. However, the construction company would have the ultimate re-
sponsibility of assessing the appropriate level of skill required to do the 
job,	and	whether	to	choose	a	certified	operator	or	someone	with	lesser	
skills. This is analogous to construction companies choosing whether or 
not to hire a union worker on a construction project. The union worker 
usually has greater skills through the attendance at union-sponsored 
training programs. Nevertheless, the construction company may choose 
to go with a nonunion worker, who has lesser skills but may work for 
substantially less money. The likelihood that a construction company 
would have the resources to search for the kind of skills required to 
perform the position is high. Although the question of asymmetric in-
formation is important and relevant for individuals who may not have 
access to the kinds of skills required to do a job, organizations like 
hospitals,	schools,	and	construction	firms	are	likely	to	be	able	to	gather	
the kind of information to make economically rational decisions about 
the	type	of	labor	they	require.	Finally,	under	a	regime	of	certification,	
individuals who misrepresented their education or skills still would be 
subject to legal penalties under fraud statutes. Yet, the consumer would 
have greater freedom to choose the appropriate level of skills needed to 
perform	the	task.	Legal	constraints	on	dental	offices,	such	as	mandating	
that dentists be on site for a dental cleaning or having dental assistants 
perform different work than hygienists, would not be required by law.
Organizations	such	as	universities	can	use	certification	rather	than	
licensing in their hiring decisions, unlike public schools. This gives 
universities the option of hiring non-PhDs, which is the general educa-
tional entry requirement for positions such as faculty or administrators. 
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Professional schools, such as business schools or schools of public pol-
icy, have the ability to hire individuals without the generally accepted 
qualifications	because	university	professors	are	not	 licensed.2 In con-
trast, public schools, which require licensing for all teachers and most 
administrators,	 do	 not	 allow	 for	 the	 flexibility	 of	 having	 unlicensed	
“professionals.” 
If	certification	provides	more	choices	than	licensing	for	consumers,	
then	why	not	provide	just	a	list	of	qualified	applicants	through	regis-
tration, which is the most lenient form of regulation? Although regis-
tration provides the greatest number of choices, it gives only minimal 
protection for consumers of services where incompetence may lead to 
major	financial	or	health	losses.	A	list	of	practitioners	similar	to	those	
maintained by the Better Business Bureau provides some protection but 
has little enforcement powers beyond moral suasion. A central monitor-
ing authority like the state, which screens potential applicants, provides 
greater assurance about the abilities of the individual. Without enforce-
able costs to violators for “title protection,” little quality assurance 
could be provided to the public on this listing of practitioners. The cost 
of being removed from the list of registered practitioners without the 
additional legal penalties for having “inappropriate skills” or for incom-
petence	may	lead	to	insufficient	consumer	knowledge	of	the	quality	of	
the skill for important services. Without the legal costs inposed by “title 
infringement,” there would be little economic incentives for honesty 
among service providers. Furthermore, registration may not provide 
sufficient	protection	 for	providers	of	 the	occupation	 to	undertake	 the	
investments	that	are	required	to	advance	the	field.	If	low-quality	practi-
tioners can claim to have the skills and expertise to perform a task, then 
optimal investments in human capital acquisition may not take place. 
Unlike	registration,	certification	allows	consumers	to	select	only	those	
persons	who	have	met	the	“certification	requirements”	established	by	
the profession or any other services, and it allows for the purchase of 
lower-quality service but without the “brand.” The market-based alter-
native	under	certification	can	serve	as	an	incentive	for	the	professions	to	
keep	barriers	to	entry	minimal,	but	meet	quality	standards.	Certification	
also allows the members of the occupation input into setting entry re-
quirements and continuing education but with the discipline established 
by the service market.
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Recently the solar power industry debated whether to seek licensure 
or	certification	 for	 the	purveyors	of	 its	engineering	services	 for	solar	
powered energy. The report for the industry came to the following con-
clusion:  
The evidence leads to the conclusion that voluntary national cer-
tification	 for	 practitioners	 represents	 the	 most	 beneficial	 option	
for the solar industry. Of the various regulatory options, only cer-
tification	 maintains	 freedom	 of	 choice	 for	 both	 consumers	 and	
practitioners and has the potential to provide the same quality of 
installation	 benefits	 as	 state-by-state	 licensure	without	 imposing	
the restrictions and higher costs inherent in mandatory licensure 
(Parker, Bower, and Weissman 2002).
With the recent research on the institution of occupational regula-
tion, policymakers would do well to reconsider the toughest form of 
regulation that creates monopolies. At the other end of the continuum, 
just	providing	a	list	of	potentially	qualified	individuals	with	no	ratings	
of their skill level (registration) does not provide enough information 
to consumers from a perceived impartial monitoring source like the 
government.	The	middle-ground	of	certification	gives	consumers	more	
information about the training and skill of the practitioner and encour-
ages	individuals	to	seek	greater	investment	in	occupation-specific	hu-
man capital. Moreover, it gives the consumer the ability to choose the 
appropriate level of expertise they require for the task, and it avoids the 
issue	of	finding	 the	proper	venue	 for	one	occupation	over	another	 in	
performing a task. As in the story of Goldilocks and the Three Bears, 
where	the	first	one	was	too	hot,	the	second	too	cold,	and	the	third	one	
was	 just	 right,	certification	may	provide	 the	optimal	policy	choice	of	
regulation of occupations.
Nevertheless, if occupational licensing is the choice of the public as 
the optimal way of regulating the workforce, what are the methods to 
ensure that the occupations are less likely to show the monopoly face 
of regulation? Shimberg (1982) developed several guides both for the 
public and for legislators on minimizing the monopoly effects of licens-
ing. He initially proposed many of the questions presented in Appendix 
A that are now central for any occupation seeking regulation in Minne-
sota and many other states. However, many of his recommendations on 
publicizing the complaint rates to licensing boards and the disposition 
of the complaints to include whether individuals lose their license form 
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a low-cost method of informing the public of the effectiveness of this 
institution. Moreover, Shimberg’s conclusion that licensing has “more 
bark	than	bite”	is	consistent	with	several	of	the	findings	in	this	book.	
Just as public universities have only public members on their boards 
of directors and generally no faculty to oversee the activities of the 
enterprise, it is important that licensing boards have public members 
nominated who have been given wide publicity as to their potential ap-
pointment so that they are open to “blogger” scrutiny. This would allow 
interested parties to comment on their suitability for board membership. 
Members of the profession would then advise the board regarding tech-
nical issues within the occupation (Broscheid and Teske 2003). Provid-
ing more public involvement, monitoring, and control of licensing may 
be	a	second	best	alternative	to	certification.	
Prospects for Further Research
Although the estimates in this book provide an empirical examina-
tion of occupational licensing, there is a greater need to track the growth 
of regulated and unregulated occupations. Much like the current data 
effort that is used to track union membership, similar data are needed 
to follow the growth of occupational licensing. Asking questions in 
monthly or yearly samples in the CPS and NLSY would enhance ana-
lysts’ abilities to track the labor market effects of government regula-
tion.
If one of the key issues for the public acceptance of licensing is its 
ability to avoid “loss aversion,” then experiments such as those in the 
development of prospect theory should be implemented. To what extent 
are consumers willing to pay for licensing if there is a perception that 
it reduces downside risks? How many consumers are unwilling to go 
to	an	unlicensed	practitioner	at	a	discounted	price?	If	certification	were	
a policy option, would there be a regulatory wage or quality premium? 
Evidence from experimental economics may be helpful in explaining 
the continuing growth of this labor market institution. 
At the international level, even though the data from the United 
States could use much improvement, the access to EU licensing data 
would greatly improve the ability of analysts to examine whether labor 
market regulation matters across international borders. The ability to 
have international trade in services the way goods are traded may have 
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similar	benefits	to	consumers.	Moreover,	can	occupations	move	from	
being regulated to unregulated in the United States similar to what has 
occurred in Germany (Miller 2004)?
For any of these changes to take place in public policy and data col-
lection and analysis, licensing has to appear on the radar screen of both 
academics and policymakers. Unlike unions, whose strike or lock-out 
activity engages local and national attention, policies passed by legisla-
tures on occupational licensing are back-burner issues. Until this form 
of labor market regulation is shown to have large effects on public ex-
penditures, private sector purchases, or a visible political champion in 
the policy arena, much of the data that are needed to further gauge and 
monitor this public policy issue will not be forthcoming, to the detriment 
of many practitioners, workers, consumers, and the public. 
notes
 1. A closed-shop labor agreement means that the employer can only hire employ-
ees who are members of the union. These agreements are illegal outside the 
construction industry under the Taft-Hartley amendments to the National Labor 
Relations Act, amended (1960).
 2. The Public Policy School at the University of Minnesota hired its dean in 2002 
without any graduate degrees and granted him full professor status with tenure. 
In contrast, the Minneapolis Public Schools made its superintendent, who had 
a PhD in education, take required education classes in Minnesota to become a 
fully licensed teacher/administrator in the state in order to remain in her position 
(Brandt 2005).
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Appendix A
Criteria for Regulating Occupations for 
Legislators and a Questionnaire for 
Occupations Seeking Regulation in Minnesota
Table A.1  A Report to be Completed by Legislators to Comply with 
Minnesota Statutes on the Criteria for Regulating Occupations 
1. What harm will result to the public or could be posed by unregulated 
practice of the occupation or by continued practice at its current degree 
of regulation?
2. Is there any reason why existing civil or criminal laws or procedures 
are inadequate to prevent or remedy any harm to the public?
3. Why is the proposed level of regulation being proposed and why, if 
there is a lesser degree of regulation, was it not selected?
4. List any associations, organizations, or other groups representing the 
occupation seeking regulation and the approximate numbers in each in 
Minnesota.
5. What are the functions typically performed by members of this occu-
pational group, and are they identical or similar to those performed by 
another occupational group or groups?
6. Is any specialization, training, education, or experience required to en-
gage in the occupation, and if so, how have current practitioners ac-
quired that training, education, and experience?
7. Would the proposed regulation change the way practitioners of the oc-
cupation acquire any necessary specialized training, education, or ex-
perience, and if so, why?
8. Do any current practitioners of the occupation in Minnesota lack what-
ever specialized training, education, or experience that might be re-
quired to engage in the occupation, and if so, how would the proposed 
regulation address that lack of training?
9. Would new entrants into the occupation be required to provide evi-
dence of any necessary training, education, or experience, or to pass an 
examination, or both?
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10. Would current practitioners be required to provide evidence of any nec-
essary training, education, or experience, or to pass an examination if 
the occupation became licensed, and if not, why not?
11. What is the expected impact of the proposed regulation on the supply 
of practitioners of the occupation and on the cost of services or goods 
provided by the occupation?
SOURCE: Broat et al. (2004).
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Table A.2  Questionnaire for Proponents of Licensing an Occupation  
in Minnesota
1. Describe the professional or occupational group proposed for regulation 
or expansion of regulation. Include the number of individuals or business 
entities that would be subject to regulation, the names and addresses of 
associations, organizations, and other groups representing practitioners. 
Estimate the number of practitioners in each group.
2. Describe the functions typically performed by members of the occupa-
tional group. Indicate the functions performed by this occupational group 
which are similar to those performed by other occupational groups.
3. What functions performed by the occupational group are unsupervised? 
What are typical work settings?
4. Describe	 any	 levels	 of	 practitioner	 specialization	 and	 qualifications	 for	
each.	Describe	the	minimum	qualifications	for	entry	into	the	occupation.	
Is there a state or national examination currently used for entry? Is the 
occupation	affiliated	with	an	association	which	enacts	and	enforces	stan-
dards? Explain the association’s enforcement mechanisms in instances of 
practitioner noncompliance with established standards. State why these ef-
forts are inadequate to protect the public.
5. Is there any state or local business, facility, or industry regulation that can 
protect consumers or clients?
6. Describe	and	document	the	physical,	emotional,	social,	or	financial	conse-
quences to the consumer that result from erroneous or incompetent care/
practice or omission of appropriate care/practice. Include a description of 
any	 complaints	 filed	with	 state	 law	 enforcement	 authorities,	 courts,	 de-
partmental agencies, or other associations that have been lodged against 
practitioners of the profession or occupation in Minnesota within the past 
five	years.
7. Describe which existing legal remedies are inadequate to prevent or re-
dress the kinds of harm that could result from nonregulation. How can 
regulation be provided through an existing state agency or in conjunction 
with presently regulated practitioners?
8. What is the expected impact of the proposed regulation on the existing 
supply of practitioners? What percentage of current practitioners will be 
able to meet the proposed eligibility criteria? If current practitioners will 
be “grandparented,” describe how long and under what conditions.
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9. Describe the extent to which regulation or expansion of regulation will 
increase the cost of goods or services provided by practitioners and the 
overall cost-effectiveness and economic impact of the proposed regula-
tion, including indirect costs to consumers. If applicable, does the profes-
sion	or	occupation	plan	to	apply	for	mandated	benefit	coverage?
SOURCE: Broat et al. (2004).
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Appendix B
Data Sources
The sources of much of the data used in this book are given along with the 
years of the surveys and their frequency. In addition, sample sizes for the data 
are presented along with the sources’ unique characteristics that make them 
useful for analyzing occupational regulation.
Data Used to Analyze Occupational Licensing in the United States
Census of the Population 
• Conducted by: U.S. Department of Commerce, U.S. Census Bureau as pro-
vided by the Minnesota Population Center (Integrated Public Use Microdata 
Series), University of Minnesota.
• Survey years: Every 10 years dating to the founding of the United States.
• Unit surveyed: Individuals by household.
• Number of units in survey: Between 5 and 100 percent of the population, 
depending on the question.
• Unique characteristics: Provides large samples of individuals’ labor force 
status (employed, wages, earnings), demographic characteristics, industry 
and occupation, national origin, and area of residence. 
Current Population Survey (CPS)
• Conducted by: U.S. Department of Commerce, U.S. Census Bureau for the 
U.S. Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics.
• Survey years: Monthly since 1943.
• Unit surveyed: Individuals 16 years or older by household.
• Number of units in survey: Approximately 120,000 individuals in 60,000 
households.
• Unique characteristics: Each CPS survey includes data on demographic 
characteristics, labor force status, industry, region, state, and occupation.
U.S. Department of Labor Listing of Licensed Occupations 
• Conducted by: U.S. Department of Labor in conjunction with state labor 
market information agencies.
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• Survey years: Various years including 2000.
• Units surveyed: State agencies responsible for occupational regulation. 
• Unique characteristics: Census of state licensed occupations in the United 
States as provided to the U.S. Department of Labor in 2000 and updated by 
state agencies responsible for labor market information and licensing oc-
cupations. 
Malpractice Insurance Premiums by State for various Occupations 
• Conducted by: Scott Cordes and Yinying Wang for the Center for Labor 
Policy at the University of Minnesota.
• Survey years: 2004–2005.
• Units surveyed: Insurance companies offering malpractice insurance in all 
50 states to pastoral counselors, marriage and family therapists and profes-
sional counselors for 2005, and occupational therapists and practical and 
vocational nurses for 2004. 
• Unique characteristics: Rates offered by insurance companies for various 
levels of coverage and policies by age and experience in regulated and un-
regulated occupations and states.
national Longitudinal Survey 
• Conducted by: The National Longitudinal Survey (NLS) is a survey spon-
sored by the Bureau of Labor Statistics, U.S. Department of Labor, and con-
ducted by the National Opinion Research Center (NORC) at the University 
of Chicago with assistance from the Center for Human Resource Research 
(CHRR)	at	The	Ohio	State	University.	The	field	work	is	done	by	the	U.S.	
Census Bureau.
• Survey years: Occasionally since 1965.
• Units surveyed: The current survey consists of a nationally representative 
sample of approximately 9,000 individuals and their housholds.  
• Unique characteristics: The NLS is a set of surveys designed to gather infor-
mation at multiple points in time on the labor market activities and other sig-
nificant	life	events	of	several	groups	of	men	and	women.	An	extensive	two-
part questionnaire was administered that listed and gathered demographic 
information on members of the household and on their immediate family 
members living elsewhere. Youths are interviewed on an annual or biannual 
basis. Questions are asked about current and former occupations for the year 
of the survey.
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Survey of Licensing Pass Rates
• Conducted by: The Center for Labor Policy, University of Minnesota, Mor-
ris Kleiner with Adrienne Howard and Hwikwon Ham.
• Survey years: Various years between 1980 and 2000.
• Units surveyed: State pass rates for dentists, lawyers, and cosmetologists in 
the 50 U.S. states.
• Unique characteristics: Various year state pass rates for selected occupa-
tions. Generally includes only new entrants and not individuals who are 
moving from another state. 
Survey of Licensing Statutes
• Conducted by: The Center for Labor Policy, University of Minnesota, Mor-
ris Kleiner with Adrienne Howard and Hwikwon Ham. 
• Survey years: Various years between 1980 and 2000.
• Units surveyed: State statutes for accountants, cosmetologists, dentists, law-
yers, and teachers in the 50 U.S. states.
• Unique characteristics: Statutory data and changes in laws on age, citizen-
ship, residency, good moral character, special education, graduate education 
requirements, experience, exam requirements, bachelor’s degree require-
ments, reciprocity requirements with other states or countries. 
Survey of new Air Force Recruits on their Dental Health
• Conducted by: U.S. Air Force personnel at Lowry Air Force Base near Den-
ver, Colorado, for the Center for Labor Policy, University of Minnesota, 
supervised by Morris Kleiner and Robert Kudrle.
• Survey year: 1992.
• Units surveyed: 464 new Air Force recruits from the 50 U.S. states.
• Unique characteristics: Complete information on Air Force recruits’ initial 
dental	exam	along	with	time	specific	demographic	and	economic	character-
istics of the new recruits and their households.
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Data Used to Analyze Occupational 
Licensing in the European Union
France
Labour Force Surveys (“Enquêtes Emploi”) 
• Conducted by: The National Institute for Statistics and Economic Studies 
(INSEE, Paris).
• Survey years: 1990–1997.
• Units surveyed: Household data, approximately 15,600 used for the analysis. 
• Unique characteristics: Data on demographic characteristics, labor force 
status, industry, region, metropolitan area, and occupation.
Germany
Acquisition and Application of Occupational Qualifications 1991/92 
(“Qualifikation und Berufsverlauf”)
• Conducted by: Bundesinstitut für Berufsbildung (BIBB), Berlin; Institut 
fuer Arbeitsmarkt- und Berufsforschung der Bundesanstalt für Arbeit, Nu-
ernberg.
• Survey years: 1991–1992.
• Units surveyed: 34,277 individuals.
• Unique characteristics: Detailed occupation characteristics linked to demo-
graphic and economic data in Germany.
United Kingdom
Labour Force Survey
•	 Conducted	by:	Social	and	Vital	Statistics	Division	of	the	Office	for	National	
Statistics (ONS) on behalf of the Statistical Outputs Group of the ONS.
• Survey years: Quarterly, annual, or biannual since 1979.
• Units surveyed: Data on 60,000 households.
• Unique characteristics: Data on demographic characteristics, labor force 
status, industry, region, metropolitan area, and occupation.
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Table C.1  Licensed Occupations and Comparable Unlicensed 
Occupations, by Census Code and name, 2000
Census number Occupation
80 Accountants and auditors
100 Computer systems analysts and scientists
120 Actuaries
28 Purchasing agents and buyers, farm products
29 Buyers, wholesale and retail trade, except farm products
33 Purchasing agents and buyers, n.e.c.
124 Miscellaneous mathematical science occupations
306 Physicians
172 Chemists and material science
161 Biological and life scientists
301 Dentists
331 Dental hygienists
230 Preschool and kindergarten teachers
231 Teachers, elementary school
220 Teachers, secondary school
233 Teachers, special education
282 Public relations specialists
176 Clergy
210 Lawyers
211 Judges
180 Economists
186 Miscellaneous social scientists, including sociologists
201 Social workers
450 Barbers
451 Hairdressers and cosmetologists
404 Bartenders
411 Waiters and waitresses
423 Maids and housemen
62 Human resources, training, and labor relations specialists
Appendix C
Occupations Analyzed in the United States 
Using Multivariate Techniques
Kleiner.indb   167 1/9/2006   2:44:47 PM
168   Kleiner
Census number Occupation
325 Veterinarians
304 Optometrists
312 Podiatrists
313 Registered nurses
305 Pharmacists
243 Librarians
350 Licensed practical and licensed vocational nurses
Table C.1  (continued)
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